Discipline and Reason

The Theory of Discipline in Kant's Practical Philosophy

Dissertation zur Erlangung des Grades einer Doktorin der Philosophie (Dr. phil.),

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I would like to dedicate this thesis to all those who, directly or indirectly, have been a part of my journey in its preparation and realisation.

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> "Não se assuste pessoa se eu lhe disser que a vida é boa [...] E só tô beijando o rosto de quem dá valor pra quem vale mais o gosto do que cem mil réis. Antes de você ser eu sou eu sou, eu sou, eu sou o amor da cabeça aos pés. Eu sou, eu sou, eu sou o amor da cabeça aos pés"
>
> (Composição: Moraes Moreira / Luiz Galvão)

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ABSTRACT

The main objective of this thesis is to reconstruct the theory of discipline within Kant's philosophical system and to analyse its relationship with the concept of autonomy. In contemporary philosophical discourse, the concept of discipline is regarded as a pivotal parameter for the analysis of subjectivity. Nevertheless, numerous philosophers regard the notion of discipline as a source of concern, on the grounds that it impedes the practice of autonomy. In order to demonstrate the compatibility and interrelatedness of discipline and autonomy, the initial chapter proposes an examination of two perspectives that diverge from Kant's, namely those of Hannah Arendt and Michel Foucault. The significance of this initial exploratory phase lies in its focus on the practical-political dimension of the thesis. To examine the relationship between autonomy and discipline, two conceptual frameworks are presented that illustrate instances of disciplinary abuse and its incompatibility with autonomy. The second chapter presents the concept of discipline as found in Kant's philosophy. It aims to reconstruct the theory of discipline and demonstrate its categorisation and functions. In particular, it examines the types of disciplines (theoretical, practical and pragmatic) and their action (internal and external) on the agent. The third chapter has two principal aims: (i) to demonstrate the implementation of Kant's theory of discipline in his practical philosophy, encompassing its various domains (anthropological, moral, political, pedagogical and legal); and (ii) to evaluate the perspectives on discipline presented in this thesis, illustrating how Kant's theory of discipline can address the concerns raised by Arendt and Foucault in their accounts of disciplinary power and absolute obedience. In other words, it compares and demonstrates the importance of the theory of discipline for Kant's normative theory, not only within its own system, but also as a consistent alternative to the problems that plague contemporary democracies.

Keywords: Discipline. Autonomy. Morality. Moral Character. Progress.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AA Akademie Ausgabe

Anth Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht (AA 07)

GMS Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (AA 04)

IaG Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht (AA 08)

KpV Kritik der praktischen Vernunft (AA 05)

KrV Kritik der reinen Vernunft (quoted according to the A/B editions)

KU Kritik der Urteilskraft (AA 05)

MAM Muthmaßlicher Anfang der Menschengeschichte (AA 08)

MS Die Metaphysik der Sitten (AA 06)

RL Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre (AA 06)

TL Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Tugendlehre (AA 06)

OP Opus Postumum (AA 21 u. 22)

Päd Pädagogik (AA 09)

RGV Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft (AA 06)

Refl Reflexion (AA 14-19)

Reflexionen zur Metaphysik (AA 18)

SF Der Streit der Fakultäten (AA 07)

TP Über den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht für die Praxis (AA 08)

V-Anth/Fried Vorlesungen Wintersemester 1775/1776 Friedländer (AA 25)

V-Mo/Collins Moralphilosophie Collins (AA 27)

V-MS/Vigil Die Metaphysik der Sitten Vigilantius (AA 27)

WA Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung? (AA 08)

WDO Was heißt sich im Denken orientiren? (AA 08)

ZeF Zum ewigen Frieden (AA 08)

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INTRODUTION

As Krieken (1990) asserts, the concept of "discipline" is of paramount importance in the analysis of the history of Western subjectivity. In particular, critical social theory, particularly at the beginning of the 19th century, analyzed and developed a perspective on this concept that continues to the present day. When considering the transition from modernity to contemporaneity, it becomes evident that a unifying characteristic can be identified in the history of ideas. This characteristic is the subject acting in accordance with a discipline imposed by the state, by others, and by themselves. As Krieken (1990) notes, the history of Western societies "is seen to be characterised by an increasing objectification and disciplining of subjectivity, an ever-intensifying ordering of the soul, which, coupled with increasing individualization, seems to have turned us moderns into thoroughly self-controlled […]".[1]

The topic of discipline has emerged as a central concern within the field of critical theory, with notable contributions from Karl Marx (1954), Georg Simmel (1964), Max Weber (1978)[2], and other prominent figures associated with the Frankfurt School. The concept of discipline is related to a number of other notions, including work, ascetic Protestantism, and modern capitalism. In particular, modern capitalism has generated a distinctive form of discipline that is in accordance with the individual's psychological constitution. The concept of self-discipline is regarded as a fundamental aspect of any liberal democracy. This is because it encompasses both self-control and social control. This form of social control is achieved through the use of coercive means to shape social agents, the regulation of bodies, and the bureaucratization of subjectivities.[3]

In recent years, there has been a tendency to define and present the concept of discipline as problematic and therefore unacceptable. This doctoral dissertation aims to redefine this definition and performance of the concept of discipline. Consequently, it claims that Immanuel Kant's philosophy offers the potential for developing a theory of discipline that can be formulated, defined, and implemented in a manner distinct from that analyzed by social theory. It is crucial to acknowledge that this thesis does not endeavor to re-analyze history and the

[1] (Krieken, 1990, p.353).
[2] On the relationship between discipline and rationality, John O'Neill argues that the disciplinary society analyzed by Foucault is also seen as an extension of Weber's concept of rational-legal discipline. For more on this perspective, see O'Neill (1986).
[3] For more details and references on the concept of discipline and the sociological debate in recent years see Krieken (1990).

process of civilization through Kant's concept of discipline. In this regard, we agree with the analyses presented by the majority of critical theorists. The primary objective is to defend the concept of discipline as a necessary component of a normative philosophy. This entails supporting that the concept of discipline, when subordinated to Kant's morality, can be beneficial for both the subject and society.

In the context of the ongoing debate surrounding the concept of discipline, there exists a vast range of philosophical perspectives and positions that could have been selected for engagement with Kant. However, in order to emphasize the practical-political dimension of the theory of discipline, we have chosen to engage with the work of Hannah Arendt and Michel Foucault. In light of the aforementioned, it is my intention to provide a clarification as follows:

(i) The objective is not to directly confront the positions of Kant with those of Arendt and Foucault. Rather, the aim is to demonstrate the divergent outcomes that the concept of discipline can have when its abuse replaces its proper use. Additionally, this endeavor aims to address the critiques leveled by theorists and philosophers against the concept of discipline. While these critiques are often valid, they are often generalized and fragmented, suggesting a tendency to eliminate discipline from theoretical frameworks while conflating the concept's proper function with its misuse. We concur that the misapplication of the concept of discipline can give rise to the emergence of social issues. The objective is thus to analyze whether the concept of discipline itself or merely its misuse is inherently evil. (a) The presentation of Arendt's and Foucault's perspectives is intended to illustrate how these accounts of the misuse of discipline are valid to a certain extent. (b) Considering the fact that despite their historical reputation as critics of this concept and its developments, even Arendt and Foucault are able to accept it in their theories, the question arises as to whether Foucault and Arendt are, in fact, critics of the concept of discipline or merely of its institutional misuse. Does the fact that Foucault advocated self-discipline based on the care of oneself provide sufficient evidence to conclude that he was in favor of adequate and non-abusive state and external discipline?

(ii) Although there is no direct debate between Foucault, Arendt, and Kant on the concept of discipline, there is an explicit dialogue between the theories of Foucault and Kant and Arendt and Kant on issues that permeate the concept of discipline. Mentions of Kant by both philosophers are recurrent, both in philosophical texts and

in interviews. Both are considered by many interpreters to be part of the Kantian tradition. Moreover, although the concept of discipline is limited to certain uses, its implications for Kant's normative theory and his theory of moralization are diverse. In the practical-political sphere, these implications are both disputed and congruent with the perspectives of Foucault and Arendt, as one can observe in the examples of (a) the dispute between Foucault and Kant over the legitimacy of coercion, and the dispute between Arendt and Kant over the concept of obedience and of (b) the relationship between Arendt and Kant in terms of alignment of thought, judgment, and their relationship to the world, and, additionally, of (c) the alignment between the idea of self-discipline in Kant and care for oneself in Foucault. This analysis demonstrates that, with regard to (a), there is a distinction between legitimate and illegitimate forms of coercion that Foucault's theory is unable to discern. However, Kant's theory allows for this distinction to be made. With regard to (b), it can be observed that Kant's theory allows for the distinction between moral and political judgments. The discipline of reason is necessary for maintaining coherence in the world. This coherence allows for the dissent that arises from social pluralities and diversity to be handled effectively in the public sphere. It also enables the equal exercise of freedom and the coexistence of diverse world conceptions without one annulling or annihilating the other.

Ultimately, the intention of the thesis is less a confrontation than an exchange between divergences and convergences of the problems raised, and the solutions proposed between the three philosophers. In the initial chapter, the objective is to present Foucault's and Arendt's accounts, demonstrating the detrimental effects of disciplinary abuse while also illustrating that even for Foucault and Arendt the nature of discipline is multifaceted, as for example when Foucault discusses the care of the self. In general, safeguarding the particularities of each perspective, discipline is perceived as an alienating force that can render bodies docile and subjugate the individual. Furthermore, it is associated with blind obedience that can impede the ability to think independently and to judge. Although Foucault and Arendt did not explicitly accuse or criticize Kant's concept of discipline, it is necessary to engage in a dialogue in order to demonstrate the potential harm and oppression resulting from the misuse of discipline, both on the individual and societal level. It is similarly important to argue that discipline does not inherently equate to domination or blind obedience.

Consequently, in order to investigate how the reconciliation between the concepts of discipline and autonomy is founded in Kant's theory of discipline, the second chapter presents a distinct concept of discipline that differs from contemporary understandings. The chapter seeks to identify and analyze Kant's work, with the aim of developing a theory of discipline that can emancipate the individual, enabling them to emerge from their minority status, and thus become a means of achieving morality. In order to achieve this objective, we will examine the concept of Kantian discipline, categorizing its variations, in order to explore, for example, its correlation with maxims and habit formation. This will enable us to map out the different types of disciplines and their respective roles in Kant's system. It is evident that their actions can manifest themselves in both internal and external contexts. When internal, it is referred to as self-discipline, while when external, it is designated as external discipline. Consequently, there are two distinct types of discipline: theoretical and practical. Practical discipline, in turn, is subdivided into moral and pragmatic disciplines. Given the sensitive and rational nature of the human mind, it is unlikely that disciplines will disappear over time. Indeed, human reason requires exercise, and therefore disciplines must be maintained through a permanent and continuous process of disciplining reason and inclinations.

In the third chapter, we present an argument about the uses of discipline in Kant's practical philosophy, including an analysis of its relationship with and the notion of progress. This chapter has two principal objectives. The first objective is to investigate and analyze the function of discipline in relation to various fundamental concepts in Kant's philosophy. These include an investigation into the relationship between discipline and virtue, its distinction in relation to moral conscience, its compatibility and necessity in relation to autonomy, and its function for the political sphere related to law and education. Secondly, the aim is to respond to the concerns of Foucault and Arendt regarding the use of discipline in the practical-political field from a perspective of discipline theory as presented by Kant. Furthermore, it seeks to demonstrate that, in contrast to the contemporary understanding of discipline as problematic and controversial, I will defend the view that discipline is an alternative to some of the problems that plague constitutional democracies. It will attempt to demonstrate that the utilization of discipline does not perpetuate oppression or inequalities. In fact, Kant's theory of discipline is compatible with the pursuit of individual and collective enlightenment, the concept of progress, and the moral development of human beings. It is crucial to highlight that this presentation of the theory of discipline as an alternative to the problem of social irrationality exemplifies a

resurgence of Kantian philosophy, which aims to examine, discuss, and suggest alternatives to the challenges that prevail in contemporary constitutional democracies.

In light of the hypothesis that a theory of discipline can be identified within Kant's philosophical system, an inquiry arises concerning the appropriate position for this theory within his system. Does it represent a moral theory or a type of theory of action? In general, moral theory is conceived as an explanation of how morality is justified and how it operates. A theory of moral action can be classified as a type of moralization project that seeks to understand how human beings, given their rational and sensitive condition, given their empirical conditions, their stages of development, among other aspects, can become moral agents in the world. In other words, it seeks to answer the following question: how does morality operate in this context? The question thus arises as to how a moral theory is implemented. In other words, what is the moralization project of Kant's moral theory? In light of the aforementioned distinctions and the assumption of a direct relationship between Kant's proposals, I will attempt to demonstrate that Kant's theory of discipline occupies has its place within the theory of moral action. This is to say that it is part of Kant's moralization project and it is systematized with various fields, including the cognitive, the ethical, the political, the social, the legal, and the pedagogical.

It is crucial to highlight that this thesis is predicated on two fundamental assumptions. (i) That Kant's moral theory encompasses the notion of individual and species moral development; and (ii) That Kant's philosophical system is methodologically compatible with degrees of abstraction and normativity that permit the argumentation on a purely normative level that is present in Kant's moral theory, and on a still normative level, but in a weaker sense that is found in the theory of moral action, namely the project of moralization, which is part of the scope of implementation of Kant's moral theory. The latter is comprised of multiple levels and is based on the theory of discipline.

An illustration of this hierarchical perspective in Kant's theory is the methodological debate on the metaethical, normative ethical, and applied ethical levels. When we inquire into the foundation or origin or source of Kantian morality, we are in the process of critiquing practical reason, in the metaethical realm. This is because practical laws are products of pure reason. On the other hand, conversely, when the focus is on the duties that arise from moral principles, or on the criteria for distinguishing right from wrong, just from unjust, we are in the domain of normative ethics. In this context, the categorical imperative functions as a universal principle. This is because, as beings with practical reason, we must not only exercise it, but also

construct justifications that are valid not only for us, but for all rational beings. This construction can be understood as an attempt to make objectively practical reason also subjectively practical. In turn, in the transition between normative ethics and applied ethics, certain intermediate elements facilitate the construction process. This process has critique as its source, practical teleology as its guide, enlightenment as its path, and autonomy as its endpoint.

The origin, formation, and application of these levels must always aim at or enable the moral person, seeking convergence between what is subjectively practical and what is objectively practical in order to provide a moral determination of the maxim. This suggest that Kantian philosophy is capable of varying degrees of abstraction and transitions between spheres (theoretical, practical, pragmatic, and applied) that render it increasingly relevant in contemporary contexts without compromising its normative and a priori rigor. Furthermore, it enables the appreciation of the significance of the intermediary elements and the process of construction, whereby being and ought to be converge. The ought to be is an inherent aspect of pure practical reason, which in turn is a fundamental aspect of humanity. In accordance with the Kantian conceptualization of the moral individual, the individual is capable of acting in accordance with principles. Adherence to these principles enables the realization in the world of the categorical imperative, or rather the essential ends of human reason. In order to realize oneself in the world, it is necessary to adhere to contexts with prudence, and one must acknowledge that there is no leap between ought to be and being; rather, there are constructive processes which are necessary for transitions between metaethics, ethics, and applied ethics. To comprehend these levels of argumentation and these degrees of abstraction is to recognize that the “dichotomy” is not only essential for the a priori, but also methodological.

By assuming this interpretative proposal, we demonstrate that there is a theoretical space within Kant's practical philosophy for a theory of discipline that does not replace moral motivation. Given that the theory of discipline is situated within the context of the implementation of Kant's moralization project, it does not conflict with the scope of the justification of his moral theory. At each argumentative level, a particular point of view is employed, and a specific type of methodology is utilized that converges, through criticism, towards the moral goal. Moreover, the theoretical discipline as critique is also embedded in this goal, not only because it is responsible for opening up safe paths for the practical use of reason, but also because the theory of the discipline itself presupposes a mutual communication between different fields for each function of the discipline. For example, from a meta-ethical perspective, discipline is necessary because the human being is a being who acts according to

representations and needs to exercise his reason. In the second moment of action, in the context of normative ethics, the human beings ought to endow themselves with the Moral Law and making reflexive use of self-discipline to follow it. In applied ethics, for example, in its moral practicability of acting according to duty, the discipline can help in the construction of a moral character through education and serve as an incentive for active behavior in the political sphere in order to implement or to get civil constitution increasingly closer to the idea of a just civil constitution. The fact that Kant's philosophy encompasses a multitude of levels of execution and application allows us to assert that discipline is necessary without detracting from the force of moral law.

1 ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON DISCIPLINE

The purpose of this chapter is to present two perspectives on discipline that differ from Kant's standpoint: the Foucauldian and Arendtian perspectives, in order to contribute to identify Kant's potential contribution to the current debates on discipline. Michel Foucault and Hannah Arendt are illustrative of philosophers who perceive social dynamics and military power as instruments of discipline that can pacify and dominate subjects. Yet, even if in this process there is the consent of the agent himself, there is an alienation of his own autonomy. Discipline is often used as a means of behavioral training for social agents, in an effort to gain control over various aspects of human life in schools, churches, institutions, and society. Coercive state power frequently employs this type of discipline for alienating purposes, as exemplified by the disciplinary society that Foucault discusses in *Discipline and Punish* (1975). Another form of discipline abuse is cited by Arendt in totalitarian regimes that manifest in the form of absolute obedience. These types of discipline undoubtedly result in a decline or loss of autonomy. However, it is important to note that it is a particular type of abusive use of discipline that undermines the concept of autonomy and that must be denounced, and not the entire notion of discipline itself.

1.1 DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE CONCEPTIONS OF MICHEL FOUCAULT AND KANT: IS DISCIPLINE NECESSARILY A TECHNIQUE OF POWER?

Among the anti-disciplinary perspectives, Michel Foucault's analysis stands out. In several of his texts, Foucault presented discipline as a technique of power that can be found in schools, families, hospitals and cities, in other words, as a technique that permeates society as a whole. In *Discipline and Punish* (1975), Foucault describes disciplinary societies formed by numerous historic processes that occur economically, legally, politically, and scientifically. According to him,

> Generally speaking, it might be said that the disciplines are techniques for assuring the ordering of human multiplicities. It is true that there is nothing exceptional or even characteristic in this: every system of power is presented with the same problem. But the peculiarity of the disciplines is that they try to define in relation to the multiplicities a tactics of power that fulfils three criteria: firstly, to obtain the exercise of power at the lowest possible cost (economically, by the low expenditure it involves;

> politically, by its discretion, its low exteriorization, its relative invisibility, the little resistance it arouses); secondly, to bring the effects of this social power to their maximum intensity and to extend them as far as possible, without either failure or interval; thirdly, to link this 'economic' growth of power with the output of the apparatuses (educational, military, industrial or medical) within which it is exercised; in short, to increase both the docility and the utility of all the elements of the system. This triple objective of the disciplines corresponds to a well-known historical conjuncture.[4]

Although present in the machinery of society, discipline cannot be classified as an institution, but rather as a form of power that includes a range of procedures, objectives, tools, and techniques.[5]

According to him, disciplinary power has two facets: one that excludes, represses, and censors, and another that produces. It generates dominating bodies and objects, while striving to remain unnoticed, yet obliging those subjected to it to be visible, as this exposure is what maintains the disciplined individual's subordination.[6] In *Microphysics of Power* (1978), when talking about sovereignty and discipline, Foucault presents discipline as

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[4] (Foucault, 1995, p.218).

[5] "'Discipline' may be identified neither with an institution nor with an apparatus; it is a type of power, a modality for its exercise, comprising a whole set of instruments, techniques, procedures, levels of application, targets; it is a 'physics' or an 'anatomy' of power, a technology. And it may be taken over either by 'specialized' institutions (the penitentiaries or 'houses of correction' of the nineteenth century), or by institutions that use it as an essential instrument for a particular end (schools, hospitals), or by pre-existing authorities that find in it a means of reinforcing or reorganizing their internal mechanisms of power (one day we should show how intra-familial relations, essentially in the parents-children cell, have become 'disciplined', absorbing since the classical age external schemata, first educational and military, then medical, psychiatric, psychological, which have made the family the privileged locus of emergence for the disciplinary question of the normal and the abnormal); or by apparatuses that have made discipline their principle of internal functioning (the disciplinarization of the administrative apparatus from the Napoleonic period), or finally by state apparatuses whose major, if not exclusive, function is to assure that discipline reigns over society as a whole (the police). On the whole, therefore, one can speak of the formation of a disciplinary society in this movement that stretches from the enclosed disciplines, a sort of social 'quarantine', to an indefinitely generalizable mechanism of 'panopticism'. Not because the disciplinary modality of power has replaced all the others; but because it has infiltrated the others, sometimes undermining them, but serving as an intermediary between them, linking them together, extending them and above all making it possible to bring the effects of power to the most minute and distant elements. It assures an infinitesimal distribution of the power relations" (Foucault, 1995, p.215-216).

[6] "The examination transformed the economy of visibility into the exercise of power. Traditionally, power was what was seen, what was shown and what was manifested and, paradoxically, found the principle of its force in the movement by which it deployed that force. Those on whom it was exercised could remain in the shade; they received light only from that portion of power that was conceded to them, or from the reflection of it that for a moment they carried. Disciplinary power, on the other hand, is exercised through its invisibility; at the same time it imposes on those whom it subjects a principle of compulsory visibility. In discipline, it is the subjects who have to be seen. Their visibility assures the hold of the power that is exercised over them. It is the fact of being constantly seen, of being able always to be seen, that maintains the disciplined individual in his subjection. And the examination is the technique by which power, instead of emitting the signs of its potency, instead of imposing its mark on its subjects, holds them in a mechanism of objectification. In this space of domination, disciplinary power manifests its potency, essentially, by arranging objects. The examination is, as it were, the ceremony of this objectification" (Foucault, 1995, p.187).

> […] a technique for exercising power that was not entirely invented, but elaborated in its fundamental principles during the 18th century [...] Discipline is the set of techniques by which systems of power target and result in individuals in their singularity. It is the power of individualization that has examination as its fundamental instrument. Examination is the permanent, classificatory surveillance that makes it possible to distribute individuals, judge them, measure them, locate them and, consequently, use them to the maximum.[7]

The discipline of disciplinary society serves as a tool for domination through the isolation, codification, and monitoring of individuals.[8] Its goal is to create pliant, obedient, and useful bodies, turning individuals into mere objects and instruments for its exercise.

Disciplinary coercion occurs within the boundaries of both sovereignty and the disciplinary mechanism. Even though discipline is utilized by the legal system, it also possesses its own discourse. "Disciplines carry a discourse that cannot be that of law; the discourse of discipline is alien to that of law and rule as the effect of sovereign will".[9] Disciplinary rules are not laws, but they are mechanisms of normalization. Prior to individuals becoming moral subjects or subjects of rights, they are subject to disciplinary power. In combating disciplinary power, Foucault proposes a new anti-disciplinary law as the way forward.[10]

The relationship between discipline and law has a complex history, particularly concerning the distinction between discipline and the legal system. During the Classical Age, for instance, the relationship between these two concepts was distant and filled gaps, i.e., discipline occupied an area that laws had left empty. According to Tadros (1998), Foucault's analysis of the modern law's development underscores four differences between disciplinary and legal power. They are referred to as: (i) discipline intensifies as well as represses; (ii) discipline homogenizes through activities; (iii) discipline acts in the production of subjects; and (iv) disciplinary power is ideally invisible in its application. Generally speaking, in the former, discipline functions by repressing actions and behavior to establish a repeated disciplinary

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[7] (Foucault, 1979, p. 61-62 – own translation).

[8] "Thus discipline produces subjected and practiced bodies, 'docile' bodies. Discipline increases the forces of the body (in economic terms of utility) and diminishes these same forces (in political terms of obedience). In short, it dissociates power from the body; on the one hand, it turns it into an 'aptitude', a 'capacity', which it seeks to increase; on the other hand, it reverses the course of the energy, the power that might result from it, and turns it into a relation of strict subjection. If economic exploitation separates the force and the product of labour, let us say that disciplinary coercion establishes in the body the constricting link between an increased aptitude and an increased domination" (Foucault, 1995, p. 138).

[9] (Foucault, 1979, p.106 – own translation).

[10] "I believe, however, that we have reached a kind of dead end: it is not by resorting to sovereignty against discipline that the effects of disciplinary power can be limited, because sovereignty and discipline, sovereign law and disciplinary mechanisms are two intrinsically constitutive parts of the general mechanisms of power in our society. In the fight against disciplinary power, it is not towards the old law of sovereignty that we must march, but towards a new law that is anti-disciplinary and, at the same time, freed from the principle of sovereignty" (Foucault, 1979, p. 107 – own translation).

action that leads to a behavioral norm, while legal power operates through interdiction. In the second, while legal power delimits two fields of activity, the field of what is permitted and the field of what is prohibited, disciplinary power in turn "prescribes a norm which one may hope to attain or a maximum which one may hope to achieve. There is no absolute difference between the space of the transgressive and the space of freedom for discipline. One does not transgress in discipline, one deviates or underachieves".[11] On the other hand, while it is challenging to gauge the impact of legal constructs on the subject, discipline directly influences the production of one's personal identity by imposing behavioral norms upon the individual, assigning them a unique status. And finally, in the fourth differentiation, legal power is openly exercised in society, whereas disciplinary power is applied invisibly. "The principle of Panopticism is to see without being seen; to exercise power through observation alone. By making the individual constantly observable to itself, discipline exercises power with the minimum of violence and is, as a result, more difficult to resist".[12] Therefore, disciplinary power and legal power coexist but operate differently. According to Tadros, governmentality is the concept that fits to the operational methods of disciplinary institutions and constitutes, along with them, what Foucault calls biopower. Consequently, in the second moment, i.e. in the 19th century, the connection between discipline, law, and governmentality strengthened. Power, from a legal perspective, is exercised over actions.

However, according to Tadros,

> once the governmental technology was put in place, the law began to be exercised in order to adjust the relationships between individuals qua individuals. The primary aim of law was no longer to prescribe general rules which defined a level of transgression, it was to intervene into the relationships between particular groups of people according to information carefully collected and analyzed in the form of the economy. […] The 'positive' role of law, in a Foucauldian account, takes its place amongst a more general technical apparatus of governmental control which intervenes into the lives of individuals and groups in response to knowledge collected about those lives. Whilst legal theory has remained focused on the legitimacy of legislating on certain acts (pornography, civil disobedience, homosexuality, prostitution, and so on) the way in which law operates has shifted to the regulation of the lives. The modern regulatory aspect of law, then, ought not to be understood merely as 'power-conferring' but should be seen as intervening in the social construction and government of the modern subject.[13]

[11] (Tadros, 1998, p.89).
[12] (Tadros, 1998, p.90).
[13] (Tadros, 1998, p.93).

Mass disciplines have changing control methods. Disciplinary mechanisms now encompass the entire social sphere. Disciplines have transcended institutional boundaries and permeated the community. Foucault's example of school surveillance and patient observation for community healthcare analysis illustrates this phenomenon. According to Tadros, there is a disciplinary process in this relocation. At school, for example, surveillance was mutual: on one hand, it is possible to observe parents by monitoring their children, making it acceptable to bring the investigation initiated at school to social service experts. On the other hand, parents could monitor the school's disciplinary actions.

In his analysis, Foucault cautions that external discipline was not the only form of control in Western societies, as self-discipline also became widespread.[14] He focused on three key questions: How did the human subject become a possible object of knowledge? What forms of rationality and historical conditions led to this? And ultimately, what were the consequences? Deacon (2002) asserts that Foucault's analysis explains the expansion and generalization of the ancient quest for self-mastery and self-knowledge within the modern state to encompass the entire population, which previously had been limited to an elite group. This widespread expansion was achieved through disciplinary techniques expressed in Western political rationalities.

Deacon argues that, "for Foucault, however, the most important changes between Greeks and Christians were not in the code but in the ethics, in one's relation to oneself".[15] Christian confessions required individuals to engage in self-examination focused on hidden thoughts and inner impurity, a type of thinking about thought that aimed to dismantle the self and involve complex hermeneutics in analyzing the origin of thoughts. Foucault suggests that the process of subjectivation of the Christian self was not guided by an ethic of bodily self-control, but by hermeneutic techniques aimed at discovering the presence of a diabolical other within the self.

According to Foucault,

[14] "During the 17th and 18th centuries, some of these practices, not least the pedagogical and ethical technology of self-formation which is the confession, fused together with more global processes of political centralization and population management into a complex system of relations which Foucault referred to as modern 'disciplinary' power. Via procedures of observation, normalization and examination, the Enlightenment bequeathed to modernity not only civil liberties, humanistic philosophies and scientific advances, but also the disciplinary mechanisms (represented in ideal form by the Panopticon) essential to the fabrication of the individuals upon which modern societies are premised" (Deacon, 2002, p.92).

[15] (Deacon, 2002, p.95).

> Many disciplinary methods had long been in existence – in monasteries, armies, workshops. But in the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the disciplines became general formulas of domination. They were different from slavery because they were not based on a relation of appropriation of bodies; indeed; the elegance of the discipline lay in the fact that it could dispense with this costly and violent relation by obtaining effects of utility at least as great. They were different, too, from 'service', which was a constant, total, massive, non-analytical, unlimited relation of domination, established in the form of the individual will of the master, his 'caprice'. They were different from vassalage, which was a highly coded, but distant relation of submission, which bore less on the operations of the body than on the products of labour and the ritual marks of allegiance. Again, they were different from asceticism and from 'disciplines' of a monastic type, whose function was to obtain renunciations rather than increases of utility and which, although they involved obedience to others, had as their principal aim an increase of the mastery of each individual over his own body. **The historical moment of the disciplines was the moment when an art of the human body was born, which was directed not only at the growth of its skills, nor at the intensification of its subjection, but at the formation of a relation that in the mechanism itself makes it more obedient as it becomes more useful, and conversely**.[16]

During the modern era, there was a pursuit for new practices of self-governance, social control, and legitimation of political authority. To Deacon (2002), "the government of a state (politics), of a family (oeconomy) and of oneself (morality) were conceived of as interconnected, and internal and external affairs of state meshed together ever more tightly".[17] The Modern State's political rationality was not based on moral philosophical ideals, but on the State's maintenance. The art of governing was not aimed at the common good, but at good government. As Deacon points out, disciplinary mechanisms detached from sovereign power emerged at the beginning of the modern era. For Foucault, disciplines re-signified the practices of punishment, producing a new ethic of everyday life. The generalization of disciplines coincided with the rise of bourgeois economic and political domination.[18] Over time, disciplines have become distinct

[16] (Foucault, 1995, p.137-138).
[17] (Deacon, 2002, p.98).
[18] "During the 17th and 18th centuries, the disciplines raised themselves to 'a level at which the formation of knowledge and the increase of power regularly reinforce one another in a circular process' (Foucault, 1986a: 224) and spread throughout the social body to form 'what might be called in general the disciplinary society' (Foucault, 1986a: 209, 215; 1979c: 64). On the one hand, anxieties about real or imagined contagion and disorder motivated this spread of the disciplines: fears of the plague, symbolizing confusion and disorder (Foucault, 1986a: 199; see also 1971: 202), and of the 'dangerous classes' (Foucault, 1986a: 218; Mann, 1993: 481; Bauman, 1987). Partly as a consequence, '[t]he crowd . . . is . . . replaced by a collection of separated individua lities' (Foucault, 1986a: 201); the Physiocratic concept of 'population', bearing its own specific regularities and cycles, establishes itself as the measure of wealth, while the family, once the model for government, is relegated to a source of population statistics (Foucault, 1979a: 16–17; 1980a: 171); and 'reason of state' begins to dissolve into various 'political economies' of the liberal and socialist varieties. On the other hand, the generalization of the disciplines coincided with the rise to economic and political dominance of the bourgeoisie" (Deacon, 2002, p.103).

and dissociated from sovereign power. For Foucault, for example, while sovereign power was aimed at wealth and merchandise, disciplines extracted time and labor from bodies.[19]

During the era of discipline, individuals were fashioned as a result of discipline, which, as a particular power technique, intrudes upon their time, making them both the object and instrument of its execution, as Foucault argued. "The disciplines should be regarded as a sort of counterlaw. They have the precise role of introducing insuperable asymmetries and excluding reciprocities".[20] This is because discipline creates a private bond of subordination between individuals, distinct from a contractual legal obligation. Additionally, it excludes reciprocity by defining subjects based on scales and hierarchies. To Foucault, "the 'Enlightenment', which discovered the liberties, also invented the disciplines"[21], so the modern subject is a combination of despotic reason, enlightenment and discipline. Deacon clarifies that at the heart of the construction of the modern subject "are three procedures: hierarchical observation, normalizing judgement and the examination. Each of these terms hints simultaneously at an exercise of power (hierarchy; judgement; testing) and a formation of knowledge (observation; normalization; evaluation)".[22]

For Foucault, the panopticon is a laboratory of power whose object and purpose are disciplinary relations, in which surveillance and observation, security and knowledge, individualization and totalization, isolation and transparency occur simultaneously.[23] Therefore, Deacon clarifies that power relations "become more effective the more they infiltrate into everyday life, as they shift from being externally imposed to being internally invoked, from being authoritarian to being participatory, and from acting primarily upon bodies to acting in

[19] "Foucault contrasted the disciplines against the power of the sovereign, in that the former extract time and labour, not wealth and commodities, from bodies; and as 'power in terms of the minimum expenditure for the maximum return' (Foucault, 1986b: 239), they are also to be distinguished from slavery, that 'costly and violent' 'relation of appropriation of bodies' from 'service', based on a master's caprice; from vassalage, since they are not centred around allegiance and the products of labour; and from asceticism and monastic disciplines, in that they seek neither renunciation nor 'an increase of the mastery of each individual over his own body' (Foucault, 1986a: 137). Christianity bequeathed much to the modern disciplinary society – confession, penitence, salvation, even 'labour… [as] an approved ascetic technique' (Weber, 1930: 158) – but each of these bequests has been substantially modified over time, not least by the exigencies of modernity, which refined and qualified them (Foucault, 1986a: 150; see also Weber, 1930: 261, n. 14). With the advent of the disciplines, we 'have passed from a form of injunction that measured or punctuated gestures to a web that constrains them or sustains them throughout their entire succession' (Foucault, 1986a: 152)" (Deacon, 2002, p.104).

[20] (Foucault, 1995, p.222).

[21] (Foucault, 1995, p.222).

[22] (Deacon, 2002, p.105).

[23] "The theme of the Panopticon – at once surveillance and observation, security and knowledge, individualization and totalization, isolation and transparency – found in the prison its privileged locus of realization. Although the panoptic procedures, as concrete forms of the exercise of power, have become extremely widespread, at least in their less concentrated forms, it was really only in the penitentiary institutions that Bentham's utopia could be fully expressed in a material form" (Foucault, 1995, p.249).

addition and more particularly upon souls and actions".[24] As an illustration of these connections in daily life, Foucault cites examples in the domain of education, as well as religious and philanthropic institutions.

According to Foucault, looking back, since the 17th century, disciplinary power has exercised totalizing and individualizing tendencies through biopolitics. The population controls were indispensable for the development of the regulation of life in its entirety.[25] Deacon argues that modern societies are both bourgeois and imbued with disciplinary mechanisms. To him, "not only can and do these labels overlap, but existing states of domination premissed on class, race, or gender are, like the disciplinary mechanisms themselves, global products of the intertwining of specific local relations of power".[26]

According to Deacon, Foucault did not set out to develop a theory of power relations, rather Foucault's focus was on analyzing power relations and how they operate within historical structures. He sought to understand the dynamics between individuals exercising power over each other, rather than developing a theory on power relations. One of Foucault's fundamental discoveries was the correlation between the mechanisms individuals implement to govern and discipline others, and the methods used to form one's sense of self-discipline or identity. The constitution of the self occurs indirectly through the exclusion of certain others within these power relations. Furthermore, the ethical techniques of the self also serve as a means to constitute identity.

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[24] (Deacon, 2002, p.106).

[25] "In concrete terms, starting in the seventeenth century, this power over life evolved in two basic forms; these forms were not antithetical, however; they constituted rather two poles of development linked together by a whole intermediary cluster of relations. One of these poles – the first to be formed, it seems – centered on the body as a machine: its disciplining, the optimization of its capabilities, the extortion of its forces, the parallel increase of its usefulness and its docility, its integration into systems of efficient and economic controls, all this was ensured by the procedures of power that characterized the *disciplines*: *an anatomo-politics of the human body*. The second, formed somewhat later, focused on the species body, the body imbued with the mechanics of life and serving as the basis of the biological processes: propagation, births and mortality, the level of health, life expectancy and longevity, with all the conditions that can cause these to vary. Their supervision was effected through an entire series of interventions and *regulatory controls*: *a biopolitics of the population*. The disciplines of the body and the regulations of the population constituted the two poles around which the organization of power over life was deployed. The setting up, in the course of the classical age, of this great bipolar technology – anatomic and biological, individualizing and specifying, directed toward the performances of the body, with attention to the processes of life – characterized a power whose highest function was perhaps no longer to kill, but to invest life through and through" (Foucault, 1978, p.139).

[26] (Deacon, 2002, p.111).

1.1.1 The ethics in The Care of the Self and self-discipline

In his analysis, Foucault observes that the Greeks distinguished between self-knowledge and the care of the self, a distinction not made by the moderns. During one of his lectures, Foucault explains that

> In the Greco-Roman world, the care of the self was the mode in which individual freedom – or civic liberty, up to a point – was reflected [*se réfléchie*] as an ethics. If you take a whole series of texts going from the first Platonic dialogues up to the major texts of late Stoicism Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius, and so on-you will see that the theme of the care of the self thoroughly permeated moral reflection. It is interesting to see that, in our societies on the other hand, at a time that is very difficult to pinpoint, the care of the self became somewhat suspect. Starting at a certain point, being concerned with oneself was readily denounced as a form of self-love, a form of selfishness or self-interest in contradiction with the interest to be shown in others or the self-sacrifice required. All this happened during Christianity however, I am not simply saying that Christianity is responsible for it.[27]

At the same time as self-knowledge was presupposed and subordinate to the care of the self, the care of the self could not be achieved without self-knowledge.

> Taking care of oneself requires knowing [connaitre] oneself. Care of the self is, of course, knowledge [connaissance] of the self – this is the Socratic-Platonic aspect – but also knowledge of a number of rules of acceptable conduct or of principles that are both truths and prescriptions. To take care of the self is to equip oneself with these truths: this is where ethics is linked to the game of truth.[28]

For the Greeks, the care of the self involved both self-examination of thoughts and ethos, so the care of the self was also a way of controlling and limiting the abuse of power. Foucault in *The Care of the Self* (1978), when discussing the Greek, Hellenistic and Roman worlds, sought to analyze the ethics of the care of the self.[29] Foucault explains that the culture of the self is characterized as the principle of caring for oneself, the art of existence. It underlies necessity, commands development and organizes practice. He emphasizes in modern times the growth of an individualism that gives space to the private aspects of existence, the values of personal

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[27] (Foucault, 1997, p.284).
[28] (Foucault, 1997, p.285).
[29] Foucault's analysis of the care of the self is not limited to the thematic section made in this chapter. For example, it also covers medical practices, dream analysis, love choices and philosophical experience. However, it was necessary to limit the explanation in view of the thematic section of the thesis.

conduct and the interest one takes in oneself. Thus, Foucault asserts the need to distinguish between three aspects of this individualism: (i) the individualistic attitude; (ii) the valorization of private life, and (iii) the intensity of relationships with oneself.

Foucault explains that in Greek culture this principle appears as an imperative.[30] Taking care of oneself is a necessary practice. Socrates, for example, reminded us to take care of ourselves and our souls.[31] According to Foucault, taking care of oneself, while a precept, also became an attitude that permeated ways of living, a reflected and taught social practice that provided a certain way of knowing and the elaboration of knowledge. The first two centuries of the imperial era were, according to Foucault, the golden age of the culture of the self. Within the Classical context, some ancients questioned why human beings didn't perfect their souls with the help of reason. In turn, the Epicureans believed that philosophy should be considered a permanent exercise in caring for oneself, for example. For Foucault, Epictetus provides the highest philosophical elaboration on the subject. The term *Epimeleia* designates a set of occupations. Possession of oneself is not an empty temple; rather, it entails practical tasks such as taking care of one's body, health, meditating, and reading. In addition, it is not a solitary pursuit, but a genuine social practice; conversing with friends and confidants allows for the revelation of one's innermost thoughts and feelings.

In the practice of the care of the self, interpersonal communication holds great significance.[32] "The most important aspects of this activity devoted to oneself: it constituted, not an exercise in solitude, but a true social practice […] The care of the self – or the attention one devotes to the care that others should take of themselves – appears then as an intensification

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[30] "The concern with freedom was an essential and permanent problem for eight full centuries of ancient culture. What we have here is an entire ethics revolving around the care of the self; this is what gives ancient ethics its particular form. I am not saying that ethics is synonymous with the care of the self, but that, in antiquity, ethics as the conscious practice of freedom has revolved around this fundamental imperative: 'Take care of yourself' [*soucie-toi de toi-même*]" (Foucault, 1997, p.285).

[31] "This 'cultivation of the self' can be briefly characterized by the fact that in this case the art of existence – the techne tou biou in its different forms – is dominated by the principle that says one must 'take care of oneself'. It is this principle of the care of the self that establishes its necessity, presides over its development, and organizes its practice. But one has to be precise here; the idea that one ought to attend to oneself, care for oneself (heautou epimeleisthai), was actually a very ancient theme in Greek culture. It appeared very early as a widespread imperative" (Foucault, 1986, p.43-44).

[32] "What makes it ethical for the Greeks is not that it is care for others. The care of the self is ethical in itself; but it implies complex relationships with others insofar as this ethos of freedom is also a way of caring for others. This is why it is important for a free man who conducts himself as he should to be able to govern his wife, his children, his household; it is also the art of governing. Ethos also implies a relationship with others, insofar as the care of the self enables one to occupy his rightful position in the city, the community, or interpersonal relationships, whether as a magistrate or a friend. And the care of the self also implies a relationship with the other insofar as proper care of the self requires listening to the lessons of a master. One needs a guide, a counselor, a friend, someone who will be truthful with you. Thus, the problem of relationships with others is present throughout the development of the care of the self" (Foucault, 1997, p.287).

of social relations".[33] Foucault's analysis of classical ethics shows that in the practice of the care of the self, knowledge of the self occupies an important place.[34] Foucault presents three habits: (i) the "trial procedure" as a progressive procedure that has the role of advancing in the acquisition of a virtue, and its purpose is the practice of becoming capable of abstaining from the superfluous; (ii) the examination of conscience, which consisted of the analysis of the day, the moment when the soul received its share of praise or reproaches. Foucault analyzes Seneca's examination, which is a legal staging and an administrative control. The aim is to inspect the actions committed and the words spoken. Therefore, for Foucault, the subject's relationship with himself in this examination is not only established in the form of a legal relationship in which the accused is in front of the judge, but it is also established as an action of inspection. In this context, the examination of conscience serves to reinforce, through the recollection and reflection of actions, the rational equipment that ensures wise conduct. Finally, he presents (iii) the need for thought to work on itself. Here the aim is to permanently filter representations, examining, controlling and removing them. Foucault emphasizes that it is necessary to take a constant attitude towards oneself.

Foucault explains that unlike Christian self-examination, Greek self-examination seeks to gauge the relationship between oneself and what is represented. In this way, only what can be freely and reasonably chosen is accepted in the relationship with oneself. The common goal of the practices of the self can be characterized by the very principle of the general good of conversion to the self. The practices of the self form the ethics of self-mastery. But it's not just about control; once it's turned in on itself, someone who has access to themselves can also

[33] (Foucault, 1986, p.51-53).

[34] It should be noted that at a certain point in history, the care of the self was overshadowed by self-knowledge. According to Foucault, "there are several reasons why 'Know yourself' has obscured 'Take care of yourself' First, there has been a profound transformation in the moral principles of Western society. We find it difficult to base rigorous morality and austere principles on the precept that we should give more care to ourselves than to anything else in the world. We are more inclined to see taking care of ourselves as an immorality, as a means of escape from all possible rules. We inherit the tradition of Christian morality which makes self-renunciation the condition for salvation. To know oneself was, paradoxically, a means of self-renunciation" (Foucault, 1997, p.228). Therefore, according to Foucault, it is difficult to relate self-care to what is understood today as morality, because "we also inherit a secular tradition that sees in external law the basis for morality. How then can respect for the self be the basis for morality? We are the inheritors of a social morality that seeks the rules for acceptable behavior in relations with others. Since the sixteenth century, criticism of established morality has been undertaken in the name of the importance of recognizing and knowing the self. Therefore, it is difficult to see the care of the self as compatible with morality. 'Know thyself' has obscured 'Take care of yourself' because our morality, a morality of asceticism, insists that the self is that which one can reject". […] "The second reason is that, in theoretical philosophy from Descartes to Husserl, knowledge of the self (the thinking subject) takes on an ever-increasing importance as the first step in the theory of knowledge. To summarize: There has been an inversion in the hierarchy of the two principles of antiquity, 'Take care of yourself' and 'Know yourself'. In Greco-Roman culture, knowledge of oneself appeared as the consequence of the care of the self. In the modern world, knowledge of oneself constitutes the fundamental principle" (Foucault, 1997, p.228).

access a kind of pleasure that can only be had with themselves. In this context, reflections on the morality of pleasures developed. There are violent pleasures and pleasure for oneself. This reflection is necessary for the individual to be constituted as a moral subject. Foucault posits that the aims of the culture of the self are not to restrict desire, but rather to alter the underlying components of moral subjectivity. The ethical and aesthetic criteria of existence are grounded in universal principles of nature or reason. The work that needs to be done on oneself, through the culture of the self, opens up space for self-knowledge, in other words, at the starting point of the work of the self, it is necessary to have the task of testing oneself, examining oneself, controlling oneself and placing the question of truth at the center of the constitution of the moral subject. The point of arrival, therefore, is the subject's sovereignty over himself, assuming at the same time a form of domination and enjoyment without desire and without disturbance, in other words, assuming control and guaranteeing his freedom.

The culture of the self seeks to define the principle of a relationship with oneself that makes it possible to determine the forms and conditions in which political action is possible, impossible, acceptable or necessary. The art of governing oneself is a determining factor in the political game. In the art of governing there are countless pitfalls, and in many cases the ruler must be guided by his own reason. Therefore, if you know how to govern yourself well, you will know how to govern others. According to Foucault, in classical and Hellenistic times, the rationality of governing others was the same as the rationality of governing oneself. This premise is clear in Plutarch's *Treatise on the Inexperienced Prince*, when he says that you can't govern others if you don't have self-government. The importance of virtue in politics concerns the culture of the self, insofar as, for example, if the emperor masters his passions and knows how to set limits on himself, he will be able to set limits on his own political power. The principle that applies to anyone who has to govern is: you have to take care of yourself, guide your own soul, and establish your own *ethos*. It is the morality of the rational being that underlies the relationship between rulers and ruled. It is in the construction of the moral subject as a moral subject in relation to social, civic, and political activities that the culture of the self relates to the other.

According to Smith (2015), Foucault's *ethical turn* has led to profound disagreements among his interpreters and critics about how to understand the positive position that Foucault defended in the last phase of his work. At times, Foucault has been framed as a moral anarchist, but for many, care of the self implies an understanding of the ethical subject as a process and relationship with itself. How, then, can these positions be reconciled? Smith suggests analyzing

Foucault's work from a specifically philosophical perspective, starting his analysis from the position of Giorgio Agamben. Foucault is a critic of the modern, legal conception of ethics. According to Smith, Agamben[35] rightly places Foucault in a philosophical lineage that criticizes modern humanism but recognizes the difficulty of overcoming it. Therefore, the main task of distancing oneself from modern deontological or consequentialist ethics is to create a new set of ethical concepts.[36] For Foucault, the relationship between ethics and law should not be necessary; in fact, it is historically locatable. In general, the concepts that permeate ethics are the same concepts that are used in the legal sphere, and according to Foucault, these historical processes take law and the form of law as a rule for the domain of human practice.

Foucault situates the care of the self in proximity to the concept of the *aesthetics of existence*.[37] Some interpreters[38] of Foucault posit that the aesthetics of existence constitutes a form of art of living, a mode of subjectivation.[39] Foucault establishes a connection between

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[35] Agamben, Giorgio. **The Kingdom and the Glory.** Translated by Lorenzo Chiesa, California: Stanford University Press, 2011.

[36] On the relationship between the care of the self and the aesthetics of existence, Smith (2015) develops the following argument: "when Foucault says we should treat our life as a work of art, we should not understand him to be saying that 'we' are something separate from and transcendent to this object 'life' which we ought to use as the material for an aesthetic work of art. This would re-introduce exactly the kind of dualism Foucault tries to get away from in this essay. The distinction is not one of two different levels, a transcendent author-principle opposed to the substantial work of art which it produces, but one whereby the two things, the author and the work, remain strictly immanent to one another. Returning to the concept of 'care of the self', this means that we must understand the two principles – 'care' and 'self' – not as two independent substances interacting with one another, but rather as inherently interrelated concepts, which always operate on the same plane. As Foucault puts it very clearly in the course of one of his discussions of an ancient text: "you have to take care of yourself: it is you who takes care; and then you take care of something which is the same thing as yourself, [the same thing] as the subject who 'takes care'. 'Care of the self" is therefore to be understood in both possible senses, according to both the subjective and the objective genitive – the self is both that which does the caring, and the object of that same care" (Smith, 2015, p.141).

[37] "The obligation to keep the use of pleasure within the bounds of marriage was also, for Plato's guardian, Isocrates' leader, or Aristotle's citizen, a way of exercising self-mastery, a mastery made necessary by one's status or by the authority one had to exercise in the city. [...] Even in the most detailed texts on the life of the couple, such as those of Plutarch, what is proposed is not a regulation that would draw a division between permitted and forbidden acts. It is instead a mode of being, a style of relations. The ethics of marriage and the advice on conjugal life are at the same time universally valid principles and rules for those who wish to give their existence an honorable and noble form. It is the lawless universality of **an aesthetics of existence** that in any case is practiced only by a few" (Foucault, 1997, p.184-185 – own emphasis).

[38] For example: Timothy O'leary (2002) and Andrew Thacker (1993).

[39] Foucault also explains the relationship between ethics and aesthetics when dealing with questions of sexual pleasure. For example, when he states that: "Sexual pleasure as an ethical substance continues to be governed by relations of force – the force against which one must struggle and over which the subject is expected to establish his domination. But in this game of violence, excess, rebellion, and combat, the accent is placed more and more readily on the weakness of the individual, on his frailty, on his need to flee, to escape, to protect and shelter himself. Sexual ethics requires, still and always, that the individual conform to a certain **art of living** which defines the aesthetic and ethical criteria of existence" (Foucault, 1997, p.67 – own emphasis). And also when he states that: "And if one wishes to understand the interest that was directed in these elites to personal ethics, to the morality of everyday conduct, private life, and pleasure, it is not all that pertinent to speak of decadence, frustration, and sullen retreat. Instead, one should see in this interest the search for a new way of conceiving the relationship that one ought to have with one's status, one's functions, one's activities, and one's obligations. Whereas formerly ethics implied a close connection between power over oneself and power over others, and therefore had to refer to **an aesthetics of life** that accorded with one's status, the new rules of the political game made it more difficult to

classical ethics and the aesthetics of existence insofar as both pertain to the practice of the self with constituting oneself. It is on this aspect of the care of the self and its link to the aesthetics of existence that some interpreters distance Foucault's ethical position from Kant's but bring Foucault's ethical position closer to Kant's aesthetics. This link occurs because they understand that Kant guarantees universality and subjectivity at the same time. According to Smith, while the ethics of the care of the self moves away from Kant's morality, it can move closer to his aesthetics because while it rejects universalism, it also does not accept relativism. In this way, for him, Kant's aesthetics,

> whilst still carrying universal necessity (a judgement of taste demands universal assent), takes its universality from the structure of the aesthetic judgement itself, rather than from its object. Whilst in ethics, any given object is 'in itself' determined as good or bad, according to whether or not it can be willed as a universal law, in aesthetics it is the judgement, not the object, which has the 'absolute' status. Kant thus allows us to avoid relativism, maintaining the idea that there is some necessity to aesthetic judgements, while still holding that there are no external 'absolute' criteria which determine what makes an aesthetic object beautiful.[40]

For Smith, Foucault's ethics is the continuous subjectivation of the self in relation to itself. In this way, Foucault understands that the self, in caring for itself, both receives external influences and influences itself.[41] Smith's central thesis is to propose an intersection, an inextricable link between the subject and its activity, suggesting that perhaps one can no longer distinguish between "being" and "ought to be" because the subject is what it makes of its freedom, and for Foucault, ought does not demand anything of the subject because it is not an imperative.[42]

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define the relations between what one was, what one could do, and what one was expected to accomplish. The formation of oneself as the ethical subject of one's own actions became more problematic" (Foucault, 1997, p.84 – own emphasis).

[40] (Smith, 2015, p.144).

[41] "This, then, is why there is no contradiction between Foucault's ethics and his work on power. Real ethical practices are of course saturated with power relations; Foucault freely admits that the practices of the self are not 'something invented by the individual himself', but are 'models that he finds in his culture and are proposed, suggested, imposed upon him by his culture, his society, and his social group.' But it is not true, either, that the subject is totally determined by external influences; not in the sense that there is always a point of absolute freedom hidden deep within us that cannot be completely subjected to power, but rather that the self, in addition to being influenced by outside forces, also affects itself. The manner in which this auto-affection is carried out might itself be completely determined by external powers, but this is not a problem for Foucault's theory, because his conception of freedom does not make appeal to anything supposed to be 'outside' of those power relations. Of those forces which act on the self, some of them come from the self itself, and it is these forces which constitute its freedom. If we were to give a diagrammatic representation of all the forces which act on the self, 'freedom' would designate that subset of those forces which emanate from the self itself, 'folding' back on itself, constituting and reforming the very thing which is doing the constituting" (Smith, 2015, p.145).

[42] "In the figure of the ethical subject we have been considering, the major oppositions and distinctions which usually govern our thinking about ethics no longer seem to function. One can no longer distinguish between the being of the subject and its activity, since the subject is only its activity and its activity, what it actually does,

From this point of view, Foucault's ethics of the care of the self is the opposite of Kant's morality, which is both imperative and uses legal language. On the one hand, this does not negate the differences between Foucault and Kant, nor does it negate Foucault's aims with his critique of the modern philosophical project. However, on the other hand, (i) it is possible to bring Foucault's analysis of the care of the self and self-discipline closer to Kant, and for this, (ii) one does not need to resort to Kant's aesthetics, his own moral project can account for this similarity, and finally, (iii) one must disagree with the thesis presented by Smith on the convergence between *being* and *ought to be*. Indeed, it should be uncontroversial that concepts of normativity are different from descriptive concepts, and Kant presents a normative theory in a strong sense, while Foucault understands normativity in an immanent way. Yet, to propose an overlap between *being* and *ought to be* from a perspective composed of immanent normativity would be problematic, to say the least, since Foucault himself unmasks and exposes the entrails of society. A union between being and duty would lead to a loss of criteria that only a normative perspective can offer, criteria that are necessary for something to be considered oppressive or not, for example. And even if we interpret this combination of being and ought to be through an aesthetic lens, the problem remains, since the care of the self, based on Foucault's analysis, is a continuous process, in other words, even if the ethics of the care of the self are not imperatives, they presuppose (i) techniques that shed light on the creative activity of the existing, and (ii) a continuous process of activity with oneself that frees subjectivity from certain bonds, but at the same time generates new subjectivations that will need to continue the continuous process of the care of the self. Since the care of the self is the manifestation of freedom, it is a continuous process of relating to oneself and is reflected in the relation to others. For Foucault, the care of the self is the government of the self.[43]

With this in mind, the questions to be explored in the following chapters of this doctoral dissertation are: (i) Is all discipline, whether externally or internally imposed, an expression of

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exhausts what it is. One can no longer distinguish between subject and substance, because the subject is only the substantial work of art it fashions its life into, and this substance exhausts what it is for this subject to be. One can perhaps no longer even distinguish between 'is' and 'ought', because the subject is only what it makes of the empty 'ought' that is its freedom, and this 'ought' does not demand anything specific of the subject (recall Foucault's critique of Sartre – freedom is not freedom to realize the 'true' authentic substance of your being, but freedom to engage in the completely open concept of 'creative activity'). Instead of opposing the two sides of the binary, or even of showing how they are always unstable, constantly contaminating and passing over into each other (the preferred tactic of deconstruction), their strategy is to examine that strange zone within which the two terms can no longer be separated" (Smith, 2015, p.150).

[43] In one of his courses, Foucault sets out his starting points for thinking about the care of the self, he asks: "What should one do with oneself? What work should be carried out on the self? How should one 'govern oneself' by performing actions in which one is oneself the objective of those actions, the domain in which they are brought to bear, the instrument they employ, and the subject that acts?" (Foucault, 1997, p.87).

punitive practices? (ii) Is external discipline related to the state necessarily illegitimate? (iii) What is the relationship between Foucault's care of the self and Kant's self-discipline? And finally, (iv) Is discipline necessarily a technique of power? In the following chapters, we will try to answer the questions above.

1.2 DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN THE CONCEPTIONS OF HANNAH ARENDT AND KANT: IS DISCIPLINE NECESSARILY AN ABSOLUTE OBEDIENCE?

In Arendt's work, the concept of discipline can rarely be mapped explicitly. However, the way she defines the concept of obedience aligns with the definition of discipline; that is, obedience entails following orders given by others as well as by oneself. Arendt asserts that, in political and moral matters, there is no truly an "inadequate" use of the faculty of judgment, since the agent, by adhering to rules imposed by others, gives their consent. Thus, this rule becomes a self-imposed rule, requiring discipline insofar as the agent follows a rule given by another, and simultaneously self-discipline, as they consent to and fulfill it.

Therefore, although the concept of *discipline* is not frequently employed in Arendt's work, we can assert that (i) she applies the same definition of discipline when addressing obedience; and (ii) the theme of discipline in her texts is directly defined and interwoven with other concepts, such as authority and its relationship with the faculties of the mind – thinking for oneself and judging. Given the particular way in which Arendt approaches issues of discipline in her accounts and philosophy, we propose this equivalence in definition between the concept of discipline and that of obedience when interpreting her work.

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Hannah Arendt's concept of absolute and blind obedience demonstrates that discipline, a defining characteristic of dictatorial regimes, can also be incorporated into totalitarian regimes in an attempt to justify the atrocities and horrors committed. In *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (1951), Arendt states that:

> The so-called 'leader principle' is in itself not totalitarian; it has borrowed certain features from authoritarianism and military dictatorship which have greatly contributed toward obscuring and belittling the essentially totalitarian phenomenon. If the functionaries appointed from above possessed real authority and responsibility, we would have to do with a hierarchical structure in which authority and power are delegated and governed by laws. **Much the same is true for the organization of an army and the military dictatorship established after its model; here, absolute power of command from the top down and absolute obedience from the bottom up correspond to the situation of extreme danger in combat, which is precisely why they are not totalitarian. A hierarchically organized chain of command means that the commander's power is dependent on the whole hierarchic system in which he operates. Every hierarchy, no matter how authoritarian in its direction, and every chain of command, no matter how arbitrary or dictatorial the content of orders, tends to stabilize and would have restricted the total power of the leader of a totalitarian movement**.[44]

Consequently, discipline – understood as absolute obedience to orders – is characteristic of military regimes. Nevertheless, even in the absence of totalitarian regimes, absolute obedience can be observed. This is the obedience that Eichmann invokes in his trial.[45] In *Eichmann in Jerusalem* (1963), Arendt states the following:

> Eichmann, with his rather modest mental gifts, was certainly the last man in the courtroom to be expected to challenge these notions and to strike out on his own. Since, in addition to performing what he conceived to be the duties of a law-abiding citizen, he had also acted upon orders – always so careful to be 'covered' – he became completely muddled, and ended by stressing alternately the virtues and the vices of **blind obedience**, or the 'obedience of corpses', (*Kadavergehorsam*), as he himself called it.[46]

In his defense, Eichmann asserted that his guilt stemmed from his obedience, a virtue that he considered to be praiseworthy. In *Responsibility and Judgment* (2003), Arendt notes that in all Holocaust trials, from the Nuremberg Trials to Eichmann's trial, the defense presented was based on obedience to superiors and laws. But the fallacy, she argues, lies precisely in equating *consent* with obedience. For instance, an adult may consent to an action, yet a child may obey. According to Arendt, no individual, regardless of their strength, can act in a morally good or bad manner without the assistance of others. The notion of consent is implicit, which is why the fallacy of "blind obedience" is initially accepted. Those who claim to obey to

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[44] (Arendt, 1973, p.364-365 – own emphasis).

[45] "In this respect, the evidence in the Eichmann case was even more convincing than the evidence presented in the trial of the major war criminals, whose pleas of a clear conscience could be dismissed more easily because they combined with the argument of obedience to 'superior orders' various boasts about occasional disobedience. But although the bad faith of the defendants was manifest, the only ground on which guilty conscience could actually be proved was the fact that the Nazis, and especially the criminal organizations to which Eichmann belonged, had been so very busy destroying the evidence of their crimes during the last months of the war" (Arendt, 1994a, p.276-277).

[46] (Arendt, 1994a, p.135).

something are in fact indirectly expressing support. In this context, the act of not committing a crime on one's own free initiative does not exonerate criminals from culpability. This is because, in matters of politics and morality, there is no such thing as obedience without consent.[47]

To Arendt, "the longer one listened to him [Eichmann], the more obvious it became that his inability to speak was closely connected with an inability to *think*, namely, to think from the standpoint of somebody else".[48] He claimed that he had lived his life in accordance with Kantian moral principles and emphasized the Kantian definition of duty. However, "this was outrageous, on the face of it, and also incomprehensible, since Kant's moral philosophy is so closely bound up with man's faculty of judgment, which rules out blind obedience".[49] Arendt firmly acknowledges that Eichmann is committing an outrage by mentioning Kant. It is well known that Kantian philosophy would never justify Eichmann's claims, regardless of the context. This includes his concept of autonomy, his formula for humanity, his philosophy of law, his moral philosophy, or his concept of right. Totalitarianism challenges the legal legacy initiated by Kant and the entire tradition that has shaped modernity and the Enlightenment as the era of the conquest of rights in favor of coexistence with fellow citizens.[50] The argument to be developed in this doctoral dissertation is that there is a relationship between two of Arendt's statements: *Eichmann's inability to think* and his "obedience".

As outlined by Lang (2014), Arendt's objective was to safeguard the values of freedom and individuality against the conformity of the masses, obedience, and atrocity. Some interpreters have argued that Arendt's transformation of Eichmann into a "common man" in her account demonstrated the potential for the banality of evil to exist within all of humanity. This perspective was further reinforced by Stanley Milgram's 1960 socio-psychological experiment on obedience. Lang, explain Milgram's experiment follows:

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[47] Cf. Arendt, 2003, p. 45-47.
[48] (Arendt, 1994a, p.49).
[49] (Arendt, 1994a, p.136).
[50] Bach (2006) explains that for Arendt, the historical rupture and the abandonment of tradition occurs when: "The contingent nature of historical events therefore points to the lack of a firm and stable foundation for the meaning that is produced and to the very indeterminate nature of this meaning, whose future is not teleologically guaranteed by any necessary law that leads it to a safe harbor. [...] The unprecedentedness of the historical rupture is introduced precisely when the logic of the organization of society escapes common sense and any reasonable conception of justice that would make it possible to once again ensure a world common to all" (Bach, 2006, p.21 – own translation).

> Milgram had asked ordinary Americans, in the name of science, to inflict what they thought were a series of strong electric shocks on an innocent individual; he found that a large majority were willing to do so. Milgram had embarked on this research long before the Eichmann trial, and it was only after he had completed the obedience studies that Arendt's analysis was published. Fortuitously, Milgram was able to use Arendt's arguments to support his own, and it is unlikely that he would have made such strong claims without her work. Inspired by Arendt's characterization of Eichmann as someone who did not critically examine the moral quality of his actions or the validity of his beliefs, Milgram argued that most people "blindly" obey authority because they find themselves in a situation where obedience is expected of them – and not because of their personal convictions about the correctness of the commands. Milgram turned Eichmann into an illustration of a general human tendency to obey authority mindlessly.[51]

However, as Lang notes, the resonance between Milgram's experiment and Arendt's account helped to shape the situationist argument that "ordinary individuals commit evil deeds because they find themselves in situations that subvert their moral judgment".[52] In the view of Lang, this type of situationist argument put forth by some social psychologists is actually at odds with both Arendt's and Milgram's positions. According to him that situationist explanations of the banality of evil fail to acknowledge the ontological and normative dimensions of Arendt's argument that "emphasized people's capacity to think critically and make individual moral judgments".[53] The dissolution of the public sphere, in part, facilitated the erosion of the private or internalized morality of individuals. This implies that "In this atmosphere of weakened public opinion, people may easily lose their 'common sense', as Arendt put it, making it possible for the coercive logic of totalitarian ideology to prevail, according to which mass murder can become a moral duty".[54]

As posited by Lang (2014), Milgram (1974) postulates that the primary cognitive basis of obedience is a deficiency in reflective thought, i.e, the absence of critical judgment. "Obedient individuals abandon the personal process of continuous meaning-making – they stop trying to evaluate or make sense of their actions – and entrust authority with the right to define the significance of any given act".[55] In essence, the central issue at hand in Milgram's position is not merely social psychology, but rather encompasses personal accountability, legal responsibility, and the concept of justice. In light of this, we agree with Lang that Milgram's position differs from Arendt's normative social analysis.

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[51] (Lang, 2014, p.650).
[52] (Lang, 2014, p.651).
[53] (Lang, 2014, p.651).
[54] (Lang, 2014, p.653).
[55] (Lang, 2014, p.654).

For Arendt, the concept of individual responsibility serves to elucidate her arguments concerning the banality of evil. This is evident in her critique of the Nazi self-justifications for their obedience and the claims of situationist social psychology, as exemplified by the defenders of Milgram's experiments who argued that what differentiates the Nazi perpetrators from other social agents is merely the circumstances. For Arendt, obedience is a political act of recognition. "Arendt's rejection of obedience as an explanation of perpetrator behavior relied on a strong conception of human freedom".[56] This kind of interpretation is due to the ambiguous passages in Arendt's own writings. Given that she characterizes the Nazis, as in the case of Eichmann, as "incapable of thinking", this opens up the possibility of a fragmented interpretation of her position on the notion of individual agency. However, according to Lang, in order to gain a coherent and complete understanding of Arendt's position, it is necessary to take into account her presuppositions and her other writings. Consequently,

> yet her rejection of obedience as an explanation of perpetrator behavior depended upon the view, defended by Arendt from her first publication, that individual subjectivities exist at 'a remove from the collective subject' (Arendt, 1994, p. 39). In what political theorist Judith Shklar (1977) called 'an act of rational faith' (p. 90), Arendt believed that people possess an ability to imagine alternative social and political arrangements, and that this capacity enables individuals to transcend existing norms and to question them. Indeed, her view asserted that people have the moral responsibility to interrogate the principles behind the laws that affect them.[57]

As outlined by Lang, Arendt was highly critical of the social sciences, arguing that their arguments failed to acknowledge the capacity of the human mind to judge and to engage in independent judgment. In her time, these sciences depicted individual subjectivity as a mere reflection or result of social forces. For Arendt, this perspective reduces the human being to a creature that only behaves in accordance with external constraints. This perspective, as Arendt posits, results in the deprivation of human beings of their own dignity, their status as free, unique, and unpredictable agents. As stated by Lang,

> Arendt insisted that it is a morally and politically dangerous idea to think that we should overcome this inner struggle, for just as democratic politics depends on the protection of a plurality of differing viewpoints, so human freedom, according to Arendt, depends on a subjectivity that is multiple. The more autonomous and unitary the self – that is, the more one aspect of the self dominates the others – argued Arendt,

[56] (Lang, 2014, p.656).
[57] (Lang, 2014, p.656). The Arendt text cited is: Philosophy and sociology, In Essays in understanding (1994). The Shklar text cited is: Rethinking the past (1977).

> the stronger the perceived link between self and action becomes, and with it the belief that human action can be explained by its psychological antecedents.[58]

Consequently, for her, the psychological sciences have unfortunately become a threat to the notion of individual uniqueness and human freedom, since they understand the human being in a generalized and conditioned way. Arendt's perspective is that we are not all the same inside. She believes that it is a mistake to reduce the richness of human conduct to a monotonous sameness of cognitive processes and emotions, as social psychology does.

Arendt, in her commitment to human freedom, developed normative definitions of power and political authority. Lang elucidates that

> She defined 'the political' in ideal terms as a public realm of free discourse, where political action is a joint venture based on decisions reached through open deliberations. Arendt shared the view of a liberal tradition within political philosophy which holds that authority relies on a shared recognition of the right of some to rule and the duty of others to obey. She defined authority as the ability to demand action from others without coercing them or arguing with them [...].[59]

Political power, then, is power with others and not power over others, because there is no such thing as obedience in political and moral matters. Consequently, obedience represents the external manifestation of support and consent. Arendt posits that even in totalitarian regimes, command is based on the support of the masses.[60] For Arendt, individuals present themselves as such through their actions, and thus can and should be judged on the basis of those actions.[61]

For Arendt, politics is the coexistence of different people. Totalitarianism, in contrast, is the impossibility of this coexistence. Arendt states that the collapse of the 20th century was not a direct consequence of the rise of political movements or the traditional party system. In

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[58] (Lang, 2014, p.657).

[59] (Lang, 2014, p.658).

[60] "The Nazi regime's right to prescribe behavior (i.e., its authority) and its ability to act in concert (its power) depended on the continued support of relevant sections of the population. According to Arendt, it was when large parts of the German population came to accept that the Nazis had a right to rule that mass atrocities became possible. This recognition of authority was part of a process of identification, Arendt claimed, whereby Germans began to see Nazism as a common enterprise. The Nazi worldview became the framework that gave their actions meaning" (Lang, 2014, p.658).

[61] "Arendt's eventful conception of history – based on her conviction that human action is spontaneous and creative – downplayed the notion of path dependency and emphasized the importance of rupture. Arendt insisted that every individual born into history has the potential to interrupt the flow of that history. At the same time she pointed out that people live their lives among the conflicting wills and intentions of others, making it impossible for them to predict the outcomes of their actions. This unpredictability is what renders history inherently contingent; it is the reason why history can only be written retrospectively, since we can only make sense of actions in terms of what they produced, not in terms of what the actors actually intended" (Lang, 2014, p.662).

fact, totalitarianism represents the ultimate consequence of this collapse, as it emerged in contexts where the party system had lost its prestige and the authority of the government was no longer recognized. For Arendt, both in practice and in theory, no one was in a position to know what authority truly meant. According to her

> Since authority always demands obedience, it is commonly mistaken for some form of power or violence. Yet authority precludes the use of external means of coercion where force is used, authority itself has failed! Authority, on the other hand, is incompatible with persuasion, which presupposes equality and works through a process of argumentation. Where arguments are used, authority is left in abeyance. Against the egalitarian order of persuasion stands the authoritarian order, which is always hierarchical. If authority is to be defined at all, then, it must be in contradistinction to both coercion by force and persuasion through arguments.[62]

For Arendt, the authoritarian relationship between those who command and those who obey is not based on common reason or power. Rather, it is based on hierarchy and the recognition of a stable and predetermined common place between the two.[63]

For her, political legitimacy prior to the 20th century was grounded in authority, religion, and tradition. Arendt examines the concept of authority by returning to Roman politics and the idea of foundation. In her return to Plato, Arendt elucidates her position:

> The ideas become the unwavering, 'absolute' standards for political and moral behavior and judgment in the same sense that the 'idea' of a bed in general is the standard for making and judging the fitness of all particular manufactured beds. For there is no great difference between using the ideas as models and using them, in a somewhat cruder fashion, as actual yardsticks of behavior, and Aristotle in his earliest dialogue, written under the direct influence of Plato, already compares 'the most perfect law', that is, the law which is the closest possible approximation to the idea, with 'the plummet, the rule, and the compass . . . [which] are outstanding among all tools'. It is only in this context that the ideas relate to the varied multitude of things concrete in the same way as one yardstick relates to the varied multitude of things measurable, or as the rule of reason or common sense relates to the varied multitude of concrete events which can be subsumed under it. This aspect of Plato's doctrine of ideas had the greatest influence on the Western tradition, and even Kant, though he had a very different and considerably deeper concept of human judgment, still occasionally mentioned this capacity for subsuming as its essential function. Likewise, the essential characteristic of specifically authoritarian forms of government – that the source of their authority, which legitimates the exercise of power, must be beyond the sphere of power and, like the law of nature or the

[62] (Arendt, 1961a, p.92-93).

[63] "This point is of historical importance; one aspect of our concept of authority is Platonic in origin, and when Plato began to consider the introduction of authority into the handling of public affairs in the polis, he knew he was seeking an alternative to the common Greek way of handling domestic affairs, which was persuasion (πείθειν) as well as to the common way of handling foreign affairs, which was force and violence (βία)" (Arendt, 1961a, p.93).

> commands of God, must not be man-made – goes back to this applicability of the ideas in Plato's political philosophy.[64]

Authority represents a form of legitimacy for political power that originates from a source that transcends the political sphere itself. Consequently, in the Roman period, the founding myths listed the Roman gods as part of the founding authority, thereby establishing the trinity of authority, religion, and tradition as a reality.

The question for Arendt is the following: Since persuasion is insufficient to guide human beings in their capacity as political agents, is it necessary to consider how authority can be established or guaranteed without resorting to violence? Arendt turns to Plato to address this issue. Like Plato, she believes that reason is insufficient because only a select few are subject to the power of reason. This problem persists because it cannot be guaranteed that the majority – the multitude that constitutes the body politic – is subject to the same truth that emerges from reason.

As Ferreira (2019) notes, Arendt distinguishes between tradition and the past. She asserts that tradition is the narrative thread that links the present to the past. In contrast, religion differs from faith in that it possesses a political dimension. Religion is defined as re-ligare, i.e, "being connected to the past". This connection is to something that has been previously established. For him,

> Hannah Arendt's political thought is, to a significant extent, an attempt to reconcile Athens and Rome. From Athens, the German philosopher appreciates the accessibility of public spaces, which permits freedom of action. However, the absence of political authority in these spaces results in political instability. From Rome, Arendt admires precisely what is absent in Athens: stability. Roman civilization managed to create institutions that were able to legitimize themselves politically for centuries, precisely because they were sustained by the triad of authority, tradition, and religion.[65]

Ferreira explains that, for Arendt, the legitimization of a political structure takes place "when channels of political discussion are established between the governed and the governors, which, if we use Hannah Arendt's usual terminology, we can call a public space, an environment whose main characteristic, for the philosopher, should be plurality".[66] Therefore, for Arendt, authority

[64] (Arendt, 1961a, p.110-111).
[65] (Ferreira, 2019, p.58 – own translation).
[66] (Ferreira, 2019, p.56 – own translation).

allows for the foundation of a political structure composed of a public space that guarantees the stability and legitimacy of authority itself.

In order to restore authority, Arendt turns to the Greeks and the Romans, as the collapse of authority in her time is a concern for her. For Haugaard (2017) "to restore authority, Arendt normatively endorses and wishes to resurrect structures of authority based upon ancient Roman and Greek precedent".[67] Nevertheless, he offers a contrasting viewpoint, maintaining that Arendt's arguments "are inconsistent with contemporary liberal and republican democratic theory and would not find resonance in contemporary society (echoing the old sociological dictum that society is not like a street car that can be stopped and then reversed)".[68]

Haugaard explains that the phenomenon of authority can be analyzed from different perspectives, for example, authority can be theorized empirically using sociological theory[69], or normatively[70] when analyzed by political theory.[71] In the first case, the social sources of legitimacy of authority are analyzed, and in the second case, it is analyzed which forms of authority are normatively justified. "In the sociological language game, legitimacy refers to the

[67] (Haugaard, 2017, p.5).
[68] (Haugaard, 2017, p.5).
[69] As an illustration of a purely sociological perspective on authority, Haugaard (2017) also examines Max Weber's position. In this context, a social scientist must analyze power relations through an empirical report on people's beliefs. This analysis allows the scientist to conclude that power is legitimate where those involved in it believe it to be legitimate. In other words, legitimacy derives from people's belief in it. In turn, authority is the probability that a given order will be obeyed. Authority thus contains a certain minimum of voluntary submission and a certain interest in obedience.
[70] As a normative example, Haugaard (2017) analyzes the position of John Raz. According to him, Raz sought to build a liberal theory with conceptual space for authority based on the primacy of freedom. In order to achieve this, it is necessary to replace coercion with authority, which represents a step towards guaranteeing the legitimacy of political institutions. Similarly to Weber and Arendt, Raz also distinguishes between coercive power and authority. As outlined by Haugaard (2017), Raz in *The Morality of Freedom* "analyses legitimate authority from the perspective of understanding what it means to recognize authority. If A has normatively legitimate authority or is an authority, this means that those over whom they exercise authority ought to obey. This amounts to the following: A has authority; A decrees B is to do X; Therefore, B ought to do X. (Raz, 1986: 28)" (Haugaard, 2017, p.7). As Raz posits, the strength of authority is derived from the original considerations that established it. In order to elucidate Raz's position, Haugaard (2017) provides the following example: "Imagine that B and C are in disagreement over something and they decide to have a neutral outside party help them decide a fair outcome. Therefore, they give A the authority to arbitrate their dispute. However, B and C's reasons for obedience to A are based upon their original desire for a neutral arbiter. The authority of A now stands for the authority of neutral arbiter. It is not added to that original reason but stands for it. [...] So, the authority of A is more complex than simply A standing in for the particularities of the reasons of B, C and D. Once A proves herself good at solving these collective actor problems, B, C and D become willing to increase A's authority. Thus, A's authority expands and exceeds its origins. While authority exceeds its source in B, C and D, it is not an independent reason for compliance in itself. If, for instance, in the above examples, A is not a neutral arbiter or A does not exercise her authority for the purposes of making the traffic flow, instead using it to her personal benefit, then that authority ceases to be normatively legitimate. Of course, in these cases A may remain as de facto authority (backed by coercion) but that is not a normative reason for compliance" (Haugaard, 2017, p.8).
[71] In his article, Haugaard (2017) not only analyzes some proposals on authority but also proposes a "re-theorization of authority" by disagreeing with and sometimes agreeing with the positions of Weber, Arendt, and Raz.

actions and beliefs of social actors, while political theory tests legitimacy with respect to the political theorist's normative frame of reference".[72]

Arendt's position can be positioned as a sociological analysis as well as a normative analysis. This is evidenced by her analysis of Greco-Roman authority, which places it as an ideal between violence and persuasion. Haugaard provides an explanation of Arendt's position on the question of authority, stating that for Arendt, "we should consider authority as an ideal type that is on two oppositional scales as follows: (a) *authority versus power/violence/coercion* and (b) *authority versus equality and argumentation*".[73] Arendt offers the family relationship as an example of the distinction between authority and mere coercion. Arendt posits that when a father exercises authority over his son, the son is expected to obey without question. However, when this authority is lost or undermined, the son may engage in endless arguments that can potentially escalate to the point of violence to the father in order to ensure compliance.[74] This illustrative example demonstrates that authority is the antithesis of violence[75] and argumentation. However, it is not identical to power. For Arendt, the commonality between power and authority is that power is also the antithesis of violence. Arendt posits that power and violence are not synonymous. She asserts that "violence appears when power is in jeopardy, but left to its own course it ends in power's disappearance".[76]

According to Haugaard, "in essence, Arendt makes the following three claims: 1. Authority 'legitimates the exercise of power'; 2. This legitimation is possible by appeals to the law of nature or God; 3. This is effective because neither the law of nature nor God appear man-made or conventional".[77] This position is indicative of her defense of the foundational trinity of authority, namely authority, religion, and tradition. However, Haugaard states that Arendt's

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[72] (Haugaard, 2017, p.2).
[73] (Haugaard, 2017, p.4).
[74] "*Authority*, relating to the most elusive of these phenomena and therefore, as a term, most frequently abused, can be vested in persons-there is such a thing as personal authority, as, for instance, in the relation between parent and child, between teacher and pupil or it can be vested in offices, as, for instance, in the Roman senate (auctoritas in senatu) or in the hierarchical offices of the Church (a priest can grant valid absolution even though he is drunk). Its hallmark is unquestioning recognition by those who are asked to obey; neither coercion nor persuasion is needed. (A father can lose his authority either by beating his child or by starting to argue with him, that is, either by behaving to him like a tyrant or by treating him as an equal.) To remain in authority requires respect for the person or the office. The greatest enemy of authority, therefore, is contempt, and the surest way to undermine it is laughter" (Arendt, 1969, p.45).
[75] "*Violence*, finally, as I have said, is distinguished by its instrumental character. Phenomenologically, it is close to strength, since the implements of violence, like all other tools, are designed and used for the purpose of multiplying natural strength until, in the last stage of their development, they can substitute for it" (Arendt, 1969, p.46).
[76] (Arendt, 1969, p.56).
[77] (Haugaard, 2017, p.7).

argument based on this trinity is normatively problematic. Although sociologically this position is tenable, as tradition and reification through the divine enhance authority among people, this type of authority is incompatible with a normative theory that is based on the equal value of citizens. Furthermore, Haugaard argues that "[i]n essence, Arendt is suggesting that the ordinary people are not capable of being persuaded through argumentation, which is an elitist claim. Consequently, they need the magic of religion and tradition to make them reach the truth (for the wrong reasons)".[78]

How can one distinguish between authority and blind obedience, between consent to an ideology that is at odds with an individual's perspective and that ideology itself? It appears that Arendt's position can normatively endorse blind obedience, which was not her intention. By using tradition as a means of increasing sociological authority, she can, contrary to her intention, endorse recursive actions and not reflexive actions. This incompatibility becomes more evident when Haugaard elucidates that the distinction between sociological authority and normative authority can be incongruous. For instance, patriarchal authority may be perceived as legitimate in numerous societies, yet it does not qualify as normatively legitimate. In fact, authority and autonomy must be compatible.

1.2.1 On the faculty of judgment

According to Arendt,

> In the *Critique of Judgement*, however, Kant insisted upon a different way of thinking, for which it would not be enough to be in agreement with one's own self, but which consisted of being able to 'think in the place of everybody else' and which he therefore called an 'enlarged mentality' (*erne erweiterte Denkungsart*) – The power of judgment rests on a potential agreement with others, and the thinking process which is active in judging something is not, like the thought process of pure reasoning, a dialogue between me and myself, but finds itself always and primarily, even if I am quite alone in making up my mind, in an anticipated communication with others with whom I know I must finally come to some agreement. From this potential agreement judgment derives its specific validity. This means, on the one hand, that such judgment must liberate itself from the 'subjective private conditions', that is, from the idiosyncrasies which naturally determine the outlook of each individual in his privacy and are legitimate as long as they are only privately held opinions, but which are not fit to enter the market place, and lack all validity in the public realm, And this enlarged way of thinking, which as judgment knows how to transcend its own individual limitations, on the other hand, cannot function in strict isolation or solitude; it needs

[78] (Haugaard, 2017, p.7).

> the presence of others 'in whose place' it must think, whose perspectives it must take into consideration, and without whom it never has the opportunity to operate at all. As logic, to be sound, depends on the presence of the self, so judgment, to be valid, depends on the presence of others. Hence judgment is endowed with a certain specific validity but is never universally valid. Its claims to validity can never extend further than the others in whose place the judging person has put himself for his considerations. Judgment, Kant says, is valid 'for every single judging person', but the emphasis in the sentence is on 'judging'; it is not valid for those who do not judge or for those who are not members of the public realm where the objects of judgment appear.[79]

On the one hand, Kant would disagree with Arendt's claims[80] about his supposed "unconsciousness" of the implications of the distinction between reason and thought, about his political philosophy being found only in his aesthetic writings, and about Arendt's interpretation of the validity of judgments. On the other hand, however, he would be able to agree with Arendt's interpretation of the functioning of the faculty of judgment in terms of its potential for agreement and communicability.

For Arendt,

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[79] (Arendt, 1961, p.220-221).

[80] "That the capacity to judge is a specifically political ability in exactly the sense denoted by Kant, namely, the ability to see things not only from one's own point of view but in the perspective of all those who happen to be present; even that judgment may be one of the fundamental abilities of man as a political being insofar as it enables him to orient himself in the public realm, in the common world – these are insights that are virtually as old as articulated political experience. […] The difference between this judging insight and speculative thought lies in that the former has its roots in what we usually call common sense, which the latter constantly transcends. Common sense – which the French so suggestively call the 'good sense', *le bon sens* – discloses to us the nature of the world insofar as it is a common world; we owe to it the fact that our strictly private and 'subjective' five senses and their sensory data can adjust themselves to a nonsubjective and 'objective' world which we have in common and share with others. Judging is one, if not the most, important activity in which this sharing-the-world-with-others comes to pass. What, however, is quite new and even startlingly new in Kant's propositions in the *Critique of Judgment* is that he discovered this phenomenon in all its grandeur precisely when he was examining the phenomenon of taste and hence the only kind of judgments which, since they concern merely aesthetic matters, have always been supposed to lie outside the political realm as well as the domain of reason. Kant was disturbed by the alleged arbitrariness and subjectivity of de *gustibus non disputandum est* (which, no doubt, is entkely true for private idiosyncrasies), for this arbitrariness offended his political and not his aesthetic sense. Kant, who certainly was not oversensitive to beautiful things, was highly conscious of the public quality of beauty; and it was because of their public relevance that he insisted, in opposition to the commonplace adage, that taste judgments are open to discussion because 'we hope that the same pleasure is shared by others', that taste can be subject to dispute, because it 'expects agreement from everyone else', Therefore taste, insofar as it, like any other judgment, appeals to common sense, is the very opposite of private feelings. In aesthetic no less than in political judgments, a decision is made, and although this decision is always determined by a certain subjectivity, by the simple fact that each person occupies a place of his own from which he looks upon and judges the world, it also derives from the fact that the world itself is an objective datum, something common to all its inhabitants. The activity of taste decides how this world, independent of its utility and our vital interests in it, is to look and sound, what men will see and what they will hear in it. Taste judges the world in its appearance and in its worldliness; its interest in the world is purely 'disinterested', and that means that neither the life interests of the individual nor the moral interests of the self are involved here. For judgments of taste, the world is the primary thing, not man, neither man's life nor his self" (Arendt, 1961, p.221-222).

> Crucial for a new political philosophy will be an inquiry into the political significance of thought; that is, into the meaningfulness and the conditions of thinking for a being that never exists in the singular and whose essential plurality is far from explored when an I-Thou relationship is added to the traditional understanding of human nature.[81]

The theme of thought and judgment is fundamental to both Kant and Arendt. It can be seen that judgment runs through all of Arendt's writings and was to be the third part of *The Life of the Mind* (1978), but she died before she could write it. For some interpreters, such as Beiner (1992), Arendt not only refers to Kant as a guide for her thinking about judgment, but is also strongly influenced by him. However, this thesis is controversial among Arendtian interpreters. Taylor (2002), for example, recognizes that Arendt appropriates, reconceptualizes and politicizes the Kantian perspective of aesthetic judgment, but, precisely because it is an appropriative interpretation that Arendt does not place herself in the wake of Kantianism, for her, it is possible to find more differences than similarities between the implications of Kant's faculty of judgment and Arendt's writings on judgment. It cannot be denied that Arendt claimed to derive her notion of critical thinking from the Kantian notion of the public use of reason. For Taylor, however, Arendt's notion is more political than Kant's, despite her claim to the contrary. Taylor interprets Arendt's emphasis on plurality and anti-authoritarianism as referring to Kant's attachment to obedience and equality.[82]

For Arendt, the faculty of judgment [83] is essential to the problem of theory and practice, as well as to any plausible theory of ethics. In *The Life of the Mind,* Arendt presents us with the three basic activities of the mind, namely thinking, willing, and judging. They are not derived from each other, that is, they are independent, even though they share common characteristics. "To the question 'What makes us think?' there is ultimately no answer other than what Kant called 'reason's need' die inner impulse of that faculty to actualize itself in speculation".[84] The will, for its part, is moved neither by desire nor by reason, but by itself. Judgment, or the faculty of judgment, according to Arendt, is in no way linked to the intellect, either through determinant or reflexive judgments. The three capacities are autonomous and "each of them obeys the laws inherent in the activity itself".[85] In the three faculties, the objects are given by the world, that

[81] (Arendt, 1994, p.445).
[82] See: Taylor, 2002, p.160-161.
[83] According to Beiner: "Thus judgment serves to help us make sense of, to render humanly intelligible, events that otherwise could not be made so. The faculty of judgment is in the service of human intelligibility – the very same service that Arendt ascribes to the telling of excellent deeds in a story – and conferring intelligibility is the meaning of politics" (Beiner, 1992, p.100).
[84] (Arendt, 1978, p.69).
[85] (Arendt, 1978, p.70).

is, what the mind is concerned with comes from living in this world. However, they are neither determined nor conditioned by the world, because they can transcend empirical conditions. Therefore, the human beings "can judge affirmatively or negatively the realities they are born into and by which they are also conditioned; they can will the impossible, for instance, eternal life; and they can think, that is, speculate meaningfully, about the unknown and the unknowable".[86] However, although the faculties of the mind are independent, they are in communication with each other.

The volume *Thinking* deals with the status of thinking. Arendt breaks with the traditional view that thinking is the access to truth for judging certain events and makes room for the emergence of something new, a free perspective on thinking. For Arendt, it is necessary to understand the free way of thinking, detached from traditional attributes, and in order to do this, it is necessary to detach thinking from knowledge. In other words, thinking has not only an instrumental or cognitive function, nor does it have all the normative answers for a practical life. Therefore, for Arendt, the freest of our spiritual activities is thinking. It does not impose the determination of criteria for how we should act or how we should judge events in the world. But even on the premise that thinking is free, Arendt does not rule out the possibility that there is a relationship between thinking and the guiding parameters of thinking.

Rupture, discontinuity, and crisis are recurring concepts and themes in Arendt's work. Especially in times of social crisis, the experience of thinking is accompanied by the abandonment of guiding parameters. The great historical tragedies demonstrate the failure of traditional criteria to guide political thought and action. Moments of rupture, however, have a liberating effect. They would be thinking without ties, without the function of determining criteria for practical life. And it was again in one of these moments of abandonment of thought and conceptualization that Arendt decided to distance herself somewhat from political theory, which is concerned with action, and turn to what she calls "astonishing topics". Arendt justifies her turn away from the realm of political theory toward a concern with the activities of the mind as having its origins both in the Eichmann trial and in Kant's distinction between thinking and knowing. Although these two sources of inspiration are distinct, they intersect in the relationship between banal evil[87] and the absence of thought.

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[86] (Arendt, 1978, p.71).

[87] "In *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, Hannah Arendt uses the term radical evil, understood as absolute evil, to refer to the manufacture of superfluity in the extermination camps. In *Eichmann in Jerusalem* she uses the expression banality of evil to refer to the conduct of individuals like Adolf K. Eichmann, who in their superficiality would have witnessed an unprecedented mismatch between the stature of the evildoer and the transgressions

The immediate impulse of the Eichmann trial that led Arendt to turn her attention to the faculties of the mind was again astonishment at the loss of a point of reference for thinking about human evil. In Arendt's view, evil had always been presented as something demonic, rooted, and sinful, whether in philosophical, theological, or literary thought.[88] She concludes, however, that Eichmann was no demon, he was both superficial and factual. Eichmann's actions were monstrous, but he himself, as an agent, was banal. In her words,

> There was no sign in him of firm ideological convictions or of specific evil motives, and the only notable characteristic one could detect in his past behavior as well as in his behavior during the trial and through out the pre-trial police examination was something entirely negative: it was not stupidity but thoughtlessness.[89]

One of the questions that permeates Arendtian thought is whether the problem of evil [90], or our ability to distinguish right from wrong, is related to the faculty of reason. The immediate and provisional answer she gives us is that there is no connection between the faculty of thinking and the faculty of discerning between right and wrong if the former is defined as capable of producing the good as a result, that is, if thinking is understood as it has traditionally been, as connected to the contemplative life, since contemplation is passivity. From this we can see not only the demarcation that Arendt makes between the faculties of the mind, that is, their independence, which means that they can communicate but are not necessarily hierarchical or have a direct connection to be exercised, but we can also see that until then, according to her, there is a gap in the traditional way of understanding the relationship between thought and action. However, Arendt takes a different position from the tradition in some respects.[91] She

committed" (Correia, 2013, p.93 – Own translation). The banality of evil for Arendt is also indifference to the suffering of others, not putting oneself in the other's shoes. The phenomenon of the banality of evil is related to evil acts, committed in gigantic proportions, acts whose root we will not find in a special evil, pathology or ideological conviction of the agent.

[88] It should be noted that Kant does not fit into this generalized statement by Arendt, because the question of evil for Kant is not portrayed as demonic and sinful. For more on Kant's position in the debate on evil, see RGV.

[89] (Arendt, 1978, p.4).

[90] The problem of evil, in this sense, is situated in questions of totalitarianism. "This evil embedded in the world of the 20th century reached proportions incomparable to the evil we were historically familiar with, motivated by economic, ideological and subjective reasons. It is an evil that it calls 'radical' in order not only to distinguish it from the horrors committed by other political regimes over the centuries, but also to indicate that it is not exhausted, either in the objective of extermination as such or in the possible sadism of some of its executors" (Bach, 2006, p.20 – own translation).

[91] One of the aspects on which she agrees with part of the philosophical tradition is that thinking is a solitary activity. In this respect, she states that 'being alone' is distinct from solitude, in both we find ourselves alone, but in the former we keep ourselves company and in the latter we are not only abandoned from the company of others, but also from our own company. "Mental activities themselves all testify by their *reflexive* nature to a *duality* inherent in consciousness; the mental agent cannot be active except by acting, implicitly or explicitly, back upon himself. Consciousness, to be sure – Kant's 'I think' – not only accompanies all other representations but all my

suggests that there is a relationship between the faculty of judgment and the faculty of thinking, and therefore that

> then we must be able to 'demand' its exercise from every sane person, no matter how erudite or ignorant, intelligent or stupid, he may happen to be. Kant – in this respect almost alone among the philosophers – was much bothered by the common opinion that philosophy is only for the few, precisely because of its moral Implications, and he once observed that 'stupidity is caused by a wicked heart'.[92] This is not true: absence of thought is not stupidity; it can be found in highly intelligent people, and a wicked heart is not its cause; it is probably the other way round, that wickedness may be caused by absence of thought.[93]

The activity of the mind is a theme that runs through the history of ideas, and generally speaking, thinking has always been defined in terms of a contemplative, passive, and solitary way of life.[94] For Plato, the activity of thinking is the silent dialogue that everyone has with himself, which serves to open the eyes of the mind without interfering with active life. In the Christian era, although thinking was understood as meditation, it still led to contemplation, since it was a servant of theology, i.e., "a kind of blessed state of the soul where the mind was no longer stretching out to know the truth but, in anticipation of a future state, received it temporarily in intuition".[95] And even in modernity, when thought distanced itself from theology and began to serve science, the guiding principle for the search for and production of certain knowledge was mathematics, an abstract, non-empirical science par excellence. However, Arendt was aware that it was possible to look at the question of thought and its implications

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activities, in which nevertheless I can be entirely oblivious of my self. Consciousness as such, before it is actualized in solitude, achieves nothing more than an awareness of the sameness of the I-am – 'I am conscious of myself, not as I appear to myself, nor as I am in myself, but only that I am' – which guarantees the identical continuity of a self throughout the manifold representations, experiences, and memories of a lifetime As such, it 'expresses the act of determining my existence'" (Arendt, 1978, p.74).

[92] Arendt's interpretation of stupidity in Kant is questionable. Kant recognized that human stupidity could also be linked to the accumulation of knowledge, that is, an educated person could be educated and stupid at the same time, so stupidity is not the same as 'lack of information and knowledge' on a given subject. For Kant, stupidity is related to the lack and lack of exercise of the faculty of judgment and not to the 'intelligence' of the agents. Kant states in the *KrV*: "The lack of the power of judgment is that which is properly called stupidity and such a failing is not to be helped. A dull or limited head, which is lacking nothing but the appropriate degree of understanding and its proper concept may well be trained through instruction, even to the point of becoming learned. But since would usually still lack the power of judgment (*the secunda Petri*), it is not at all uncommon to encounter very learned men who in the use of their science frequently give glimpses of that lack, which is never to be ameliorated" (KrV, B 172).

[93] (Arendt, 1978, p.13).

[94] Contemplative life looks at all ways of life in a contemplative way, even *active life* (Vita Activa). "Seen from that perspective, the active way of life is 'laborious', the contemplative way is sheer quietness; the active one goes on in public, the contemplative one in the 'desert'; the active one is devoted to 'the necessity of one's neighbor', the contemplative one to the 'vision of God'" (Arendt, 1978, p.6). This is the traditional view of the *contemplative life* (Vita Contemplativa), which is the highest state of mind.

[95] (Arendt, 1978, p.6-7).

from another point of view.[96] Although questions such as *What is thinking? What are we doing when we do nothing but think? Where are we when we are only in our own company?* have been seen as belonging to metaphysical philosophy [97], for her it is possible to reposition them from a more realist point of view, that is, taking into account the relationship between the sensible and the supersensible. Generally speaking, the question for Arendt is not whether we are capable or have the faculty of thinking, because we are thinking beings. What is at issue are the functions and implications of the activity of thinking, which for her certainly goes beyond serving as an instrument of knowledge and action. Thinking is an activity that requires the commitment of the thinking subject.[98]

For Arendt, what was important in Kant's work on the faculties of the mind was the distinction he made between *Vernunft* and *Verstand*, that is, between reason and intellect.[99] What motivated this distinction was *the scandal of reason*, the fact that the mind is not capable of certain knowledge in relation to things that it sets for itself. That is, reason sets out to think about God, the immortality of the soul, and freedom, but on none of these subjects can reason produce certain, verifiable, and certain knowledge. This means that beyond existential questions, reason is not only concerned with the search and desire for knowledge. "Hence, the distinguishing of the two faculties, reason and Intellect, coincides with a distinction between two altogether different mental activities, thinking and knowing, and two altogether different concerns, meaning, in the first category, and cognition, in the second".[100] Despite this enormous contribution, Arendt argues that Kant was unable to detach himself from the way of thinking of his time. He was still immersed in the questions of tradition, and so he didn't realize that just as reason can think beyond the limits of what can be known, it also has the need to reflect on almost everything that happens to human beings. Kant made room for thinking as an activity.

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[96] Cf. Arendt, 1978, p.7.

[97] The discrediting of metaphysics is also due to the discrediting of everything that is not visible, tangible and palpable, since it dealt with suprasensible objects, transcending common sense thinking. Therefore, the death of metaphysics for Arendt means changing the way we proceed with research into certain subjects. In other words, the way we answer certain questions must now take into account the end of the distinction between the sensible and the suprasensible. "Hence, the possible advantage of our situation following the demise of metaphysics and philosophy would be twofold. It would permit us to look on the past with new eyes, unburdened and unguided by any traditions, and thus to dispose of a tremendous wealth of raw experiences without being bound by any prescriptions as to how to deal with these treasures" (Arendt, 1978, p.12).

[98] "None of the systems, none of the doctrines transmitted to us by the great thinkers may be convincing or even plausible to modern readers; but none of them, shall try to argue here, is arbitrary and none can be simply dismissed as sheer nonsense. On the contrary, the metaphysical fallacies contain the only clues we have to what thinking means to those who engage in it – something of great importance today and about which, oddly enough, there exist few direct utterances" (Arendt, 1978, p.12).

[99] It should be noted that Arendt translates the German term *Verstand* as intellect and not understanding.

[100] (Arendt, 1978, p.14).

This also means that thinking has a activity different from the one of the intellect. Therefore, "[t]he need of reason is not inspired by the quest for truth but by the quest for meaning. And truth and meaning are not the same".[101]

The distinction between thinking and knowing is not mutually exclusive; it is clear that thinking plays a role in scientific inquiry. Arendt does not deny the connection between the search for meaning in thought and the search for truth in knowledge, not least because she sees human beings as questioning beings. But this role is one of means and ends. And the end is determined by a decision about what the inquirer wants to know, or what is worth knowing. Therefore, there is a relationship between thinking and knowledge, and the end is knowledge or cognition itself, and once achieved, it becomes an integral part of the world. However, this concept has been replaced by the concept of truth, and each truth claims its own general validity. For science, what doesn't appear is forced to appear, and the activity of knowing is related to the construction of the world and reality. Knowledge seeks truth, even if it is a changeable and provisional truth, and thought must be used in the search for knowledge, but "[t]o expect truth to come from thinking signifies that we mistake the need to think with the urge to know. Thinking can and must be employed in the attempt to know, but in the exercise of this function it is never itself; it is but the handmaiden of an altogether different enterprise".[102]

The faculty of thinking (*Vernunft*) has a different nature from the faculty of knowing. As Arendt puts it, Kant distinguished reason from intellect in such a way that the former serves to understand and the latter to grasp perceptions. According to her, "the intellect (*Verstand*) desires to grasp what is given to the senses, but reason (*Vernunft*) wishes to understand its *meaning*".[103] The highest criterion of knowledge is truth, and truth is derived from the world of

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[101] (Arendt, 1978, p.14). About this, Arendt continue: "[…] The basic fallacy, taking precedence over all specific metaphysical fallacies, is to interpret meaning on the model of truth. The latest and in some respects most striking instance of this occurs in Heidegger's Being and Time, which starts out by raising 'anew the question of the meaning of Being'. Heidegger himself, in a later interpretation of his own initial question, says explicitly: 'Meaning of Being' and 'Truth of Being' say the same. The temptations to make the equation – which comes down to a refusal to accept and think through Kant's distinction between reason and intellect, between the 'urgent need' to think and the 'desire to know' – are very great and by no means due only to the weight of tradition. Kant's insights had an extraordinary liberating effect on German philosophy, touching off the rise of German idealism. No doubt, they had made room for speculative thought; but this thought again became a field for a new brand of specialists committed to the notion that philosophy's 'subject proper' is 'the actual knowledge of what truly is.' Liberated by Kant from the old school dogmatism and its sterile exercises, they erected not only new systems but a new 'science' – the original title of the greatest of their works, Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind, was 'Science of the Experience of Consciousness' – eagerly blurring Kant's distinction between reason's concern with the unknowable and the intellect's concern with cognition. Pursuing the Cartesian ideal of certainty as though Kant had never existed, they believed in all earnest that the results of their speculations possessed the same kind of validity as the results of cognitive processes" (Arendt, 1978, p.14-15).

[102] (Arendt, 1978, p.61).

[103] (Arendt, 1978, p.57).

phenomena by means of sensory perceptions, leaving evidence apparent and subject to change as new evidence comes to light. The questions raised by the thirst for knowledge arise from curiosity about the world, from the desire to investigate. The faculty of thought, in turn, is not concerned with what a thing is, but with what it means to be for the thing in question, and this activity is not limited to the insights of the so-called "wises", but is an activity that belongs to everyone. However, according to Arendt, Kant was unable to see all the implications of his distinction. "He never became fully aware of having liberated reason and thinking, of having justified this faculty and its activity even though they could not boast of any 'positive' results".[104]

Arendt believes that understanding the world is a way of thinking that goes beyond solving problems. According to Almeida (2010), knowing and thinking are different activities of the mind,

> Knowledge, in turn, must be true, i.e. its validity depends on the possibility of verifying it: either it is self-evident, or it can be proven. Either way, we can't disagree or doubt its validity, unless we can demonstrate or prove its opposite. Thought, on the other hand, does not produce definitive results that, once consolidated, are valid in themselves, independently of the activity of thinking. Its 'results' will only remain valid to the extent that they are rethought. If the criterion of veracity is therefore essential for knowing, thinking is not subject to it.[105]

An example of the existence of the distinction between thinking and knowing for Arendt is manifested in the figure of Eichmann, because he was able to coordinate the deportation of Jews to concentration camps, but was incapable of reflecting on the meaning of his actions. Knowledge, then, is the search for truth (knowledge has universal validity and utility). But knowledge has its limits, and one of them is that it doesn't give meaning to the relationships that exist in the world. The faculty of the mind responsible for giving meaning to relationships in the world is thought. Thought makes it possible to reflect on experience. The world is not only a space for work and production, but also a plural space for living together. In this way, thinking is the capacity to reflect on and question what is happening in the world. Thus, for Arendt, the human capacity to think goes beyond mere instrumental thinking or logical reasoning.

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[104] (Arendt, 1978, p.63).
[105] (Almeida, 2010, p.859 – own translation).

Finally, the Kantian contribution to the distinction between thinking and knowing is not limited to the analysis of the faculties of the mind, but can also be understood as a political question. For in order to judge, without the existence of a previously given universal rule, it is necessary to reflect the meaning of events with all their particularities and contingencies, it is necessary to signify not only events, but the world. This meaning does not have the same status as scientific truths; on the contrary, thinking is changeable and not definitive. Arendt's concern is precisely when the capacity to think is subjected to ideologies[106] as happened in the totalitarian experience. The movement of thought as an activity must be free, and the distinction between truth and meaning makes this freedom possible. The investigation of the meaning of historical events is necessary to make the world intelligible. Kant's distinction, which Arendt takes up as a means of meaning and the sense of things, is also expressed in the way she relates being and appearing.

For Arendt, there is a coincidence between being and appearing. Sentient beings are generally born into a world full of things, whether dead or alive, real or artificial, and these things appear and are perceived. For human beings, for example, these things appear, and we in turn have receptors of appearances, that is, we are living beings capable of knowing, recognizing, and responding. This means that the existence of matter in its quality of appearance depends on beings perceiving it. In other words, "Nothing and nobody exists in this world whose very being does not presuppose a spectator. [...] nothing that is, insofar as it appears, exists in the singular; everything that is is meant to be perceived by somebody. Not Man but men inhabit this planet. Plurality is the law of the earth".[107]

When we perceive the world, we are subjects; when we are perceived, we are objects. Reality is guaranteed by the relationship between perceiving and being perceived, in other words, at the same time as we are in the world, *we are part of the world*. Therefore, "the worldliness of living things means that there is no subject that is not also an object and appears as such to somebody else, who guarantees its 'objective' reality".[108] Since being and appearing coincide, Arendt can say that sentient beings are suited to worldly existence and therefore are not only in the world but are part of the world. Appearance is the way in which the world is recognized and perceived. "To appear always means to seem to others, and this seeming varies

[106] According to Morais (2000), Arendt sees ideology as a substitute for thought: "Ideologies suspend all openness to being, characteristic of the activity of thinking, which always begins with astonishment (the tháuma of the Greeks), and replace it with the affirmation of total explanatory principles, race or the class struggle, which unfold driven by the implacable force of logical reasoning" (Moraes, 2000, p.XIV – own translation).
[107] (Arendt, 1978, p.197).
[108] (Arendt, 1978, p.19).

according to the standpoint and the perspective of the spectators".[109] The world is unique, but it can be perceived in different ways because there is a plurality of spectators, so reality has its phenomenal nature. When we perceive the world, we also have to signify this perception, we have to stop and think, because reality is given by the joint action of the senses coordinated by common sense and guaranteed by plurality.

Conversely, the collapse of the world caused by totalitarian regimes can be reconciled through the activity of thinking. According to Braga (2020) "the task of thought, in this sense, is to re-signify the experience of the world and reconcile with it, so that this approach ensures a way of thinking that does not lose 'the ground of experience and enter into all kinds of theory'".[110] In *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, Arendt shows us how totalitarianism destroyed the public space for human life and replaced it with terror and its ideology. Braga explains that isolation and the creation of a fictitious world thus limited the activity of thinking. "This loss of the world reached its apex in the concentration camps where the individual was brought to a complete stage of desolation, which robbed him not only of the world, but of the very company of himself as a partner in the activity of thinking".[111] Human thought must not be limited by terror and ideology; it must manifest itself freely, communicatively and actively in public spaces. Human freedom, expressed in free thought, must have spaces for the communication of judgments, so that agents can express themselves and intervene in the world.

Since judgment is the activity that guides us in the world, what is the relationship between the absence of thought and evil? For Arendt, the activity of thinking [112] is linked to moral conscience. Once there is a refusal to think, moral conscience loses its place in moral deliberation. For both Arendt and Kant, however, thoughtlessness is a voluntary act, not an absence of capacity. Therefore, thinking and judging are choices, and the act of not judging a given situation in the world is also a choice.[113]

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[109] (Arendt, 1978, p.21).
[110] (Braga, 2020, p.15 – own translation).
[111] (Braga, 2020, p.16 – own translation).
[112] Almeida (2020) argues that "thought is something like a response to our experiences in the world. We remember what happened and try to understand it, so that what happened makes sense to us. Thus, thinking starts from concrete experience, but needs to distance itself from it in order to submit it to reflection, or, in Arendt's words, we need to 'stop and think'" (Almeida, 2010, p.857 – own translation).
[113] "When Arendt highlights the thoughtlessness of an Eichmann and his incapacity for reflection, she is obviously not looking for exemption from the illegal acts he committed, but for an understanding (*Vernunft*) of the type of mentality that made it possible for individuals like him to manifest themselves, as well as for the occupation of the spirit that could contribute to such characters as Eichmann, Stalin and Hiltler not finding more opportunities to repeat what they did" (Bach, 2006, p.28-29 – own translation).

Although Kant and Arendt do not define and distinguish the terms in the same way, their theories agree on the separation of knowing and thinking, and on the fact that judgment is essential to the ethical and political spheres. According to Beiner (1992), "judgment may require us to make the effort to understand those whose point of view we not only do not share but may even find highly distasteful. Disagreement does not release us from the responsibility to understand what we reject; if anything, it rather heightens this responsibility".[114] For the political sphere, this demand for judgment is essential.

The question of *how to judge* without parameters runs throughout Arendt's writings[115]. On the one hand, if we think about the ability to judge as it is exercised in the world, in many historical events have occurred that have escaped the parameters of history and language, and we have to reflect on them without previously given concepts. On the other hand, the timelessness of certain universal rules allows us to judge these events as right or wrong, just or unjust, beneficial or harmful to humanity. In other words, even if we didn't have immediate concepts for conceptualizing the atrocities of totalitarian regimes, we didn't lack normative criteria for judging them barbaric and monstrous. In this way, when we use a deontological theory such as Kant's moral theory, we will always have parameters for judging events in the world.

The process of judgment, exercised as a means of understanding worldly events, facilitates the thinking self's reconciliation with its place and duty in the world. Practical judgments use the faculty of judgment, and reflective judgment aids in the reconciliation of ideas and reality. Despite their particularities regarding the use of the faculty of judgment, the importance given to this faculty was shared by Kant and Arendt. Benhabib (2003) supports this notion when she says that

> Arendt wanted finally to reconcile the universal and the particular, the ideal of humanity and the fact of human particularity and diversity. The concept of 'crimes against humanity' immediately invokes the concept of the 'right to have rights', discussed in *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. In both cases, an anthropological normative universal is being invoked. In virtue of our humanity alone, Arendt is arguing, we are beings entitled to be treated in certain ways, and when such treatment is not accorded to us, then both wrongs and crimes are committed against us. Of

[114] (Beiner, 1992, p.100).

[115] According to Bach (2006), "in order to be able to judge, however, in the absence of any previously given universal rule, thought must seek to reflect the meaning of the event without circumventing its particularity and contingency, confronting it instead as the place from which meaning originates, reading in its appearance the meaning that opens up to the world" (Bach, 2006, p.25 – own translation).

> course, Arendt was thinking along Kantian lines that we are 'moral persons', and that our humanity and our moral personality coexist.[116]

This anthropological normative universal, identified by Benhabib in Arendt's writings, is founded upon both human freedom and dignity. As stated by Bach (2006), "the basis of human dignity: individuality understood as the capacity to initiate (that man is the first term of a new causal series in the world, as Kant would say) while remaining distant from the determinism of nature and the automatism of behavior".[117] Therefore, according to Arendt, seeking meaning is necessary to fully comprehend the world. It requires not only knowing and thinking but also exercising the faculty of judgment.

As Beiner states out,

> Arendt's theory of judging is thus placed within an overall account of the present historical situation, which she interprets as one of a general crisis of Western morals and politics: traditional standards of judgment are no longer authoritative, ultimate values have ceased to be binding, the norms of political and moral civility have become acutely vulnerable. In this situation, the best that we can hope for is 'agreement in judgments' within an ideal judging community. The supreme danger is abstention from judgment, the banality of evil, the danger that, 'when the chips are down', the self will surrender to the forces of evil rather than exercise autonomous judgment. As long as we continue to discriminate among things good and beautiful, as long as we continue to 'choose our company' in matters of taste and politics – that is, as long as we refuse to forgo our faculty of judgment – all is not lost.[118]

We agree with Beiner that human beings cannot refuse to reflect, but must constantly exercise the faculty of judgment, making autonomous judgments about different human contexts.

Since the faculty of judgment is a common and essential point for Kant and Arendt, we ask: (i) Is obedience to the moral law the same as the blind obedience reported by Arendt? i.e. does the concept of discipline necessarily invoke absolute and unreflective obedience? (ii) Is discipline, as an expression of obedience to rules, a negation of reflection and thinking for its own sake? and (iii) Does discipline necessarily lead to the training/domestication of the self? In the following chapters, we will try to answer the questions above.

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[116] (Benhabib, 2003, p.185).
[117] (Bach, 2006, p.29 – own translation).
[118] (Beiner, 1992, p.113-114).

2 KANT'S THEORY OF DISCIPLINE

The main purpose of this chapter is to present Kant's theory of discipline. One can arguably consider that the theory of discipline is fundamental for a complete reading and interpretation of Kant's work, as well as for any implementation of his moral project. This systematic perspective can also be seen as an essential tool for understanding rational practical thought, rational practical judgment, and rational practical action in general, unlike what most Kantian interpreters assume who admittedly do not deny that Kant addresses the concept of discipline, yet do not present its systematic significance in all the main areas of Kant's philosophy, i.e. they unfortunately do not deal with its overarching role for the whole system of Kant's philosophy. This chapter seeks to map out the types of discipline present in Kant's writings, and their respective functions. In addition, whereas Kant presents discipline as negative, this dissertation thesis also questions and investigates whether it is possible to interpret it in a positive sense or whether this characterization goes beyond Kant's position or whether it is compatible with it. Moreover, given that Kant's theory of discipline plays a role in his ethics, it is necessary to investigate the function of discipline in the formation of character. If this is the case, we must consider the consequences of habit for its formation. We will show that habit cannot be limited to thoughtless repetition, as if it were, it would easily bypass the rational faculties. On the one hand, it is evident that virtue is inextricably linked to certain abilities. However, on the other hand, the question arises as to the role that habit plays in Kant's practical philosophy. What is the relationship between habit and the theory of discipline? And what is the relationship between habit and the formation of moral character?

2.1 THE NECESSITY OF DISCIPLINE FOR BEINGS THAT ACT ACCORDING TO MAXIMS

The purpose of this section is to argue that the moral discipline, or Kantian self-discipline, is related to the individual's ability to give themselves maxims, since human beings are animals that act according to the representation of laws. As Kant defines it in his *Pedagogy*, "[w]ildness is independence from laws. Discipline subjects man to the laws of humanity and begins to make him feel the constraint of laws. [...] Therefore man must early be accustomed to

submit to the dictates of reason".[119] The pragmatic discipline of education makes people submit to the laws of humanity in order to strengthen their character, while the self-discipline aims to make people follow self-imposed maxims, and these maxims must be moral maxims. In Kant's moral theory, the moral law applies to maxims and not to specific actions.[120] In order to argue that the Theory of Discipline is necessary for Kant's moral philosophy, this section seeks to maintain that since human beings act according to maxims, they need discipline. For this reason, it is necessary to understand the action of moral discipline/self-discipline in two fundamental moments of the agent: a) in the submission of her sensitive impulses to her reason, and b) in the submission of general maxims to the categorical imperative in order for them to become moral maxims. In the first case, I propose to analyze the deliberative aspect of moral judgment, and in the second, the procedural aspect in which the agent guarantees the necessity of the maxim's conformity to the categorical imperative.

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To interpret discipline as necessary for Kant's moral philosophy is to affirm that Kantian ethics consists of three interpretive pillars: the categorical imperative, autonomy, and maxims. Discipline is only necessary for beings who act according to maxims, and the ethics proposed by Kant can be read as an ethics of maxims, since it does not refer to specific rules or actions, but rather to maxims.[121] This distinction is indispensable not only because it classifies Kantian ethics as deontological rather than consequentialist, but also to understand that Kant's aim is not to eradicate feelings, desires, and impulses, that *being free* (in the broad sense) is not just about the autonomy of the will, and that in the relationship between duties (perfect and imperfect) and obligations, other elements come into play at the moment of deliberation and moral judgment – such as prudence in the case of imperfect duties (benevolence) and moral discipline in both types of obligation – because the law commands only the maxim of the actions and not the actions themselves.[122]

[119] (Päd, AA 09:442 – own translation).
[120] (MS, AA 06: 393).
[121] Still from this perspective, Höffe suggests interpreting Kant's ethics as an ethics of maxims. See Höffe (2005), page 203.
[122] About this Kant states that: "For maxims of actions can be [adopted] at will, and are subject only to the limiting condition of being fit for a giving of universal law, which is the formal principle of actions. A law, however, takes

Kant states in the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*[123] that maxims are considered contingent in themselves, which means that not all maxims have a moral content, maxims can also have their prudential content linked to politics and law, for example, so that the subject can renounce a maxim or principle at any time, and therefore they are not equivalent to imperatives, since a commandment requires the need for a law.[124] However, the maxim can be a moral maxim. To do this "we must be able to will that a maxim of our action become a universal law; this is the canon for morally estimating any of our actions".[125] In this case, it must be in conformity with the moral law, which is why the imperative contains in its

away what is willful from actions, and this distinguishes it from any recommendation (where all that one requires is to know the most suitable means to an end)" (MS, AA 06:389). In section VII, Kant continues: *Ethical Duties Are of Wide Obligation, Whereas Duties of Right Are of Narrow Obligation*. This proposition follows from the preceding one; for if the law can prescribe only the maxim of actions, not actions themselves, this is a sign that it leaves a latitude (latitudo) for free choice in following (complying with) the law, that is, that the law cannot specify precisely in what way one is to act and how much one is to do by the action for an end that is also a duty. But a wide duty is not to be taken as permission to make exceptions to the maxim of actions, but only as permission to limit one maxim of duty by another (e.g., love of one's neighbor in general by love of one's parents), by which in fact the field for the practice of virtue is widened" (MS, AA 06:390).

[123] In the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* (1785), Kant presents the categorical imperative as the highest principle of morality. According to this imperative, the individual must want the maxim of his action to become a universal law [Further details on the types of imperatives in Kant can be found in Lopes (2022)]. Although the concept of maxim is present in the formulation of the universal law, Kant does not make clear the direct relationship between imperatives (whether hypothetical or categorical) and maxims. For this reason, many interpreters have debated and questioned the role of maxims in Kantian moral theory. In the 1970s, Potter says, interpreters like Jonathan Harrison, Onora O'Neill, and Nelson Potter (1994) himself contributed to the debate. This debate was not limited to this period, but continued and appeared in books and articles on Kant's moral philosophy as a necessary definition and explanation for a consistent interpretation of his moral theory. The works of Alisson (1990), Potter (1994), and Willaschek (1992) posit that maxims represent a policy of action that is repeated in analogous circumstances. They are subjective and the result of self-imposed choices, which is why they must align with the Moral Law. As they are self-imposed choices, they are the conditions that the agents consider valid for their will. In turn, interpreters such as Michael Albrecht (2009) states that the maxims are subject to change over time; the agent can change his purposes and thus change his maxims. "The maxim does not express what one in general should do, but rather what a particular individual actually wills to do" (Albrecht, 2009, p.138). Moreover, maxims are not given to us, they are an achievement of reason, in this sense they are the expression of human freedom. Therefore, for Albrecht, maxims can be technical, prudential, and moral maxims, but only the latter express morality. More details on this debate can be found in the works of the aforementioned authors.

[124] "[...] the categorical imperative alone purports to be a practical law, while all the others may be called principles of the will but not laws. The reason for this is that whatever is necessary merely in order to attain some arbitrary purpose can be regarded as in itself contingent, and the precept can always be ignored once the purpose is abandoned. Contrariwise, an unconditioned command does not leave the will free to choose the opposite at its own liking. Consequently, only such a command carries with it that necessity which is demanded from a law" (GMS, AA 04:420).

[125] (GMS, AA 04:424).

formulation the *necessity of conformity* [126], i.e., "act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law".[127]

Kant understands the maxim as the subjective principle of the will[128],

> A maxim is the subjective principle of acting and must be distinguished from the objective principle, viz., the practical law. A maxim contains the practical rule which reason determines in accordance with the conditions of the subject (often his ignorance or his inclinations) and is thus the principle according to which the subject does act. But the law is the objective principle valid for every rational being, and it is the principle according to which he ought to act, i.e., an imperative.[129]

Therefore, they are not norms determined by someone else, but principles that the agent himself recognizes as his own. What makes a maxim a moral maxim is the direction given to its *form*, its *matter*, and its *complete determination*.[130] The form consists in the universality of moral judgment and is based on the universal formula of the categorical imperative, in other words, the maxim must be capable of universalization. The matter of the maxim, in turn, is an end, but this end is limited by the Kantian moral teleological perspective, i.e., maxims have as a restrictive condition for all their arbitrary and relative ends the practical idea that the human being is an end in itself.[131] Finally, complete determination consists in the totality of the procedure, that is, in the agreement of the maxims with the respective conditions. Therefore, the moral discipline or self-discipline associated with the maxims acts in moral judgment, that is, in the procedure capable of giving unity to the form of the will while guaranteeing the plurality of the matter. This is the moment when the idea of reason approaches intuition, since

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[126] "If I think of a hypothetical imperative in general, I do not know beforehand what it will contain until its condition is given. But if I think of a categorical imperative, I know immediately what it contains. For since, besides the law, the imperative contains only the necessity that the maxim should accord with this law, while the law contains no condition to restrict it, there remains nothing but the universality of a law as such with which the maxim of the action should conform. This conformity alone is properly what is represented as necessary by the imperative" (GMS, AA 04:420-421).

[127] (GMS, AA 04:421).

[128] "An action done from duty has its moral worth, not in the purpose that is to be attained by it, but in the maxim according to which the action is determined, The moral worth depends, therefore, not on the realization of the object of the action, but merely on the principle of volition according to which, without regard to any objects of the faculty of desire, the action has been done" (GMS, AA 04:399-400).

[129] Kant makes this definition in a note: GMS, AA 04:422.

[130] See: GMS, AA 04:436-437.

[131] "The principle: So act in regard to every rational being (yourself and others) that he may at the same time count in your maxim as an end in himself, is thus basically the same as the principle: Act on a maxim which at the same time contains in itself its own universal validity for every rational being. That in the use of means for every end my maxim should be restricted to the condition of its universal validity as a law for every subject says just the same as that a subject of ends, i. e., a rational being himself, must be made the ground for all maxims of actions and must thus be used never merely as means but as the supreme limiting condition in the use of all means, i. e., always at the same time as an end" (GMS, AA 04:438).

individual is not only capable of acting according to the representation of laws, but must act in this way in order to be autonomous.[132] Practical necessity[133] is a duty for every rational being, who obeys no laws except those they have given themselves.

In the *Critique of Practical Reason*, Kant reinforces the need to universalize the maxims by stating that a rational being must represent its maxims as universal practical laws. "The matter of a practical principle is the object of the will. This object either is the determining basis of the will or it is not".[134] In other words, if the object is the determining basis of the will, then it is subject to an empirical condition, which could be the feeling of pleasure or displeasure. Consequently, it cannot become a practical law, because the law is an objective principle valid for every rational being. In turn, the form of the maxim is its representation as a universal law, its ability to be universalized according to the evaluation of the categorical imperative. This means that if fundamental propositions[135] are subjective, and their condition is considered by the subject to be valid only for her own will, they are maxims; on the other hand, if they are objective, i.e., if the condition is valid for every rational being, they are practical laws. The fundamental propositions which subjects form cannot be regarded as laws; for this to be the case, the legislative form of the maxims must be the determining basis of the will. The will must be completely independent of the natural law of phenomena, "such independence, however, is called freedom in the strictest, i.e., the transcendental, meaning. Therefore, a will which is such that the mere legislative form of a maxim can alone serve it as a law is a free will".[136]

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[132] "Autonomy of the will is the property that the will has of being a law to itself (independently of any property of the objects of volition). The principle of autonomy is this: Always choose in such a way that in the same volition the maxims of the choice are at the same time present as universal law. That this practical rule is an imperative, i. e., that the will of every rational being is necessarily bound to the rule as a condition, cannot be proved by merely analyzing the concepts contained in it, since it is a synthetic proposition" (GMS, AA 04:440).

[133] "Hence morality consists in the relation of all action to that legislation where by alone a kingdom of ends is possible. This legislation must be found in every rational being and must be able to arise from his will, whose principle then is never to act on any maxim except such as can also be a universal law and hence such as the will can thereby regard itself as at the same time the legislator of universal law. If now the maxims do not by their very nature already necessarily conform with this objective principle of rational beings as legislating universal laws, then the necessity of acting on that principle is called practical necessitation, i. e., duty. Duty does not apply to the sovereign in the kingdom of ends, but it does apply to every member and to each in the same degree. The practical necessity of acting according to this principle, i.e., duty, does not rest at all on feelings, impulses, and inclinations, but only on the relation of rational beings to one another, a relation in which the will of a rational being must always be regarded at the same time as legislative, because otherwise he could not be thought of as an end in himself" (GMS, AA 04:434).

[134] (KpV, AA 05:27).

[135] "Practical principles are propositions that contain a general determination of the will, having under it several practical rules. They are subjective, or maxims, if the condition [under which they apply] is regarded by the subject as valid only for his will; but they are objective, or practical laws, if the condition is cognized as objective, i.e., as valid for the will of every rational being" (KpV, AA 05:19).

[136] (KpV, AA 05:29).

For Kant, human beings must consider themselves capable of fighting sensitive impulses, of submitting them to practical reason, because impulses are obstacles to the fulfillment of duty. In conceptualizing virtue, Kant states that the ability to resist an unjust adversary is courage, and in relation to the adversary of the moral attitude that exists in the subject himself, this ability is virtue.[137] In the *Doctrine of Virtue*, in addition to the need to qualify the maxims with regard to universal legislation, Kant takes up an aspect presented in the GMS concerning the approximation of the idea of reason to intuition. The maxims, as subjective principles that the agent subordinates to the categorical imperative (principle of evaluation), are considered negative principles, since they do not oppose the law. But even if this subordination is necessary and universal, it still requires that the subjective end – which each person has – be subordinated to the objective end – the end that each person must set for themselves.

By defining virtue as *the strength of the human maxim*[138] in the fulfillment of duty, Kant makes it possible to establish a direct relationship between virtue, discipline, inner freedom, and maxims.[139] Moral discipline, as a constituent part of the exercise of virtue, acts as self-discipline in the deliberative moment in which individuals choose their maxims and in moral judgment, transforming a general maxim into a moral maxim. Discipline is thus a necessary condition for virtue. However, this is not a sufficient condition, since it is a self-coercion according to internal freedom, i.e. the agent must at the same time want his maxim to become a universal law.[140] Therefore, we can read the expression "strength of the maxim in the fulfillment of duty" in two ways: (a) as the strength of the maxim that has gone through procedure, deliberation, and judgment to become a substantive moral law (virtue being the starting point); or (b) as the progressive construction of a moral character, that is, not letting the influences of sensibility dictate the nature of the maxims, but on the contrary, following the principles prescribed by oneself, maxims that are capable of becoming moral maxims as a continuous exercise toward the ideal of moral perfection (virtue as progression). On can see in the three works mentioned above, Kant proposes that human beings have the capacity for self-

[137] "Now the capacity and considered resolve to withstand a strong but unjust opponent is fortitude (*fortitudo*) and, with respect to what opposes the moral disposition within us, virtue (*virtus, fortitudo moralis*). So the part of the general doctrine of duties that brings inner, rather than outer, freedom under laws is a doctrine of virtue" (MS, AA 06:380).

[138] (MS, AA 06:394).

[139] This relationship is developed in section 3.1 Moral Discipline, Virtue, Moral Conscience and Autonomy.

[140] "Since virtue is based on inner freedom, it contains a positive command to a man, namely to bring all his capacities and inclinations under his (reason's) control and so to rule over himself, which goes beyond forbidding him to let himself be governed by his feelings and inclinations (the duty of apathy); for unless reason holds the reins of government in its own hands, man's feelings and inclinations play the master over him" (MS, AA 06:408).

determination [141], for acting according to principles, and that this capacity is fundamental not only to justify the possibility of moral action, but also for the individual to be able to deliberately choose moral maxims. It is through discipline that people have the capacity to submit to the laws of humanity, to set themselves maxims capable of becoming laws. Having a free will is the same as having a will under moral laws. For Kant, all moral discipline is self-discipline, and this is a necessary condition for morality. Thinking about *the final end* (human beings under moral laws) and the possibility of the subject achieving autonomy, it follows that reason requires the subject to remove self-imposed obstacles, and moral discipline is a necessary condition for this, even if it is not a sufficient condition.

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In light of the above, we have seen how maxims are fundamental to understanding: (a) the relation of the individual to the Kantian presupposition that human beings are capable of acting according to the representation of laws; (b) the types of maxims and their implications not only for moral theory but for human action in general, and their relation to free will; (c) the relation to the moral law, how maxims express a relation of the subject to the application of the categorical imperative; and (d) how subjective maxims can become universal laws that should govern actions. All of these aspects of the relationship between the maxim and Kant's moral theory are tied to two assumptions: (i) human beings act according to the representation of laws; and (ii) maxims are subject to the discipline of reason. Since maxims themselves are not immediately moral maxims, they must be subject to the self-discipline of reason. Therefore, it is through moral discipline or self-discipline that human beings can subordinate their inclinations to practical reason.[142] Human beings need discipline because they are not purely rational beings; as sentient beings, they are always influenced by inclination. The human beings, as rational beings, have the capacity to act according to the representation of laws[143], if the

[141] Moral discipline consists of the authority of the Moral Law and this is the condition under which one must fulfill one's duties to oneself.
[142] (KpV, AA 05:82).
[143] "Everything in nature works according to laws. Only a rational being has the power to act according to his conception of laws, i. e., according to principles, and thereby has he a will. Since the derivation of actions from laws requires reason, the will is nothing but practical reason. If reason infallibly determines the will, then in the case of such a being actions which are recognized to be objectively necessary are also subjectively necessary, i. e.,

derivation of laws is done through practical reason, they are substantive moral laws. Self-discipline makes it possible for individuals to act according to moral maxims and to be free in the negative sense (determination of *Willkür* by *Wille*) – which requires independence from the determination of sensible impulses as the driving force behind the subjective ends of agents – and to be free in the positive sense, that is, to give themselves universalizable maxims.

2.2 WHAT IS KANTIAN DISCIPLINE AND WHAT ARE ITS TYPES?

For Kant, human beings must be guided by their rationality, drawing everything from themselves and thus developing their natural dispositions. In order to achieve his end, that is, humanity in one's own person, the individual must develop these dispositions. As the third proposition of *Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Perspective* (1784) states,

> *Nature has willed that human beings produce everything that extends beyond the mechanical organization of their animal existence completely on their own, and that they shall not partake in any happiness or perfection other than that which they attain free of instinct and by means of their own reason.*[144]

Since nature has endowed human beings with reason and freedom, it shows that they must overcome their animality through both. One of the ways in which the individual can overcome his animality is by disciplining his inclinations.

The moral teleological perspective of the development of dispositions requires the individual to work hard to rise ever higher from the coarseness of his nature toward humanity, because in this way he is able both to make up for his ignorance through instruction and to correct his mistakes, and to form a moral character. In other words, the moral teleological perspective connected with the pedagogical perspective involves the relationship between *Aufklärung* and *Bildung*. Therefore, progression in the cultivation of the free will is also necessary if human beings are to reach their "the purest virtuous disposition, in which the *law* becomes also the incentive to his actions that conform with duty and he obeys the law from duty. This disposition is inner morally practical perfection"[145]. Drawing everything out of

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the will is a faculty of choosing only that which reason, independently of inclination, recognizes as being practically necessary, i. e., as good" (GMS, AA 04:412).

[144] (IaG, AA 08:19).

[145] (MS, AA 06:387).

oneself also requires self-knowledge in order to achieve moral perfection with regard to duty. Moral self-knowledge requires the removal of inner obstacles and then the development of good will.

Kant, in §83 of the *Critique of the power of judgment* (1790), entitled of *On the final end of nature as a teleological system*, argues that all possible ends existing in nature, i.e, "the aptitude for defining himself ends at all and (independent from nature in his determination of ends) using nature as a means appropriate to the maxims of his free ends in general [...]"[146], are characterized as the formal condition that will enable the search for the realization of the *final end* – "this can be nothing other than the human being (each rational being in the world) under moral laws"[147]. In this sense, culture, as the production of the capacity of a rational being for desired ends in general, is the *highest end*. This culture, as the highest end, is called the culture of discipline (*Disziplin*), which is negative[148], can be taught,[149] and consists in the liberation of the will from the despotism of desires.[150] However, for human beings to be able to pursue their final end, this culture must play its part in promoting free will, in determining and choosing

[146] (KU, AA 05:431).

[147] Kant continues: "I deliberately say 'under moral laws. The final end of creation is not the human being in accordance with moral laws, i.e., one who behaves in accordance with them. [...] Only of the human being under moral laws can we say, without overstepping the limits of our insight, that his existence constitutes the final end of the world. This is also in complete agreement with the judgment of human reason as it reflects upon the course of the world" (KU, AA 05:448).

[148] Kant, in his *Lectures on Ethics*, states that: "In formative training, we should try to ensure that it is merely negative, and that we exclude everything that is contrary to nature. Art or instruction may be of two kinds, negative and positive, or excluding and imparting. The negative side of instruction is to guard against the intrusion of errors; the positive, to make some addition to the store of information. The negative aspect, in both instruction and training of the child, is discipline; the positive aspect, in instruction, is doctrine. Discipline must precede doctrine. By discipline the heart and temperament can be trained, but character is shaped more by doctrine. Discipline amounts to corrective training; but by this the child is not taught anything new; there is merely a restriction of lawless freedom. Man must be disciplined, for he is by nature raw and wild. Only by art are human aptitudes conditioned to become civilized. In animals, their nature develops automatically, but with us it is by art, and so we cannot allow nature a free hand; otherwise, we rear men to be savages" (V-Mo/Collins Moralphilosophie Collins, AA 27:467).

[149] In accordance with the Kantian pedagogical perspective, a beneficial education is the foundation for all positive qualities and actions. It is therefore essential for individuals to cultivate the dispositions that facilitate the acquisition of these qualities. In the field of education, it is essential that individuals be disciplined, cultured, prudent, and morally upright. For Robinson dos Santos (2007), "discipline fulfills a negative or preventive function, that is, it consists of preventing animality from taking over our actions. In this sense, it prevents us from becoming, from an early age, hostages to our most primitive instincts and other impulses of our sensitivity. Discipline can be considered a preamble to education and fulfills a propaedeutic function for morality. In itself, discipline only means a process of heteronomy, through which the student not only becomes accustomed to obedience and even familiarity with rules for action, but gradually develops an understanding of the need for self-discipline" (Santos, 2007, p.5 – own translation).

[150] For Kant, "As far as the discipline of the inclinations is concerned, for which the natural predisposition in respect to our vocation as an animal species is quite purposive but which makes the development of humanity very difficult, nature still displays even in regard to this second require for culture a purposive effort at an education to make us receptive to higher ends than nature itself can afford" (KU, AA 05:433).

ends.[151] In this sense, discipline can be understood from different aspects within the Kantian system. In *Pedagogy*, Kant states that discipline is also the negative part of education; it prevents people from deviating (through their impulses) from their destiny: humanity. "Through discipline the human being is submitted to the laws of humanity and is first made to feel their constraint".[152] The discipline of reason can be interpreted as: (i) theoretical discipline; (ii) practical discipline – moral and pragmatic. Both theoretical and practical discipline are subdivided into self-discipline and external discipline.

Kant states in the *Transcendental Doctrine of Method* that discipline can be understood as a system of precaution and self-examination. It is not directed at content, but at the method of knowledge based on pure reason. It is reason itself that exercises discipline, and it aims to highlight one of the great benefits of the philosophy of pure reason, which is that it "is thus only negative, namely that it does not serve for expansion, as an organon, but rather, as a discipline, serves for the determination of boundaries, and instead of discovering truth it has only the silent merit of guarding against errors"[153]. Its internal aspect can be represented, for example, by the philosopher who uses the system of self-examination to avoid dogmatic premises.[154] Its external aspect is the establishment of a set of rules for the use of pure reason, the construction of a critical philosophical method aimed at preventing error. For Kant, error is not found in the senses, but in judgment.

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[151] According to Klein (2016), the distinction between *the highest end* and *the final end* is characterized as follows: "while *the highest end* belongs to nature, even though it is its last element, *the final end* is an absolute end, which requires no further determination. In order to establish a system of ends in nature, Kant needs to determine its highest end, but on the basis of the final end, which transcends the order of natural ends. In order to establish that the highest end of nature is man, but only with a view to the development of culture and, in particular, the culture of discipline, it is necessary to presuppose the determination of the final end. Since the final end is nothing other than man under moral laws, it can be said that the terminal end of history should also be the human species developing its disposition towards morality" (Klein, 2016, p. 79 – own translation).

[152] (Päd, AA 09:442).

[153] (KrV, B 823).

[154] "I am sorry to perceive the very same dishonesty, misrepresentation, and hypocrisy even in the utterances of the speculative way of thinking, where human beings have far fewer hindrances to and no advantage at all in forthrightly confessing their thoughts openly and unreservedly. For what can be more disadvantageous to insight than falsely communicating even mere thoughts, than concealing doubts which we feel about our own assertions, or giving a semblance of self-evidence to grounds of proof which do not satisfy ourselves? As long as these machinations arise merely from private vanity (which is usually the case in speculative judgments, which have no special interest and are not readily liable to apodictic certainty), then the vanity of others resists them with public approval, and in the end things end up at the same point to which they would have been brought, though much earlier, by the most honest disposition and sincerity. But where the public holds that subtle sophists are after nothing less than to shake the foundation of the public welfare, then it seems not only prudent but also permissible and even creditable to come to the aid of the good cause with spurious grounds rather than to give its putative enemies even the advantage of lowering our voice to the modesty of a merely practical conviction and necessitating us to admit the lack of speculative and apodictic certainty. I should think, however, that there is nothing in the world less compatible with the aim of maintaining a good cause than duplicity, misrepresentation, and treachery" (KrV, B 776-777).

In turn, the practical discipline, in addition to its own performance, also has a similarity with the performance of the theoretical discipline with regard, for example, to fanaticism. According to Kant,

> The more a man can compel himself, the freer he is. The less he can be compelled by others, the more inwardly free he is. We still have to distinguish here between the capacity for freedom and the state of being free. The capacity for freedom can be greater, although the state is worse. The greater the capacity, and the more the freedom from stimuli, the freer a man is. **If man were not in need of self-compulsion, he would be wholly free, for his will would then be entirely good, and he might willingly do all that is good, since he would be in no need of compelling himself; but that is not the case with man**.[155]

Kant calls those who believe they have a spontaneous goodness of spirit moral fanatics, because they seek only merit and forget their duties.[156] In the general sense, according to Kant, fanaticism is the exceeding of the limits of reason. Moral fanaticism, on the other hand, is when human beings exceed the limits of pure practical reason, those limits that it has set for humanity. Therefore, according to Kant,

> Practical pure reason thereby forbids us to posit the subjective determining basis of actions conforming to duty – i.e., their moral incentive – in anything other than the law itself, and to posit the attitude that is thereby brought into the maxims anywhere else than in respect for this law; and it commands us to make the thought of duty – the thought which strikes down all arrogance as well as vain self-love – the supreme life-principle of all morality in human beings. If this is so, then not only novelists and sentimental educators (even if they are ever so zealously opposed to sentimentality) but sometimes even philosophers – indeed, the sternest among them all, the Stoics – have introduced moral fanaticism in place of sober but wise **moral discipline**, though the fanaticism of the latter was more heroic while that of the former was of a more insipid and tender constitution. **And one can, without being hypocritical, say quite truthfully about the moral teaching of the Gospel that, by the purity of its moral principle but at the same time by the appropriateness of this principle to the limits of finite beings, it first subjected all good conduct of human beings to the discipline of a duty laid before their eyes – which does not let them rove among fancied moral perfections – and set limits of humility (i.e., of self-cognition) to self-conceit as well as to self-love, both of which readily fail to recognize their bounds**.[157]

This case is an example of the action of practical discipline and its relationship with the limitation of practical reason. The function of limitation that is typical of theoretical self-

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[155] (V-Mo/Collins Moralphilosophie Collins, AA 27:269 – own emphasis).
[156] For more on these statements by Kant regarding pure fanaticism in disposing of noble, sublime and magnanimous actions, see Kant, KpV, AA 05:84-85.
[157] (KpV, AA 05: 85-86).

discipline is also exercised by moral discipline. In the case of practical reason, the limitation occurs in determining and shaping what can be used as a moral incentive.

This practical discipline is moral discipline, moreover Kant states in the *Critique of Practical Reason* that

> We are subject to a *discipline of reason*, and in all our maxims must not forget to be submissive to it, not to detract from it in any way, and not to curtail in any way – through delusion based on self-love – the authority of the law (even though our own reason gives it) by positing the determining basis of our will, even if in conformity with the law, still in something other than the law itself and in respect for this law. Duty and obligation are the only designations that we must give to our relation to the moral law.[158]

Kantian moral discipline, as the self-discipline that gives voice to the moral law, is capable of generating in the individual the necessary strength to overcome these obstacles for the sake of duty, and is linked to the individual's capacity to give itself maxims. In his three major works on moral theory – the GMS, KpV, and TL – Kant shows the connection between maxims on the one hand and agents as subjects who must submit their desires to the practical reason in themselves (the deliberative[159] aspect of moral judgment), and on the other hand with the imperative as a necessary procedure for this maxim to become a moral maxim (the procedural aspect). Both aspects are essential for a maxim to have moral content. The discipline of merely following self-imposed maxims does not yet have the status of a Kantian moral discipline. Kant's example in the *Anthropology* illustrates the difference between following maxims and following moral maxims. Sulla was a man admired for his achievements and a follower of his subjective principles, but at the same time he was a man of bad character who provoked abhorrence for the cruelty of his harsh maxims.[160] This example shows us that it's not enough to have character, but it's necessary to have moral character [161], in other words, it's not enough

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[158] (KpV, AA 05:82).

[159] It should be clarified that *deliberative* in this context means reflection on the *how* and not the act of deciding on the ends. In other words, *deliberation* is the reflective *process of how to make the moral law operative in actions*.

[160] (Anth, AA 07:293).

[161] With regard to this distinction between *character* and *moral character*, one can refer to the following passage: "If by this term 'character" one generally understands that which can definitely be expected of a person, whether good or bad, then one usually adds that he has this or that character, and then the term signifies his way of sensing. – **But simply to have a character signifies that property of the will by which the subject binds himself to definite practical principles that he has prescribed to himself irrevocably by his own reason. Although these principles may sometimes indeed be false and incorrect, nevertheless the formal element of the will in general, to act according to firm principles (not to fly off hither and yon, like a swarm of gnats), has something precious and admirable in it; for it is also something rare.** Here it does not depend on what nature

to follow rules dictated by oneself, it's necessary that these subjective principles of the will can be considered as substantive moral laws, and in this sense, moral discipline and virtue are linked.

Pragmatic discipline, in turn, is guided by the rules of prudence. In the *Lectures on Ethics*, Kant states that the human being,

> […] must have discipline, and he disciplines himself according to the rules of prudence; he often, for example, has the desire to sleep late, but he compels himself to get up, because he sees that it is necessary; he often has the desire to go on eating or drinking, but he sees that it is harmful to him. This discipline is the executive authority of reason's prescription over the actions that proceed from sensitivity. It is the discipline of prudence, or the pragmatic discipline. [...] Hence we may say that self-command consists in this, that we are able to subject all principia to the power of our free choice. This may be considered under two rules, namely those of prudence and morality. All prudence rests, indeed, on the rule of the understanding; but in the rule of prudence understanding is the servant of sensibility, providing it with means whereby the inclination is satisfied, since in regard to ends it is dependent on sensibility. But the true self-mastery is moral in character.[162]

The internal aspect of pragmatic discipline can be related to pragmatic self-government, such as its function of disciplining human unsociability. Kantian social antagonism, expressed in the fourth proposition of the *Idea of a Universal History*, is the means by which nature carries out the development of its dispositions, which Kant calls unsociable sociability.[163] On the one hand, sociability, as the disposition to enter into society, is the means for the development and mastery of the rational faculties; on the other hand, insociability is the propensity to isolation, resistance to the will of others. Insociability and resistance in general can lead to social evils, qualities that in themselves are not worthy of appreciation, such as selfishness. But nature does not do anything in vain; for Kant, it does not waste means to achieve ends, because "all the culture and art that decorates humankind, as well as its most pleasing social order, are fruits of an

makes of the human being, but on what the human being makes of himself, for the former belongs to temperament (where the subject is for the most part passive), and only the latter enables one to recognize that he has a character" (Anth, AA 07:292 – own emphasis). Therefore, according to this passage, it is possible to distinguish between character and moral character. I understand that to have character is to follow principles given to oneself and these rules can be good or bad. In this sense, character would simply be the act of following what I set out to do, without taking into account the morality or immorality of that rule or act. In turn, to have a moral character is it requires the maxim to have its restrictive condition and its determination contemplated. In other words, these rules or principles need to become substantive moral principles, i.e. principles that have passed through the sieve of the categorical imperative.

[162] (V-Mo/Collins Moralphilosophie Collins, AA 27: 360-361).

[163] (IaG, AA 08:20-21).

unsociability that is forced by its own nature to discipline itself and thereby develop fully the seeds that nature planted within it by means of an imposed art".[164]

On the other hand, the external aspect of pragmatic discipline can be linked to law and pedagogy. In connection with law, the discipline is used as a tool to foster a Kantian type of civic patriotism capable of driving rational and reasonable socio-political action. Kant, in the first definitive article of *Toward Perpetual Peace*, states that the civil constitution of states must be republican because it is based on the principles of freedom, dependence, and equality. It is based on the concept of law and has perpetual peace in mind. According to Kleingeld (2000), among the various definitions of patriotism, Kantian patriotism is compatible with civic patriotism, and the latter with cosmopolitanism. In Kantian terms, civic patriotism must be based on a just and democratic state[165] in which citizens are essential to its proper functioning. In the Kantian proposal presented by Kleingeld (2000), the citizen has a duty to a just democratic state, and to this end the state also needs the participation of its citizens in order to continue to function. Through participation, the citizen seeks to make the state more internally just and, consequently, more respectful of people's rights and human rights.

Linking pragmatic discipline and pedagogy, Kant wrote in his *Pedagogy*,

> Discipline or training changes animal nature into human nature. An animal is already all that it can be because of its instinct, a foreign intelligence has already taken care of everything for it. But the human being needs his own intelligence. He has no instinct and must work out the plan of his conduct for himself. However, since the human being is not immediately in a position to do this, because he is in a raw state when he comes into the world, others must do it for him.[166]

Discipline transforms animality into humanity. It prevents people from deviating from their humanity, it is purely negative because it removes the savagery from people.[167]

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[164] (IaG, AA 08:22).

[165] Regarding the use of the term democratic, Kleingeld clarifies in a note that what Kant means by republic is today what is meant by democracy. According to her, "Kant himself discusses these matters in terms of 'republicanism', not 'democracy', because he does not advocate general adult suffrage. Moreover, he regards democracy as a despotic political system in which the people rule without a separation of powers (Perpetual Peace VIII, p. 352). In Kant's terminology, what we mean by democracy today is a 'republic' with general adult suffrage and with a more clearly worked-out system of political representation than that provided by Kant" (Kleingeld, 2000, p. 328).

[166] (Päd, AA 09:441).

[167] "Savagery is independence from laws. Through discipline the human being is submitted to the laws of humanity and is first made to feel their constraint. But this must happen early. Thus, for example, children are sent to school initially not already with the intention that they should learn something there, but rather that they may grow

According to Baumeister (2020), human animality provides an indispensable basis for the development of human capacities such as technical skill, personality and humanity. He does not deny that the human capacity for self-awareness elevates it in relation to other animals, but this does not mean that human nature ceases to have and be its share of animality. For Baumeister, the discipline of human animality avoids the repression or denial of one's own animality; in fact, it is in favor of the controlled development of human animality for the sake of humanity's goals.[168] We therefore agree with Baumeister that animality must be preserved in education, because the animal instincts or impulses in human nature occupy a significant place in the development of humanity.[169] Certainly, they can be more or less virtuous; discipline is therefore necessary so that they do not deviate from their purpose.

I agree with Baumeister (2020) that although animality creates tensions with moral goals, it remains an irremediable component of human nature that we need to deal with. The vices arising from animality are not animality itself, its root, but a deviation from its ends.[170]

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accustomed to sitting still and observing punctually what they are told, so that in the future they may not put into practice actually and instantly each notion that strikes them" (Päd, AA 09:442).

[168] "Hence, Kant states, 'In general it should be observed that the first stage of education [physical education or discipline] must be merely negative, i.e., one should not add some new provision to that of nature, but merely leave nature undisturbed' (Ped. 9: 459). Kant's view of physical education is quite nuanced. It involves introducing constraints upon human animality – 'taming' the 'savagery' of animality in its lawless state – while also 'leaving undisturbed' that which is natural in the predisposition. An apt illustration of this balance is Kant's analogy between the proper education of a child and the proper growth of a tree. Referencing the botched education of princes in his time, who he claims generally do not meet with enough resistance in childhood, Kant remarks, 'But a tree which stands alone in the field grows crooked and spreads its branches wide. By contrast, a tree which stands in the middle of the forest grows straight towards the sun and air above it, because the trees next to it offer opposition' (Ped. 9: 448). Just as the tree developing within the constraints of the forest grows higher, straighter, and better positioned to benefit from the sun and the air, the child educated within the constraints placed upon it by discipline is able to develop its natural predispositions to a greater and fuller extent. At least in principle, Kant's approach to the disciplining of human animality eschews the repression or denial of animality in favour of a reasoned and controlled development or preservation of animality in light of the aims of humanity, and the aims of nature that underlie each of the human's predispositions" (Baumeister, 2020, p.115-116).

[169] "[...] in his treatment of animality as a component of human nature in the Religion, and in his elaboration of this conception in his philosophies of education and history, Kant frames the relation between humans and other animals at a level below or prior to categorical differences. Far from denying the animality of human beings, Kant recognizes the necessary and co-constitutive part played by animality within the developmental trajectories of human nature. While Kant's account remains, from a contemporary perspective, problematic in multiple ways, it nonetheless offers distinctive, and uniquely Kantian, resources for rethinking the relationship of humans to other animals, and of human beings to themselves" (Baumeister, 2020, p.122).

[170] "[...] Kant does not place blame on animality itself. It is rather the conflict between animality and reason (the wellspring of morality) that is to blame. Kant is explicit about this in the 'Conjectural Beginning of Human History'. Imagining the emergence of the human being and of human history from an otherwise entirely non-human, non-rational natural background, Kant suggests that 'Before reason awoke, there was neither command nor prohibition and hence no transgression; but when reason began its business and, weak as it is, got into a scuffle [*Gemenge*] with animality in its whole strength, then there had to arise ills and, what is worse, with more cultivated reason, vices, which were entirely alien to the condition of ignorance and hence of innocence' (Con. 8: 115). 0e double-sided character of human animality plays out in the development of the species just as it does in that of the individual. Though the persistence and necessity of animality in human history hampers the project of achieving the ends of history, the ills and vices symptomatic of this project's failure are not the fault of animality, which is itself something innocent" (Baumeister, 2020, p.120-121).

Therefore, it is not an obstacle to be extirpated, but an indispensable feature of our nature that contributes to human well-being. From this perspective, I argue that with the perspective of discipline as a gradual process, and a continuous procedure, this harmonization is possible, and that discipline is indispensable to Kant's system. We can't overcome our animality, but we must discipline it. The fact that Kant lists certain concepts apparently as stages or steps does not necessarily mean that they are in fact stages in the sense that they must be "overcome" and then they are "overcome", i.e. the fact that Kant presents animality as the first predisposition and discipline as the first educational step does not necessarily imply that they are stages to be overcome. Whether it's the three dispositions (animality, humanity, and personality) or the four stages of education (discipline, cultivation, civilization, and moralization), we must find the means in human nature itself to constantly harmonize them. For Kant, in the *Religion Within the Boundary of Mere Reason*, animality is an original and natural human predisposition, so it can't and shouldn't be extirpated, therefore it must be disciplined because only in this way can it contribute to the development of dispositions towards humanity and freedom.[171]

For Kant, human beings are naturally inclined toward freedom as *Willkür*, so they must be accustomed to the precepts of reason from an early age. The education of citizens has two stages, discipline and instruction, which must be carried out by a cosmopolitan educational project. Kant emphasizes that it is through education that people become truly human; pedagogically speaking, people are what education makes them. Kant not only doesn't deny the possibility that each future generation will take a further step toward the perfection of humanity, but it is the object of the Idea of a University History. Education is an art that requires practice, it must be perfected over several generations, so that one generation educates another.[172] For Kant, good education is the source of all good in the world, while the cause of evil is the failure to subject human nature to moral norms.[173] Human beings are capable of acting according to maxims and deviating from their impulses, which stem from self-love.

In education, human beings must be disciplined, become cultured, become prudent, and take care of moralization. Kant lists these four steps as follows:

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[171] The three predispositions that Kant lists in the RGV are: (i) the animality of the human being as a living being; (ii) humanity in the human being as a living and rational being and (iii) personality as a rational and at the same time responsible being (RGV, AA 06:26). According to these definitions, there is no irremediable conflict between the predispositions, since there is not inevitably a contradiction, but means of harmonizing them are possible.

[172] (Päd, AA 09:446).

[173] "Good education is exactly that from which all the good in the world arises. The germs which lie in the human being must only be developed further and further. For one does not find grounds of evil in the natural predispositions of the human being. The only cause of evil is this, that nature is not brought under rules" (Päd, AA 09:448).

> 1) be disciplined. To discipline means to seek to prevent animality from doing damage to humanity, both in the individual and in society. Discipline is therefore merely the taming of savagery.
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> 2) The human being must be cultivated. Culture includes instruction and teaching. It is the procurement of skillfulness. The latter is the possession of a faculty which is sufficient for the carrying out of whatever purpose. Thus skillfulness determines no ends at all, but leaves this to the later circumstances. Some kinds of skillfulness are good in all cases, for example reading and writing; others only for some purposes, for example music, which makes us popular with others. Because of the multitude of purposes, skillfulness becomes, as it were, infinite.
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> 3) It must be seen that the human being becomes prudent also, well suited for human society, popular, and influential. This requires a certain form of culture, which is called civilizing. Its prerequisites are manners, good behavior and a certain prudence in virtue of which one is able to use all human beings for one's own final purposes. This form of culture conforms to the changeable taste of each age. Thus just a few decades ago ceremonies were still loved in social intercourse.
>
> 4) One must also pay attention to moralization. The human being should not merely be skilled for all sorts of ends, but should also acquire the disposition to choose nothing but good ends. Good ends are those which are necessarily approved by everyone and which can be the simultaneous ends of everyone.[174]

On the one hand, education for autonomy is not yet morality, but on the other hand, it is capable of teaching individuals to think for themselves, to exercise their freedom, to build a culture of reason, and to develop their moral character. Therefore, the aim of the pragmatic educational discipline is not to equal morality[175], because education is still heteronomy; its aim is to serve as a tool for the process of *moralization* and the construction of moral character.

2.2.1 Theoretical Discipline as a precautionary system

According to Kant in the *Critique of Pure Reason*,

[174] (Päd, AA 09:449-450).

[175] Kant makes it clear in the Päd that the role of pragmatic educational discipline is not to equal morality. “Maxims must originate from the human being himself. One should try to convey concepts concerning good and evil to children already early on in moral culture. If one wants to ground morality," one must not punish. Morality is something so holy and sublime that one must degrade it and place it on the same level with discipline. The first effort in moral education is the grounding of character. Character consists in the aptitude of acting according to maxims. In the beginning these are school maxims and later maxims of humanity." In the beginning the child obeys laws. Maxims too are laws, but subjective ones; they originate from the human being's own understanding. [...] If one wishes to form a character in children, it is very important to draw their attention to a certain plan in all things, certain laws, known to them, which they must follow exactly. [...] Human beings who have not given themselves certain rules are unreliable” (Päd, AA 09:481).

> […] where the limits of our possible cognition are very narrow, where the temptation to judge is great, where the illusion that presents itself is very deceptive, and where the disadvantage of error is very serious, there the negative in instruction, which serves merely to defend us from errors, is more important than many a positive teaching by means of which our cognition could be augmented. The compulsion through which the constant propensity to stray from certain rules is limited and finally eradicated is called **discipline**.[176]

The human desire to knowledge often inclines towards positive judgments, as they can contribute to the accumulation of knowledge. This human desire to know is a propensity that often aspires to an incessant expansion of knowledge that can transcend the limits of reason itself. This human tendency to diverge from certain rules necessitates the imposition of constraints to prevent the use of reason from descending into dogmatism or skepticism. This restriction is referred to as discipline. Consequently, in composing the *Transcendental Doctrine of Method*, Kant's objective is to delineate the formal prerequisites of a comprehensive system of pure reason. This necessitates the establishment of four fundamental elements: discipline, canon, architectonics, and history of pure reason. Kant posits that the negative character of the teachings is designed to safeguard reason from error, and that this function is occasionally more crucial than the imparting of numerous positive teachings. He thus sets aside four sections to discuss the discipline of reason as negative legislation. These are as follows: (i) the discipline of pure reason in dogmatic use; (ii) the discipline of pure reason with regard to its polemical use; (iii) the discipline of pure reason with regards to hypotheses and (iv) the discipline of pure reason with regard to its proofs. The first section directs reason towards its own method, namely the philosophical method, rather than the mathematical method. The second use of the discipline concerns polemical use and the discipline aims to avoid overstepping its bounds in terms of dogmatic affirmations and denials.[177] In the third use, the discipline must curb impulses to start with objects and must first establish the objective validity of its concepts *a priori*.

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[176] (KrV, B 737).

[177] "I am not, to be sure, of the opinion that excellent and thoughtful men (e.g., Sulzer), aware of the weakness of previous proofs, have so often expressed, that one can still hope someday to find self-evident demonstrations of the two cardinal propositions of our pure reason: there is a God, and there is a future life. Rather, I am certain that this will never happen. For whence will reason derive the ground for such synthetic assertions, which are not related to objects of experience and their inner possibility? But it is also apodictically certain that no human being will ever step forward who could assert the opposite with the least plausibility, let alone assert it dogmatically. For since he could only establish this through pure reason, he would have to undertake to prove that a highest being or the thinking subject in us as pure intelligence is impossible. But whence will he derive the knowledge that would justify him in judging synthetically about things beyond all possible experience? We can therefore be entirely unconcerned that somebody will someday prove the opposite; we therefore do not have to think up scholastic proofs, but can always assume these propositions, which are quite consistent with the speculative interest of our reason in its empirical use and are, moreover, the only means for uniting this with the practical interest" (KrV, B 769-770).

Finally, the fourth use of the discipline in the *Critique of Pure Reason* concerns proofs; Kant establishes the rules for transcendental proofs.

For Kant, it is evident that both temperament and talent necessitate discipline. However, it is paradoxical that the very reason that provides this discipline also requires it.[178] The discipline of reason is indispensable,

> […] where neither empirical nor pure intuition keeps reason in a visible track, namely in its transcendental use in accordance with mere concepts, there it so badly needs a discipline to constrain its propensity to expansion beyond the narrow boundaries of possible experience and to preserve it from straying and error that the entire philosophy of pure reason is concerned merely with this negative use. Individual errors can be remedied through censure and their causes through critique. But where, as in pure reason, an entire system of delusions and deceptions is encountered, which are connected with each other and unified under common principles, there a quite special and indeed **negative legislation** seems to be required, which under the name of a **discipline** erects, as it were, **a system of caution and self-examination** out of the nature of reason and the objects of its pure use, before which no false sophistical illusion can stand up but must rather immediately betray itself, regardless of all grounds for being spared.[179]

Kant defines discipline as its own legislation that acts as a system of precaution and self-examination. This system is not directed at content, but only at the method of knowledge based on pure reason.[180] Discipline is understood as the self-criticism of reason, which analyzes its possibilities and limits, thus enabling the foundation and legitimacy of knowledge free from errors and illusions.[181]

In the *Transcendental Doctrine of Method*, Kant posits that a system of precaution and self-examination is necessary for the sake of reason,

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[178] "Everyone will readily grant that the temperament as well as the talents that would allow a free and unlimited movement (such as Imagination and wit) require discipline in many respects. But that reason, which is properly obliged to prescribe its discipline for all other endeavors, should have need of one itself, may certainly seem strange, and in fact reason has previously escaped such a humiliation only because, given the pomp and the serious mien with which it appears, no one could easily come to suspect it of frivolously playing with fancies instead of concepts and words instead of things" (KrV, B 738).

[179] (KrV, B 739 – own emphasis).

[180] (KrV, B 740).

[181] "But there is so much that is similar in the use of reason, whatever object it may be applied to, and yet, insofar as it would be transcendental, it is so essentially different from all other uses, that without the admonitory negative doctrine of a discipline especially aimed at them the errors could not be avoided that must necessarily arise from the inappropriate pursuit of such methods, which might be suitable for reason elsewhere but not here" (KrV, B 740).

> reason can and must exercise this discipline itself, without allowing anything else to censor it, elevates it and gives it confidence in itself, for the boundaries that it is required to set for its speculative use at the same time limit the sophistical pretensions of every opponent, and thus it can secure against all attacks everything that may still be left to it from its previously exaggerated demands. The greatest and perhaps only utility of all philosophy of pure reason is thus only negative, namely that it does not serve for expansion, as an organon, but rather, as a discipline, serves for the determination of boundaries, and instead of discovering truth it has only the silent merit of guarding against errors.[182]

As observed by Chance (2013), the concept of discipline in the first *Critique* has, for a considerable period, been largely overlooked by interpreters. However, for him, the discipline of reason represents the most crucial aspect of Kant's critique of dogmatic metaphysics. In this sense, the objective of the discipline is to establish a set of rules for the use of pure reason that, if followed, will mitigate the human tendency to make judgments about suprasensible objects. This is achieved by presenting a series of rules to avoid a certain type of error, namely, the error or "*mistake*" associated with the transcendental illusion. Kant asserts that the distinction between truth and illusion is not inherent in the objects themselves, but rather in the judgments we make about them. Consequently, the error is not located in the senses, as they do not engage in judgments. Rather, the error is found in the relationship between the object and the understanding, which is the domain of judgment.[183] The "error is effected only through the unnoticed influence of sensibility on understanding, through which it happens that the subjective grounds of the judgment join with the objective ones, and make the latter deviate from their destination".[184] As with Chance, Trevisan (2015) also notes that the discipline of reason is a rare object of analysis in the secondary bibliography.[185] Trevisan posits that pure reason necessitates a critique, which in turn constitutes a discipline. Discipline, as a system of caution and self-examination, can be understood as a form of negative legislation.

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[182] (KrV, B 823).

[183] "For truth and illusion are not in the object, insofar as it is intuited, but in the judgment about it insofar as it is thought. Thus it is correctly said that the senses do not err; yet not because they always judge correctly, but because they do not judge at all. Hence truth, as much as error, and thus also illusion as leading to the latter, are to be found only in judgments, i.e., only in the relation of the object to our understanding" (KrV, B350).

[184] (KrV, B350-351).

[185] Trevisan (2015) points out that: "As already said, the Discipline of pure reason constitutes a rare object of concern in the secondary bibliography when compared to the other parts of the KrV. Giorgio Tonelli, who sought to understand the KrV within the logical tradition of the eighteenth century, recognized the importance of the Discipline but avoided discussing in detail the 'relationship between the Transcendental Dialectic as a discipline of reason, and the Discipline of Reason in the Transcendental Doctrine of Method', arguing that here arise 'several complex problems with far-reaching consequences' [Tonelli, 1994, p.101]. It would not be an exaggeration to say that practically all commentators follow Tonelli in this judgment and do not carry out an investigation into the relationship between these parts of the KrV, including also the Transcendental Analytics, which Tonelli does not even mention in the above passage" (Trevisan, 2015, p.241-242 – own translation).

In *Constructing Authorities* (2015), O'Neill presents her interpretation of the role of the concept of discipline in Kant. Her primary objective is to demonstrate the authority of reason. To this end, she posits that the norms of human reasoning and their legitimacy must be constructed from the resources available to human beings. These resources include the discipline of reason. She defines the discipline as:

> First, the discipline of reason is negative; second, it is self-discipline; third, it is a law-giving. That it is negative is in any case part of the definition of a discipline and is a corollary of the rejection of 'alien' authorities – of foundationalism. Nothing has been assumed from which positive content could be derived; nor can anything of the sort be assumed without begging the question. That it is self-discipline confirms that reasoning is a reflexive task, which works on the available material of our incipient and often disastrous everyday practices of reasoning. That the discipline of reason is a lawgiving entails that it is at least lawlike. Lawlikeness presupposes that a plurality of agents, or at least of cases, may fall under reason's principles.[186]

In O'Neill's view, a negative law lacks content and therefore imposes no more than mere form. This implies that the discipline of reason serves to define which principles can be considered fundamental and which do not. Consequently, according to her, discipline is a practice of thinking and acting. Therefore, discipline is a process of subjecting thought and action.

O'Neill (2004; 2015) defends her interpretation and function of discipline in Kant's philosophy on the basis of the cognitive aspect. O'Neill (2015) posits that the critique of reason does not merely have a negative outcome. Furthermore, it asserts the existence of standards or principles of authority upon which theoretical thought and practical action can be based and judged. Reason is both the source of problems and the means of solving them. It is possible for our reasoning to become contradictory, therefore it is important to consider how we can avoid the dangers of unreliable reasoning. The critique of reason is a necessary phenomenon because we are inevitably committed to thinking and acting. The reflective framework is an integral component of Kant's theory of justifying the authority of reason.

In her analysis of Kant's methodology in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, O'Neill asserts that the discipline of reason rejects the traditional methods employed in philosophy, such as mathematical and skeptical methods. Kant asserts that until methods are devised to prevent cognitive slips, all critical philosophy is inherently uncertain. Kant's solution to the insatiable desire that leads us into error is to accept that recognize that we have this ambition, to limit it,

[186] (O'Neill, 2015, p. 27-28).

and to adopt a form of cognitive discipline. In order to avoid error and to limit pure reason, it is necessary to exercise discipline. Accordingly, for O'Neill, in the speculative theoretical use of reason, the discipline of reason is employed as a dialectical system of precaution and self-examination that restricts unwarranted metaphysical speculation. O'Neill notes that, at first glance, this discipline may appear to be Kant's abandonment of philosophical ambitions. The subordination of reason to a discipline seems to lead to a kind of conformism to common sense. However, this view is mistaken and does not invalidate the authority of reason in Kant.

In her view, the *Transcendental Doctrine of Method* offers a genuine relationship between discipline and reason. This relationship is based on the interpretation of reason as a type of negative self-discipline. In accordance with its three defining characteristics – namely, negative, self-discipline, and legislative – the first is founded upon limitations. When Kant refers to reason as a discipline, he indicates that it is a negative restriction on how we think and how we act. This implies that there is no content capable of completely guiding the processes of reasoning; rather, there are restrictions. The second concerns the discipline of reason which does not derive its authority from anything external to it. This implies that reason is not subject to any external influence, whether that be the Church, the State, or any other institution. The authority of reason is derived from its own internal logic, which necessitates that reason be subject to its own critical examination. The final aspect is the necessity for the authority of reason as a universal that functions in two distinct ways: theoretically and practically. It is only with the authority of reason that it is possible to distinguish between what is reasonable, i.e. ways of organizing thought and action that are capable of universality and can therefore be followed by others, and what must be rejected as irrational, i.e. arbitrary reasons that are incomprehensible to others. In the theoretical domain, the reasons must be intelligible to all. In the practical domain, the reasons for action must be ones that everyone can also adopt.

On the one hand, I agree with Onora O'Neill's perspective on discipline in Kant and its importance for thinking about the issues that permeate contemporary democracies. Conversely, it seems that O'Neill's position entails certain restrictions and limitations on the definitions and applications of the discipline, particularly in relation to Kant's practical philosophy. Although O'Neill assumes the existence of a practical aspect, it appears that this is limited to cognitive self-discipline. Consequently, she fails to acknowledge other developments of the discipline, including its external scope, pragmatic functions, and even its practical use. According to O'Neill, the practical use of the discipline is limited to self-discipline, which aims to provide a structure for what should be communicated by public reasoning in view of actions that can be

accepted by all in constitutional democracies. We concur with O'Neill's position, but seek to build upon it. Consequently, we supplement her position with the developments of the types and uses of discipline presented by Kant, both in his theoretical philosophy and in his practical philosophy. It can be argued that discipline is not merely an important concept within Kant's work that can also be used in contemporary times; rather, it is a concept that has enduring relevance. Furthermore, I argue that there is a systematic relationship between Kant's philosophy and his theory of discipline.[187]

As I will try to demonstrate throughout this doctoral dissertation, Kant's concept of discipline is not limited to its role as the initial educational step, as evidenced in *Pedagogy*, nor is it solely a system of self-examination, as exemplified in *Critique of Pure Reason*. In fact, discipline in Kant is multifaceted and can be applied in various contexts. In fact, Kant has a theory of discipline that is comprised of various uses, functions, and connections with his philosophical system. O'Neill's position entails a deficit, because she employs the theoretical discipline for practical purposes. Consequently, it appears that she does not recognize a practical and pragmatic discipline with functions in the internal and external spheres for human beings. I do not disagree with this use, as it is necessary, but it is too restricted. Therefore, I will attempt to demonstrate that Kant has a practical discipline with practical uses and functions, appropriate to his practical philosophy, and not merely a single theoretical concept used for practical purposes. The systematicity of the theory of discipline finds its place in the Kantian project of moralization and in its various connections with the ethical, political, social, legal, and pedagogical fields.

2.2.2 Can Kant's discipline be understood as positive?

With regard to discipline, Kant, in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, states that

> The compulsion through which the constant propensity to stray from certain rules is limited and finally eradicated is called discipline. It is different from culture, which would merely produce a skill without first canceling out another one that is already

[187] "Under the government of reason our cognitions cannot at all constitute a rhapsody but must constitute a system, in which alone can support and advance its essential ends. I understand a system, however, the unity of the manifold cogmtlons under one ideia. This is the rational concept of the form of a whole, insofar as through this the domain of the manifold as well as the position of the parts with respect to each other is determined *a priori*" (KrV, B 860).

> present. In the formation of a talent, therefore, which already has itself a tendency to expression, discipline will make a negative contribution, but culture and doctrine a positive one.[188]

According to Kant, discipline provides a negative contribution. In a note in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant points out that, although the terms "discipline" and "instruction" have been sometimes used synonymously, they are distinct concepts. He posits that

> I am well aware that in the language of the schools the name of discipline is customarily used as equivalent to that of instruction. But there are so many other cases where the first expression, as correction, must carefully be contrasted to teaching, and the nature of things itself also makes it necessary to preserve the only suitable expression for this difference, that I wish that this word would never be allowed to be used in anything but the negative sense.[189]

Accordingly, Kant in the *Critique of Pure Reason* posits that discipline plays a negative role. In his writings, Kant only defines and classifies discipline as negative. On the one hand, it is negative in relation to morality because it removes obstacles. Therefore, its function is not to expand, but only to limit.

Form the aforementioned passages and from numerous others that have been exposed and analyzed in this thesis, on can reasonably conclude that Kant is categorical in his assertion that discipline is negative. This role is consistently described in all the textual quotations as a limitation, restriction, or removal of obstacles. However, a question remains: while Kant explicitly states that discipline is negative, can Kantian discipline be understood as positive? Can discipline play a positive broadening role? In the *Cambridge Kant Lexicon* (2021), we find interpreters such as Otfried Höffe (2021) who, in defining discipline as negative in KrV B 740, also states that,

> Although Kant assigns a primarily negative role to 'discipline', in his (as always very thorough) argumentation in this passage as well as in the second Critique, he allows that discipline sanctions out of itself a transition to a positive task: in the end, when it comes to the shift to the canon, the transition follows Rousseau's higher valuation of the practical over the theoretical use of pure reason.[190]

[188] (KrV, B 737).
[189] (KrV, B 738).
[190] (Höffe, 2021, p.153-154).

Discipline must be negative, as it is responsible for dissuading reason from all digression and error. Consequently, it can be considered a form of negative legislation, or a system of caution. However, as Höffe (2021) suggests, discipline can also be used to sanction a transition to a positive task. In a similar vein, Trevisan (2015) posits that the discipline of speculative use enables the practical use of reason. He further asserts that it is in the discipline of pure reason that Kant sets out the legislation of reason as a dual character and its forms of executing the examining and judging tasks. For him, the analysis of the *The Discipline Of Pure Reason With Regard To Its Polemical* use is the most effective way to highlight "a complete picture of how to institute and implement the negative and positive aspects of the legislation of pure reason".[191] In this manner, Kant does not reject the claims of pure reason; rather, he delineates the evidentiary and polemical procedures that have already been established by the legislation of reason. These procedures enable the coexistence of various uses of reason, such as the practical-moral use. Trevisan (2015) notes that while Kant "directly rejects not the dogmatic method but dogmatism (Cf B xl-xli), discipline *precedes* doctrine, criticism *precedes* metaphysics, the *negative* legislation of reason *precedes* the *positive*".[192]

For Trevisan,

> The (self-)discipline of reason understood as criticism and negative legislation attacks the causes of error, its deep roots, and thus discovers and neutralizes the transcendental illusion. As the Transcendental Dialectic makes clear, the self-discipline of reason first attacks metaphysics' pretensions to synthetic a priori knowledge, its claim to become an effective science of pure reason. This is the negative utility of criticism, the proper function of its negative legislation. Certainly, if the critique stopped here, the image of Kant as the *Allzermalmer* of metaphysics would be correct. However, in immediate continuity with this negative or 'purifying' task <*Läuterung*> (A 11/ B 25), Critique also takes on a positive role, it reveals its positive legislation: with the unveiling of the source of error, criticism understood as the (self)discipline of reason imposes a determination of limits <*Grenzbestimmung*> on the pretensions of pure speculative reason at the same time as it restricts the 'sophistic presumptions' of the one who rejects the very possibility of an a priori synthetic use of reason, placing it safe from 'all unjustified attacks' [...].[193]

Trevisan posits that the court of reason, in its restrictive function within the speculative realm, simultaneously enables the expansion of freedom of reason in the practical sphere. "In other words, criticism is a *discipline*, in the genuine sense of *negative* knowledge, but also in

[191] (Trevisan, 2015, p.239 – own translation).
[192] (Trevisan, 2015 p.247 – own translation).
[193] (Trevisan, 2015, p.244 – own translation).

the necessary positive counterpart of enabling the use of reason to be expanded beyond the speculative".[194] Consequently, the discipline of pure reason is systematic, as elucidated by Trevisan. It is negative legislation preparatory to positive legislation, as the limitation of the pretensions and speculative uses of reason is a precondition for the development of its pretensions and practical uses (positive legislation). "In order for reason to be able to put into practice its positive legislation, concerning its practical-moral use, it is first necessary to 'prepare, and leave firm for construction, the ground for these majestic moral buildings' (A 319/B 375-6. Cf. A 794/B 822)".[195]

As Trevisan posits, the outcome in relation to metaphysics is not exclusively negative, but also positive in terms of practical interest. In his words:

> Against Sulzer, Kant expresses his certainty that the propositions concerning the two 'cardinal propositions of our pure reason', namely 'there is a God, there is a future life' (A 741-2/B 769-70), despite all the progress in human knowledge, can *never* be proved or demonstrated, even less with the same evidence as the propositions of geometry. This impossibility is rooted not in a flaw or insufficiency of the human intellect that could be suppressed, but in a structural limitation of human discursive understanding, which, in order to know its object, needs a possible sensible intuition, which is completely absent in the case of the transcendent objects of pure reason. At *the same time*, however, it is apodictically certain that 'there will never arise any man who can demonstrate the opposite with the slightest plausibility, least of all dogmatically' (A 742/B 770). This is the most important result of the Critique in relation to metaphysics: not only purely *negative*, insofar as it proves the impossibility of knowing the objects of reason, but also *positive* in favor of the 'practical interest' of reason, since it 'proves' the equal impossibility of the impossibility of such objects in themselves being apodictically proven, and thus the impossibility of a use for *them beyond that* linked to speculative reason. Therefore, for the opponent of metaphysics we have the *non liquet* ready, a legal term that designates the 'unclearness' of the proof he puts forward. The *non liquet* places us under sufficient protection not to fear its blows indifferently, insofar as we rely on a subjective maxim of reason (A 742-3/B 770-1).[196]

The negative utility of critique serves a positive end. This positive outcome is both the practical use and the cultivation of reason. In his work, Trevisan presents the argument that

> the representation of Discipline as the negative legislation that prepares or enables the positive. The legislation or positive use of the ideas of reason occurs, as we know, from a strictly *moral* perspective, as an expansion of the (positive) use of reason with a view to man's final destiny. For example, the doctrine of the postulates of the *KpV* indicates how the objective reality of the objects of ideas is admitted from a subjective

[194] (Trevisan, 2015, p.245 – own translation).
[195] (Trevisan, 2015, p.254 – own translation).
[196] (Trevisan, 2015, p.276 – own translation).

> necessity of *practical* reason, namely for the promotion and realization of the complete object of pure practical reason, the highest good, the complete union of virtue and happiness; from a strictly practical perspective, the objects of transcendental ideas (soul, God and freedom as positive causality in an intelligible world) are also rehabilitated from a speculative perspective (KpV AA 05: 132ff). As Kant states in the same *KpV*, the speculative limitation of pure reason has as its counterpart its practical expansion, with the result that reason is brought to a 'Verhältnis der Gleichheit' that brings it closer to the 'Vollendung' of its 'end' [...].[197]

This discipline allows for the establishment of a negative and positive legislation of pure reason. Nevertheless, it is necessary to question whether Höffe's (2021) suggestion and Trevisan's (2015) defense that discipline as a negative activity enables a positive use is the same as stating that discipline in itself has a positive use. That is to say, it is necessary to determine whether the legislation of reason comprises a negative and a positive part, that is, a discipline and a canon, is the same as stating that discipline is also the canon. We concur that Kantian discipline can enable a positive use. However, to assert that negative discipline enables the practical use of reason is tantamount to claiming that discipline is both negative and positive. In other words, is it the same to say that discipline anticipates, prepares, or enables practical use as to say that it has an amplifying function in this use?

In order to respond to this question, it is necessary to examine how Kant presents and defines the concepts of positive and negative. This inquiry extends to all of his works, including the *Critique of Pure Reason*, the *Critique of Practical Reason*[198], the *Critique of Judgment*[199], and the *Pedagogy*. When Kant classifies a concept or principle as negative, it is evident that he is referring to limitations, impediments, restrictions, inhibitions, repulsions, or opposition. However, when he calls a concept or a principle positive, it is unclear whether he always means expansion and addition. It is necessary to determine whether the positive sense of instruction and direction is identical to the sense of enlargement and addition. To illustrate this point, in the preface to the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* [KrV, B XXIV], Kant states that a negative use is that which does not dare to rise with speculative reason above the limits of experience. Consequently, it is a restriction. Conversely, the positive use is that which extends. In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant presents the a priori and the a posteriori as having a positive and a negative use. From a positive point of view, the *a priori* and *a posteriori* denote

[197] (Trevisan, 2015, p.296 – own translation).
[198] (KpV, AA 05:33 and 73).
[199] (KU, AA 05:171; 245; 269; 271; 275; 417; 432).

the ways in which judgments can be justified. In this case, the justification of the analytic judgment is an example of the positive point of view of the *a priori*.

In the *Pedagogy* [Päd, AA 09:442;449;452], the term *negative* is used to describe that which prevents defects, prevents human beings from deviating from their humanity, and it can be said that it has the same meaning as the use of "negative" in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, for example. However, he calls *positive* the part of education that focuses on instruction and direction (*Aufklärung*). Education that encompasses care and training is both negative and positive. The *positive* aspect of this education is an aspect of culture that is the creation of an ability to lead to the desired ends. This implies that it is positive not simply due to its capacity to expand, but rather *as a concept in function of another*, that is, as a skill in function of an end or as the culture of discipline aimed at high ends. For example, the theory of discipline, based on Kant's moral teleology, aims to restrict, to remove obstacles to moral ends, and to help human beings on their progressive and continuous journey towards a context in which they are/will be under moral laws.

In the *Critique of Pure Reason* [B 737-738], Kant himself makes clear his distinction between discipline and culture, between negative and positive use. This leads to the question of what Kant's philosophical objective is in the *Critique of Judgment* in which he proposes a culture of discipline [*Cultur der Zucht*]. In the *Critique of Judgment*, Kant asserts that of all the ends of nature, what remains for human beings is the formal condition, or the aptitude to set themselves ends in general and, from a moral teleological perspective, to set themselves moral ends. Kant further explains that the production of a rational being's aptitude for desired ends in general is culture. However, not every type of culture is suitable for the ultimate end of nature. The culture of skill is the most suitable for promoting ends in general, but it is still not sufficient, because when it comes to promoting the will in determining and choosing ends, the culture of discipline is the most suitable, because it frees the will from the despotism of desires. In Kant's words,

> But not every kind of culture is adequate for this ultimate end of nature. The culture of skill is certainly the foremost subjective condition of aptitude for the promotion of ends in general; but it is still not sufficient for promoting the willa in the determination and choice of its ends, which however is essential for an aptitude for ends. The latter condition of aptitude, which could be named the culture of training (discipline), is negative, and consists in the liberation of the will from the despotism of desires, by which we are made, attached as we are to certain things of nature, incapable of choosing for ourselves, while we turn into fetters the drives that nature has given us merely for guidance in order not to neglect or even injure the determina tion of the

> animality in us, while yet we are free enough to tighten or loosen to lengthen or shorten them, as the ends of reason require.[200]

It is imperative that we cultivate a culture of discipline. This culture is, as Kant asserts, negative. However, could it be interpreted as a positive discipline, given that it is a culture? Since its objective is to cultivate the capacity to liberate oneself from the tyranny of desires, could it be argued that this discipline is, in fact, a positive one? With regard to the discipline of inclinations, it can be posited that this is a positive concept insofar as it is *one concept as a function of another*. In favor of the cultural development of discipline, Kant presents a second argument. He posits that it facilitates the evolution of humanity towards the formation of individuals who are more receptive to higher ends, which is in accordance with the ends of nature.[201] This perspective can be reinforced by the passages in the *Metaphysiscs of Morals* in which Kant deals with the pragmatic purpose, namely the duty to oneself to cultivate one's own human nature. The human beings have "a duty to himself to cultivate (*cultura*) his natural powers (powers of spirit, mind, and body), as means to all sorts of possible ends".[202] Furthermore, it is the duty of human beings to seek their own perfection. Striving for this perfection is a duty, and human beings must fulfill it through continuous progress.[203] Therefore, the two duties, which at the same time are ends, are only possible if human beings develop and cultivate the culture of discipline. This entails disciplining one's inclinations and educating oneself to be increasingly receptive to higher ends and to the fulfillment of substantive moral laws.

In the context of moral philosophy, discipline is understood as a negative force that can remove or avoid obstacles to the moral law. Accordingly, for Kant, discipline is a negative concept. However, the term "negative" in this context does not refer to the mere absence of something. By fulfilling this negative function, discipline avoids the harmful consequences of a lack of discipline and facilitates the development of character. The concept of discipline can be understood to encompass both negative and positive aspects. This is because it prevents human beings from deviating from their humanity. It also transforms animality into humanity. In order to form the project of their conduct, human beings need to do so independently and with the help of others. Unlike other animals, who are everything they can be, since they are

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[200] (KU, AA 05: 431-432).
[201] "As far as the discipline of the inclinations is concerned, for which the natural predisposition in respect to our vocation as an animal species is quite purposive but which make the development of humanity very difficult, nature still displays even in regard to this second requisite for culture a purposive effort at an education to make us receptive to higher ends than nature itself can afford" (KU, AA 05: 433).
[202] (MS, AA 06: 444).
[203] (MS, AA 06: 446).

what instinct itself has made them, human beings have no instinct. Therefore, they need to extract the natural qualities that belong to humanity little by little, with exercise and development. The practice of discipline subjects individuals to the laws of humanity and, therefore, continually makes human beings feel the force of their own laws. In itself, discipline is a negative concept. However, when linked to morality, it can take on a positive aspect, as it allows for the development of character. It can be proposed as positive from the perspective of viewing it as an ability to utilize the relationship between means and ends. This positive aspect that the discipline can take on is only internal to its own use; it is not constituted by itself. For example, it is positive in the practical field insofar as it is related to morality and, in the theoretical field, insofar as it is related, in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, to the transcendental deduction of the categories. The proposal, therefore, is that when a discipline is used and related to something positive, it assumes a positive aspect in the sense of a means to an end. This positive aspect is therefore a relational element. For example, a discipline linked to morality assumes a positive role as a means for the development of rational dispositions.

The following assumptions are based on the following premises: (i) That negative discipline prepares human beings for the practical use of their reason; and (ii) that, since culture is positive, and Kant emphasizes the need for a culture of discipline; it is proposed that Kantian discipline, when thought of specifically with regard to the discipline of inclinations can be considered a positive force, in the sense of being in function of something, as it helps to develop certain feelings. For instance, it can foster the feeling of sympathy, which is a feeling of sharing, as mentioned by Kant in *Pedagogy* and the *Doctrine of Virtue*. The notion that a single concept can be perceived in two distinct, yet complementary, ways is not an unfamiliar concept within the philosophical framework of Kant. For Kant, freedom has two dimensions. By analogy, it can be proposed that Kant's discipline encompasses both negative actions with respect to morality and negative and positive actions with respect to dispositions.

Given that the Kantian project of moralization is related to character, and that character, in turn, needs to be formed, it is necessary to consider the effect of discipline in terms of tendencies, inclinations, and temperament. In order to cultivate a virtuous character, one must first subdue the passions. One method of taming the passions is through the practice of discipline, which entails the ability to withhold and resist. As an illustration of this principle, Kant in the *Pedagogy* discusses the indirect and active duty to not avoid places where people are in need, whether of money or health. For instance, one should visit hospitals and assist the sick, thereby cultivating and practicing sympathy. This exercise and cultivation, therefore, is

not merely restrictive; in this sense, pragmatic discipline has a positive function in relation to the feeling of sympathy. This positive function does not refer to morality in the traditional sense, but rather to the moral teleological and pedagogical spheres. In this context, the term "moral" is used in the sense of the process of moralization. It facilitates the promotion of benevolence and the imperfect duty of promoting the happiness of others, to the detriment of those acts practiced out of sympathy and the vice of rejoicing in the evil of others. Consequently, the proposal of the positive function is exclusively in relation to inclinations. Furthermore, theoretical and moral disciplines are continuous and permanent processes. They persist due to the inherent limitations of human reason, which is capable of irrationality and transgression even when operating within the bounds of rationality and morality. Moreover, they remain susceptible to the influence of their instincts and sensibilities. It is not to be assumed that an individual who has acted out of duty once will always do so.

2.2.3 Discipline and habit: the difference between free habit and mechanical habit

For Kant, it is necessary to remove the internal and external obstacles that hinder moral action; this removal is a normative requirement of reason itself, so that human beings can develop their natural dispositions directed toward the use of reason, so that human beings can develop their humanity by disciplining it and harmonizing it with their animality. In GMS, AA 04:412, Kant makes it clear that moral theory needs an anthropology for its application to human beings. This means that it is also necessary to understand the inclinations and workings of human beings in an empirical sense, because only in this way is it possible to identify the means and obstacles, arising from human nature itself, that respectively help and hinder submission to the moral law. In the doctrine of method of the *Critique of Practical Reason*, Kant seeks to make explicit the fundamental features of what can help moral practicability, so in his preliminary exercise he deals with general maxims in order to elucidate culture and moral practice. This exercise can promote the development of moral character.

In KrV, B 579[204], Kant describes character as both empirical and intelligible; this distinction is similar to the distinction between physical character and general character found

[204] "Suppose now that one could say reason has causality in regard to appearance; could reason's action then be called free even though in its empirical character (in the mode of sense) it is all precisely determined and necessary? The empirical character is once again determined in the intelligible character (in the mode of thought). We are not acquainted with the latter, but it is indicated through appearances, which really give only the mode of sense (the

in *Anthropology*. Claudia Blöser (2014) clarifies that intelligible character has three meanings for Kant: (i) as a rational ability, (ii) as an individual quality, and (iii) as a person's good or bad disposition. According to her, in the *Anthropology*, the *Religion Within the Boundary of Mere Reason*, and the *Pedagogy*, the focus is on character as a person's good or bad disposition. Anna Wehofsits (2016) maps the notions of character in Kant and finds that it is possible to find at least five specifications. In his *Anthropology*, for example, Kant examines the character of the person, the character of the sexes, the character of the peoples, the character of the races, and the character of the species. Specifically, the character of the person is divided into physical character, character in general, and moral character. The distinction between physical character and general character corresponds to the distinction between the way of feeling and the way of thinking – the way of thinking includes the attitude. Moral character, in turn, is a particular way of thinking, a moral way of thinking. Physical character, though innate in human beings, is not unchangeable. It includes natural dispositions and temperaments[205], and is part of the definition of human nature. Character in general is the quality of the way of thinking, which in turn is what people make of themselves through the alignment between their general maxims and their actions.

Kant's aim with the practical method[206] is for human agents to become moral agents, that is, for character to become a moral character, and for this to happen it is necessary to create a culture of reason, that is, it is necessary to exercise reason for practical purposes. Reason must become accustomed to making judgments about the practical "[...] so as to produce in us little by little the greatest but pure moral interest [...]".[207] Reason is cultivated through the exercise

empirical character) for immediate cognition. Now the action, insofar as it is to be attributed to the mode of thought as its cause, nevertheless does not follow from it in accord with empirical laws, i.e., in such a way that it is **preceded** by the conditions of pure reason, but only their effects in the appearance of inner sense **precede** it" (KrV, B 579).

[205] The temperament determine a person's physical and psychological constitution and thus influence feelings, thoughts, and decisions. Kant classified four types of temperaments: (i) sanguine; (ii) melancholy; (iii) phlegmatic; and (iv) choleric.

[206] "The method therefore takes the following course. At first the concern is only to make the judging according to moral laws a natural occupation accompanying all our own free actions as well as our observation of those of other people, and to make it, as it were, a habit, and to sharpen it by first asking whether the action objectively conforms to the moral law, and to which one; in doing this, one distinguishes attention to that law which provides merely a basis for obligation from the law which is in fact obligatory (*leges obligandi a legibus obligantibus*) (e.g., the law of what the need of human beings requires of me from what their right requires of me, the latter of which prescribes essential but the former only nonessential duties), and thus one teaches how to distinguish different duties that come together in an action. The other point to which attention must be directed is the question as to whether the action was also done (subjectively) for the sake of the moral law and therefore has not only moral correctness as a deed but also, according to its maxim, moral worth as an attitude. Now, there is no doubt that this exercise and the consciousness of a cultivation of our reason, arising therefrom, in making judgments merely about the practical must little by little produce a certain interest even in reason's law and hence in moral actions" (KpV, AA 05:159-160).

[207] (KpV, AA 05:159).

of judgment. For Kantian morality, the rightness of the act is not enough; there must be moral value in the attitude according to the maxim. Judgment in practical matters, for example, enables the moral agent to distinguish between different duties involved in the same action. This *culture of reason* aimed at moral cultivation is not the same as the acquisition of a mechanical habit or the thoughtless repetition of actions that are socially recognized as "good/ethical" actions. It concerns the exercise of judgment – as the faculty of judgment – self-discipline and the construction of moral character.

Kant is commonly read as one of the moral philosophers who argued against the concept of habit, because habit was seen as a mechanical and repetitive action, and therefore not in the realm of freedom, spontaneity of action, and consciousness. The question of habit can be problematic for Kant in both the practical and theoretical realms[208], because for him habit is characterized by being a necessity of subjectivity. As examples of the problematic issue of habit for Kant, we have the distinction that Kant makes in *Critique of Practical Reason* between the mere habit of repetitive actions and pure morality as a touchstone for testing the moral importance of each action[209], and the passage of the *Doctrine of Virtue* in which he states that virtue should not be defined [*zu erklären*] and valued merely as an aptitude, as a long-standing habit of morally good actions acquired through practice.[210]

The point here, then, is not to argue that moral practicability is some sort of mechanistic and unreflective long-term habit. That is to say, moral practicability is not the same as the illusion of morality that has been adopted out of sheer convenience and begun to be carried out without reflection and moral judgment. Although Kant states in the section *On permissive moral illusion*[211] of his *Anthropology* that it is socially desirable to appear to be kind, the proposal of moral practicability goes beyond mere illusion. It is the cultivation of the idea of duty as the sole motive for moral action. First, it is necessary to distinguish between Kant's justification of virtue, which is normatively and deontologically justified, on the one hand, and virtue as something to be taught, on the other. In *Doctrine of Virtue*, Kant reinforces this perspective. According to him, one can also say that the human being

[208] One example is Kant's debate with Hume in KrV. See (KrV, B 5-6).
[209] (KpV, AA 05:154-155).
[210] (MS, AA 06:383).
[211] "On the whole, the more civilized human beings are, the more they are actors. They adopt the illusion of affection, of respect for others, of modesty, and of unselfishness without deceiving anyone at all, because it is understood by everyone that nothing is meant sincerely by this. And it is also very good that this happens in the world. For when human beings play these roles, eventually the virtues, whose illusion they have merely affected for a considerable length of time, will gradually really be aroused and merge into the disposition" (Anth, AA 07:151).

> […] is under obligation to [acquire] virtue (as moral strength). For while the capacity (*facultas*) to overcome all opposing sensible impulses can and must be simply presupposed in man on account of his freedom, yet this capacity as strength (*robur*) is something he must acquire; and the way to acquire it is to enhance the moral incentive (the thought of the law), both by contemplating the dignity of the pure rational law in us (*contemplatione*) and by practicing virtue (*exercitio*).[212]

The practice to which Kant refers is not the mere illusion of acting in accordance with duty, but it refers to the exercise of the faculty of judgment, the fulfillment of self-discipline, and the construction of conscience and moral character through the cultivation of reason and discipline. In this sense, the question arises: What is the relationship between habit and moral practicability?

Kant defines habit in the *Metaphysics of Morals* as

> An aptitude [Fertigkeit] (habitus) is a facility in acting and a subjective perfection of choice. But not every such facility is a free aptitude [freie Fertigkeit] (habitus libertatis); for if it is a habit [Angewohnhei] (assuetudo), that is, a uniformity in action that has become a necessity through frequent repetition, it is not one that proceeds from freedom and therefore not a moral aptitude [moralische Fertigkeit].[213]

What is required in this relationship is inner freedom, and to be free in this sense, one must be master of oneself and dominate oneself, in other words, one must have self-discipline. For Kant, on the one hand, "to form a habit is to establish a lasting inclination apart from any maxim, through frequently repeated gratifications of that inclination; it is a mechanism of sense rather than a principle of thought (and one that is easier to acquire than to get rid of afterward)".[214] On the other hand, there is a *habitus libertatis*, a free disposition that comes from freedom, not mechanical action.

Therefore, Kant himself distinguishes habit/ability [*Fertigkeit*] from habit as [*Angewohnheit*] by means of choice on the part of the agent. On the one hand, the habit [*Angewohnheit*] is a pattern of unreflective action, just a frequent repetition of the same action,

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[212] (MS, AA 06:397).

[213] (MS, AA 06:407). In German: "Fertigkeit (habitus) ist eine Leichtigkeit zu handeln und eine subjective Vollkommenheit der Willkür. Nicht jede solche Leichtigkeit aber ist eine freie Fertigkeit (habitus libertatis); denn wenn sie Angewohnheit (assuetudo), d. i. durch öfters wiederholte Handlung zur Nothwendigkeit gewordene Gleichförmigkeit, derselben ist, so ist sie keine aus der Freiheit hervorgehende, mithin auch nicht moralische Fertigkeit".

[214] (MS, AA 06:479).

in *Anth* AA, 07:149 the unreflective habit is seen as detrimental to the freedom of the mind. Habit [*Fertigkeit*], on the other hand, is the capacity or ability to act according to maxims (Päd, AA 09:481; MS, AA 06:407).

For Carl Hildebrand (2023), *Angewohnheit* has two connotations: the first as a "**unthinking habit:** it is Kant's first conception of habit and it is not conducive to the formation of moral character".[215] However, this doesn't mean that all *Angewohnheit* are bad; this habit may just be the product of a thoughtless, artificial routine of the agent himself, but which may have been thought up by someone else, as in the case of education. These habits are the choices of an external agent, a child's parents or teachers, who have thought of them as a means for children to develop their mental faculties, and in this case the second connotation would be as "**external moral habits**", which, because their purpose is moralization, may help in the formation of character, but have no kind of purely moral attribution or value.[216]

Fertigkeit is the broad sense of habit, which can be translated as capability or aptitude. It also has two senses: (i) As a mere aptitude, this concept includes the cultivation of acting on the basis of self-given maxims, even if the maxim is not moral. Therefore, in this first sense: "*Fertigkeit'* and implies a skill or proficiency, a typically positive capability often consciously acquired".[217] This habit can be interpreted as close to the Aristotelian sense of habit, since both are acquired with time and training. According to Hildebrand, Kant's key point about *Fertigkeit* is that it does not determine the direction of desires, but rather the direction of an agent's thoughts. Thus, *Fertigkeit* is the aptitude for acquiring character, though not yet moral character, since it is the aptitude for acting on the basis of general maxims. And the second sense of *Fertigkeit* is as moral aptitude or *moralische Fertigkeit*, this conception of habit is preceded by freedom. Hildebrand states that

> Moral aptitude is a cultivated proficiency in thinking and acting according to rational and moral maxims. It is different from both unthinking habit and external moral habit because it includes an active cognitive component on the part of the agent. It is different from mere aptitude because it is grounded in moral maxims. So, actions proceeding from moral aptitude qualify for ascriptions of moral worth. However, like mere aptitude it is acquired through time and training and entails a tendency to think

[215] (Hildebrand, 2023, p.113).
[216] "**external moral habit**: it is Kant's second conception of habit and it is conducive to the formation of moral character. However, it is not sufficient for attributions of moral worth, since the child does not yet understand the moral law or choose it as the ground of her actions" (Hildebrand, 2023, p.113).
[217] (Hildebrand, 2023, p.113).

> (and act) in a certain way. Moral aptitude is a habit in the way of thought. It therefore provides a distinctly intellectual account of the concept of habit.[218]

Therefore, Hildebrand believes that these four notions found in the use of *Angewohnheit* and *Fertigkeit* demonstrate a path in which one considers everything from non-reflection to principles given by others, principles given by oneself, and finally principles given by the moral law. Ultimately, the purpose of this debate is not to ascribe any moral value to habit or aptitude, but rather to cultivate certain inclinations in order to aid the agent's consistency in decision making. He argues that the purpose of developing habits, for example in childhood education, is to think and control emotions so that later, in adulthood, it will be easier to understand and act in accordance with the moral law.

Furthermore, in *Pedagogy* AA 09:461-463, Kant presents discipline as a way to prevent the formation of bad habits; for Kant, the more habits one has, the less free one is. He gives us two examples of bad habits in childhood: when parents get their children used to having their wishes fulfilled by crying and shouting, or when they teach their children to walk with artificial help instead of on their own. According to Baumeister (2020), the problem with bad habits is not only that they hinder the natural development of children, but also that they hinder the development of other predispositions. Discipline, therefore, is what helps prevent bad habits. Discipline *transforms* purely animal nature into human nature. Thus, I agree with Louden (2011) and Baumeister (2020) that the use of the term "*transform*" does not refer to the eradication of desires, inclinations, or instincts, but rather to the ability to control them through the exercise of reason.

In order for the individual to be committed to his or her duty of self-improvement, he or she must have self-control, the ability to act according to maxims, and self-determination. According to Hildebrand (2023), this self-improvement consists in part of habits aimed at developing skills. Education has a purpose; a set of dispositions and skills must be developed in order for the moralization project to be implemented. In the case of children, for example, the progressive acquisition of skills will make it easier for them to become free agents. For this to happen, education must both cultivate and limit freedom. It should be emphasized that educating someone to be a moral agent is not enough for them to actually be moral. Encouraging

[218] (Hildebrand, 2023, p.113-114).

the development of dispositions and self-control makes this more likely, but it still requires a commitment on the part of the agents themselves.

The task of education, then, is to develop the dispositions and to lay the foundations for the agent to become a moral agent, that is, to develop the capacity to know and judge the moral value of maxims.[219] In the Päd, AA 09:481, Kant states that the first effort of moral culture is to lay the foundations for the formation of character. Character consists of the habit of acting according to certain maxims. These are first those of the school and later those of humanity. The ability to act according to maxims must be developed and cultivated, and for this we must be aware of rules, and they must be of a kind that has a rational justification. Enlightenment in education means enabling students to make their own judgments and evaluations; it means making decisions independently of other people's impulses and reason; it means changing the way they think and act. However, there is a debate about how this change in thinking comes about.[220] Metaphorically, Kant uses the terms reform and revolution to address questions about the transformation of an agent's and a community's way of thinking. In *What is Enlightenment?*, Kant defends reform in thinking over revolution. In the *Anthropology* and the *Religion Within the Boundary of Mere Reason*, Kant seems to advocate a kind of explosion, a revolution that occurs all at once, a revolution in the mentality of human beings (Anth, AA 07:294; RGV, AA 06:47). But even in the *Religion Within the Boundary of Mere Reason*, Kant advocates reform on the individual level (RGV, AA 06:47). Regarding this paradox, Wehofsits (2016) suggests interpreting the revolution as a qualitative transformation of internal mental activity, of the attitude or way of thinking that expresses the relationship between the subject and the moral law.[221]

According to her,

> As we have seen, Kant's attitude can take on two qualities: It is either good or evil, depending on whether the subject subordinates all non-moral interests to the moral law or not. The transition from an evil to a good disposition can be viewed in terms

[219] I agree with Hildebrand (2023) on this specific role of education: "The purpose of education is to place an individual in an ideal position to make this commitment by encouraging her to think, control her feelings, understand maxims, and act consistently on the basis of maxims" (Hildebrand, 2023, p.112).
[220] There is a large debate in the secondary literature about the reform and/or revolution of Kant's way of thinking. More on this debate can be found in Blöser (2014), Forschner (2011), Willaschek (1992). For example, for Wimmer (2005) there is a dichotomy between the way of thinking and the way of feeling that can only be resolved by a revolution, so that a reform is not possible. In turn, Herman (2008) and Louden (2000) would certainly disagree with Wimmer's (2005) view, as his position excludes the possibility of moral education and character development. Here I will not examine this controversy more closely.
[221] Cf. Wehofsits, 2016, p.114.

> of both time and quality. What is a revolution in qualitative terms must be carried out as a reform in temporal terms – this idea seems less strange when one realizes that even the common term 'value revolution' does not usually denote a sudden upheaval, but rather a qualitative transformation that is the result (or goal) of a slow change in values. Similarly, Kant's revolution of attitude stands for a qualitative transformation that we must strive for throughout our lives. According to Kant, we can never know for sure whether the reform will be successful – at best, we can always succeed in acting in accordance with our duty; we cannot make any certain statements about the underlying maxims (and thus the moral value of our actions).[222]

Therefore, being receptive to the good is an ongoing task. One wonders, for example, whether acquiring the habit of doing the right thing can help with receptivity to the law. Kant argues that human beings are receptive to morality; in other words, the moral law is accessible to everyone. Assuming this, it is then necessary to outline the method of establishing and cultivating genuine moral dispositions. On the one hand, it is undeniable that respect for the law is the only motive that teaches human beings to be aware of them own dignity, since the representation of the moral law must be the only motive of the agent. On the other hand, other motives and questions about morality, even if they are still heteronomous, can make people recognize the receptivity to morality that they possess as moral agents, that is, they can make them recognize that they are affected by the concept of duty. The recognition of oneself as a being capable of moral judgment and moral action can generate an awareness of oneself as a free, moral, rational, sensitive, and worthy being. For Kant, a moral theory based on the concept of duty must not justify itself in terms of empirical claims and real circumstances, but it must refer to them, because it must have a practical function, it must apply to the world.

[222] (Wehofsits, 2016, p.114 – own translation).

3 DISCIPLINE IN KANT'S PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY

The Kantian system of the use of reason and the Kantian discipline are means used to promote moral practicability, in other words, they are means or ways to morality. This means that they have two types of functions, namely the construction of interpretations that support the practicability of the moral will[223] and the identification of aids and obstacles to the realization of moral ends in the world. Therefore, it is necessary to think of means that can confirm the practicability of moral will so that the final end can be achieved. This can be difficult to achieve when there is a despotic state, an unjust constitution, oppressive education, and the institutional and civil exercise of social irrationality. Therefore, one can argue that this theory of discipline enables the development of practical reason, i.e., not only in the adoption of a moral maxim, but also in the consistent pursuit of its realization (against the weakness of the will, the perversion of the maxim, making an exception for oneself, etc.). There are many obstacles to the realization of the moral maxim. Therefore, means are needed to remove these obstacles. Thus, discipline plays an important role as a "facilitator" of the moral end.

3.1 MORAL DISCIPLINE, VIRTUE, MORAL CONSCIENCE AND AUTONOMY

Even before he wrote his theory of morality, Kant lectured on the subject. As early as 1770, in his *Lectures on Ethics*, we can see the importance of some of the concepts that permeate his work. We see the first attempts to formulate the categorical imperative, perspectives that are modified as his thinking matures, and some that are only strengthened, and the concept of discipline is one of them. Kant affirms that people must have discipline[224]. Already in the *Lectures*, he states that practical discipline can be divided into two types: that which is guided by pragmatic rules and that which is guided by moral rules. According to the latter "we must seek to master and compel all our sensory actions, not by prudence, but in accordance with the moral laws".[225]

[223] On this aspect, we agree with Klein and by practicability we don't mean the prolonged habit acquired by the mere repeated exercise of actions, but as a "result of a free habit, that is, by the constancy of determining oneself by the moral law and, in this sense, by an intention and explicit effort to respect humanity, both in one's own person and in the person of others" (Klein, 2016, p.238 – own translation).
[224] (V-Mo/Collins Moralphilosophie Collins, AA 27:360).
[225] (V-Mo/Collins Moralphilosophie Collins, AA 27:360).

Moral discipline is the condition for fulfilling one's duty to oneself, and it consists in the authority of the moral law. "Hence we may say that self-command consists in this, that we are able to subject all principia to the power of our free choice. [...] the true self-mastery is moral in character. This is sovereign, and its laws hold a categorical sway over sensibility".[226] Every duty is a kind of coercion. Coercion is inherent in discipline. When coercion is moral, we are internally coerced or self-coerced, which is internal coercion. The more one can coerce oneself, the freer one is.[227] In other words, the less one is coerced by either another or by one's own inclinations, the freer one is internally.

The continuity in Kant's thought on this perspective can be observed in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, where he says

> For if a rational creature could ever get to the point of fulfilling all moral laws completely gladly, this would be tantamount to meaning that there would not be in him even the possibility of a desire stimulating him to deviate from them; for, overcoming such a desire always costs the subject [some] sacrifice and hence requires self-constraint, i.e., inner necessitation to what one does not do entirely gladly. [...] These, because they rest on physical causes, do not by themselves harmonize with the moral law, which has entirely different sources. Hence they always make it necessary [for the creature], on account of them, to base the attitude of his maxims on moral necessitation – [i.e.,] not on willing acquiescence but on respect, which demands compliance with the law even if this were done reluctantly – rather than on love, which does not worry about any inner refusal of the will toward the law.[228]

Assuming that human beings are endowed with reason and sensitivity, there is no spontaneous goodness in their minds that doesn't require discipline. As far as morality is concerned, this discipline is self-obligation.

In *The Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant attempts to emphasize freedom of the choice by relating the concepts of duty and coercion. He states that duty is in itself the concept of a summons (coercion) to freedom of choice by the law, and that this coercion can be either external coercion or self-coercion.[229] The moral imperative makes this coercion known by its

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[226] (V-Mo/Collins Moralphilosophie Collins, AA 27:360-361).
[227] (V-Mo/Collins Moralphilosophie Collins, AA 27:269-270).
[228] (KpV, AA 05:84).
[229] "All duties involve a concept of constraint through a law. Ethical duties involve a constraint for which only internal lawgiving is possible, whereas duties of Right involve a constraint for which external lawgiving is also possible. Both, therefore, involve constraint, whether it be self-constraint or constraint by another. Since the moral capacity to constrain oneself can be called virtue, action springing from such a disposition (respect for law) can be called virtuous (ethical) action, even though the law lays down a duty of Right; for it is the doctrine of virtue that commands us to hold the Right of men sacred" (MS, AA 06:394).

categorical judgment. Since a person is a free (moral) being, the concept of duty can only include self-coercion, solely through the representation of the law,

> for only so can that necessitation (even if it is external) be united with the freedom of his capacity for choice. Hence in this case the concept of duty will be an ethical one. Impulses of nature, accordingly, involve obstacles within man's mind to his fulfillment of duty and (sometimes powerful) forces opposing it, which he must judge that he is capable of resisting and conquering by reason not at some time in the future but at once (the moment he thinks of duty): He must judge that he can do what the law tells him unconditionally that he ought to do.[230]

In the *Doctrine of Virtue* (1797), discipline is understood as self-coercion.

> Virtue is the strength of man's maxims in fulfilling his duty. Strength of any kind can be recognized only by the obstacles it can overcome, and in the case of virtue these obstacles are natural inclinations, which can come into conflict with man's moral resolution; and since it is man himself who puts these obstacles in the way of his maxims, virtue is not merely a self-constraint (for then one natural inclination could strive to overcome another), but also a self-constraint in accordance with a principle of inner freedom, and so through the mere representation of one's duty in accordance with its formal law.[231]

Virtue – as the maximum strength of the individual in the fulfillment of duty – recognizes natural inclinations as obstacles that generate conflicts with the moral intention [232], so that it is not only a self-obligation, but also an obligation according to a principle of inner freedom – which occurs through representation according to the moral law.[233]

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[230] (MS, AA 06:380).

[231] (MS, AA 06:394).

[232] "For Kant, a person is considered virtuous when they possess purity of attitude. Kant makes some considerations about virtue in this sense. He states that, in the real circumstances of human existence, people are subject to obstacles that prevent the fulfillment of duty and that put up resistance to this fulfillment. According to Kant, man must judge himself capable of combating and overcoming them through reason" (Tonetto, 2012, p.280 – own translations).

[233] According to Hill and Cureton, Kantian virtue is also linked to the concept of good will. "To be virtuous is more than having a good will, for virtue, Kant says, is a kind of moral strength or fortitude. In other words, Kant implies that to be (fully) virtuous is to have a good will that is *firmly resolved and fully ready to overcome temptations* to immorality. This is an ideal that we can never fully achieve, though we have a duty to strive for it. To become more virtuous is not an easy task, and it requires time and practice, as well as self-scrutiny. The aim is not merely to avoid wrongdoing and to pursue moral ends but also to do so for the right reasons. [...] In Kant's mature works, the ideal of virtue is to have a good will with the strength of will to do one's duty despite any opposing inclinations. [...] Kant does not rule out that one could have and even *act from* a good will when one also happened to have an inclination to do what was required, but he insists that morally worthy acts do not rely on inclinations" (Cureton / Hill, 2014, p.88).

Kant, in *Doctrine of Virtue*, explains that,

> Virtue is always in progress and yet always starts from the beginning. It is always in progress because, considered objectively, it is an ideal and unattainable, while yet constant approximation to it is a duty. That it always starts from the beginning has a subjective basis in human nature, which is affected by inclinations because of which virtue can never settle down in peace and quiet with its maxims adopted once and for all but, if it is not rising, is unavoidably sinking. For moral maxims, unlike technical ones, constitution of the will's determination; on the contrary, if the practice of virtue were to become a habit the subject would suffer loss to that freedom in adopting his maxims which distinguishes an action done from duty.[234]

The first perspective results from virtue understood objectively, and, in this sense, it is an unattainable ideal to which we must constantly strive. On the other hand, the fact that it is always at its starting point is subjective, since by the very nature of the individual, he/she will always be influenced by his/her inclinations. Moreover, unlike technical maxims, moral maxims cannot be based on custom, since the moral subject must act out of duty.[235] Virtue is a moral force of will. Virtue in Kantian ethics is conceived as a struggle[236], "virtue is the moral perfection of man. To virtue we attach power, strength and authority. It is a victory over inclination"[237], but that doesn't exhaust the concept. Virtue is the moral force of a human being's will in the fulfillment of his duty.[238] It commands with a moral obligation that is only possible according to the laws of inner freedom. For Kant, two things are required for inner freedom: "being one's own master in a given case (*animus sui compos*), that is, subduing one's affects, and ruling oneself (*imperium in semetipsum*), that is, governing one's passions. In these two states one's character (*indoles*) is noble (*erecta*); in the opposite case it is mean (*indoles abiecta, serva*)". [239]

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[234] (MS, AA 06:409).

[235] Actions out of respect for the law that distance themselves from sensible inclinations are called actions out of duty. They are characterized by having their moral value in the maxim that determined the action and not in the purpose that one wants to achieve. On the other hand, actions contrary to duty – these are immoral actions – and actions in accordance with duty, are characterized by correct actions, but the maxim does not contain moral content, in other words, they were done out of inclination. You have to want the maxim of the action to become a universal law.

[236] "With specific regard to the concept of virtue, Kant conceives of it in a non-Aristotelian way, as a struggle, not as an established principle. In this sense of struggle, virtue is the predominance of one part of the human being, his reason, over another, his passions, and not, as in Aristotle, the development of our nature in its maximum sense. In other words, the anti-aristotelian point of virtue in Kant is not the ignorance of virtue in his system, but the way he treated it" (Dutra, 2011, p.450 – own translation).

[237] (V-Mo/Collins Moralphilosophie Collins, AA 27: 465).

[238] (MS, AA 06:405).

[239] (MS, AA 06:407).

Inner freedom works through pure practical reason. By linking it to the concept of virtue, it adds to the concept of self-obligation the concept of end, not the end we have or any other end, but the end we ought to have, "[t]he highest, unconditional end of pure practical reason (which is still a duty) consists in this: that virtue be its own end and, despite the benefits it confers on men, also its own reward".[240] This end, in other words, is the moral end. The moral imperative[241] requires the presupposition of freedom. Kant states in the *Critique of Pure Reason* that freedom is the *ratio essendi* (reason for being) of the moral law, and the moral law is the *ratio congnoscendi* (reason for knowing) of freedom. "For if the moral law were not previously thought distinctly in our reason, we would never consider ourselves entitled to assume such a thing as freedom (even though freedom is not self-contradictory). But if there were no freedom, then the moral law could not be encountered in us at all".[242]

Inner freedom is therefore autonomy of the will or, as Kant calls it in the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, freedom in the positive sense. To have a free will is the same as to have a will under moral laws.[243] Autonomy, or free will, consists in the property of the will to be a law for itself.[244] In other words, in order to act morally, one must be free. Kant thinks of the concept of freedom from two perspectives: on the one hand, this concept is negative [245], since it denies the determination of sensitive impulses before the will. On the other hand, it is a positive concept [246], a faculty of pure practical reason, and as such must be subject to the moral law. In this context, freedom is the autonomy of the individual to give himself laws, namely moral laws that are independent of any sensible stimulus.

In view of the above, one can observe that discipline is a way of attaining virtue, and it is a constituent part of its exercise, since it is self-obligation. On the other hand, virtue, considered in its fullness, is moral action, since it is directly linked to free will, that is, to the autonomy of the will. Like discipline, virtue can and should be taught, since both are not innate;

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[240] (MS, AA 06:396).
[241] (GMS, AA 04:421).
[242] (KpV, AA 05:04).
[243] "Therefore the moral law expresses nothing other than the autonomy of pure practical reason, i.e., freedom; and this [autonomy] is itself the formal condition of all maxims, under which alone they can harmonize with the supreme practical law" (KpV, AA 05:33).
[244] "The will is thought as independent of empirical conditions and hence, qua pure will, as determined by the mere form of law, and this determining basis is regarded as the supreme condition of all maxims" (KpV, AA 05:31).
[245] "Freedom of choice is this independence from being determined by sensible impulses; this is the negative concept of freedom" (MS, AA 06:213).
[246] "The positive concept of freedom is that of the capacity of pure reason to be of itself practical" (MS, AA 06:214).

in general, the doctrine of virtue is teachable.[247] Despite the relationship and similarities between discipline and virtue, one is not reducible to the other, especially with regard to their functions and actions. From this perspective, it is necessary to understand the distinction between *Wille* (*free will*) *and Willkür* (*choice*). According to Kant, "[h]uman choice, however, is a capacity for choice that can indeed be affected but not determined by impulses, and is therefore of itself (apart from an acquired aptitude of reason) not pure but can still be determined to actions by pure will"[248]. In general, there is an important debate about the concept of freedom, will and agency in Kantian moral philosophy, which includes, for example, interpreters such as Hud Hudson (1991), Allison (1986) and Beck (1984). However, what interests us at the moment is the following thesis presented by Beck, namely that there is only one will with different uses and, in this sense, the negative concept of freedom (*Willkür*) can achieve autonomy when determined by the free will (*Wille*), since *Wille* is understood as practical reason and has a legislative function and *Willkür* as the executive faculty of the human being.[249]

Willkür can contain mere desire, and in this sense there is the possibility that it obeys a law because of its content. In this case, it can be considered free, but in the general sense of the term, because the will also shows its freedom in relation to hypothetical imperatives and even in acts contrary to duty. But the *Willkür* is capable of being determined by the moral law, that is, by conformity to universal legislation. In giving itself this law, reason does not respond to the demands of inclination, and therefore we can understand it as a free *Willkür*, that is, autonomously determined by the *Wille*. Thus, the positive concept of freedom (autonomy) is added to the negative concept of freedom. *Wille* and *Willkür* are two aspects of the will, which are distinguished in their legislative and executive functions.[250] In order to achieve full freedom of will, i.e. free *Willkür*, the subject does not need to look outside reason for its principles, since practical reason is a legislator, i.e. it provides the moral law.

One can, therefore, suggest that self-discipline, as part of the executive power of reason over actions arising from sensibility, plays its part in *Willkür*, while virtue is associated with the exercise of *Wille*. Since for Kant all moral discipline is self-discipline, it is a necessary

[247] This teaching is not through mere habit [Fertigkeit], therefore, "[h]ence virtue cannot be defined as an aptitude [Fertigkeit] for free actions in conformity with law unless there is added 'to determine oneself to act through the thought of the law,' and then this aptitude [Fertigkeit] is not a property of choice but of the will, which is a capacity for desire that, in adopting a rule, also gives it as a universal law. Only such an aptitude can be counted as virtue" (MS, AA 06:407).
[248] (MS, AA 06:213).
[249] (Beck, 1984, p.198).
[250] (Beck, 1984, p.199).

condition for morality. In this sense, the development of discipline can be thought of as an indirect duty, since the prevention of the integrity of one's own morality is both the individual's end and the duty. Moral discipline, like the duties of virtue, requires a commitment to maxims.[251] But it is not a duty of virtue, if the hypothesis is correct, it would be an indirect duty whose purpose is the cultivation of reason, the cultivation in the individual, through his active participation, of self-discipline in relation to maxims and moral principles. It should also be noted that moral virtue concerns the internal sphere of the individual and is linked to autonomy, while discipline also has an external sphere and is therefore part of the heteronomous perspective of the subject. Although discipline is presented here as a path to morality, it is not yet morality. However, the final end – the human being under moral laws – as the morality of the subject requires the removal of obstacles to this end. Kant asks:

> But whether man is by nature morally good or evil? neither, for he is not by nature a moral being at all; he only becomes so when his reason rises to the level of the concepts of duty and law. It may be said, however, that he originally has within him incentives to all vices, for he has inclinations and instincts which stimulate him, even though reason drives him to the contrary. He can therefore only become morally good through virtue, i.e. out of self-compulsion, even though he can be innocent without incentives.[252]

This force exerted on oneself – self-coercion – is self-discipline linked to virtue. Discipline must be linked to virtue in order to play one of its roles well, which is to be able to emancipate the individual, to bring him out of his minority and to be a means of achieving morality.

3.1.1 The problem of moral conscience and its relationship with discipline

The purpose of this section is to differentiate between the functions of moral conscience and moral discipline. This distinction is fundamental to the investigation because: (i) it aids in clarifying the role and function of discipline within the Kantian system; and (ii) it highlights

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[251] "What it is virtuous to do may concern only what is formal in maxims, whereas a duty of virtue has to do with their matter, that is, with an end that is thought as also a duty. But since ethical obligation to ends, of which there can be several, is only wide obligation – because it involves a law only for the maxims of actions, and an end is the matter (object) of choice – there are many different duties, corresponding to the different ends prescribed by the law, which are called duties of virtue (*officia honestatis*) just because they are subject only to free self-constraint, not constraint by other men, and because they determine an end that is also a duty" (MS, AA 06:395).
[252] (Päd, AA 09:492 – own translation).

the difference between Foucault's and Arendt's positions regarding Kantian discipline. Foucault equates the care of the self, as self-discipline, with moral conscience, while Arendt argues that the activity of thinking is tied to moral conscience. According to her, when there is a refusal to think, moral conscience loses its place in moral deliberation. Therefore, it is necessary to investigate moral conscience in Kant and its relationship with the theory of discipline.

According to Kant, the definition of moral conscience can be interpreted as self-reflection that generates an internal control mechanism that is analogous to the definition of discipline as an internal self-coercion mechanism. The following questions will be addressed: Does conscience as self-examination of one's own conduct have the same function as self-discipline as a system of precaution and self-examination? Does the moral conscience serve a role in examining reason? If so, how would it act in consideration of the theory of discipline? In order to obtain the answers, the different positions of two of Kant's interpreters on moral conscience are presented. This is done in order to distinguish between the two concepts and to exemplify the function of the theory of discipline in Kant's moral theory.

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Kant presents at least two distinct accounts of moral consciousness, one in the *Religion Within the Boundary of Mere Reason* and the other in the *Doctrine of Virtue*. On the one hand, Kant in the section of the *Doctrine of Virtue* on *Concepts of What Is Presupposed on the Part of Feeling [Aesthetische Vorbegriffe] by the Mind's Receptivity to Concepts of Duty as Such*, posits that there are certain moral qualities that are natural predispositions of the mind. Kant categorizes conscience as one of the four predispositions.[253] He postulates that every human being is endowed with a moral conscience. According to Kant, moral conscience cannot be acquired because it is an inherent and inescapable aspect of the moral being. "To be under obligation to have a conscience would be tantamount to having a duty to recognize duties".[254] In this manner, Kant presents conscience as a court, as practical reason that is charged with the

[253] "They are *moral feeling*, *conscience*, *love* of one's neighbor, and *respect* for oneself (self-esteem)" (TL, AA 06:399).
[254] (TL, AA 06:400).

duty to absolve or condemn moral agents in all cases in which it should be subject to the Moral Law.[255]

> So when it is said that a certain man has no conscience, what is meant is that he pays no heed to its verdict. For if he really had no conscience, he could not even conceive of the duty to have one, since he would neither impute anything to himself as conforming with duty nor reproach himself with anything as contrary to duty.[256]

In response to this explanation of the moral conscience, Kant asserts that there can be no erroneous conscience. On the one hand, although human beings are capable of erroneous objective judgments regarding the status of an action as a duty, they are not capable of erroneous subjective judgments regarding their own submission of maxims to the categorical imperative, i.e.,

> For while I can indeed be mistaken at times in my objective judgment as to whether something is a duty or not, I cannot be mistaken in my subjective judgment as to whether I have submitted it to my practical reason (here in its role as judge) for such a judgment; for if I could be mistaken in that, I would have made no practical judgment at all, and in that case there would be neither truth nor error.[257]

Consequently, when it comes to making decisions about actions that have not yet occurred, it is the responsibility of moral agents to clarify their understanding of what is or is not their duty. Conversely, in the case of actions that have already occurred, the "conscience speaks involuntarily and unavoidably".[258] When Kant asserts that an errant moral conscience is impossible, he is not implying that humans are incapable of making erroneous moral judgments.

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[255] "The inner tribunal of conscience may aptly be compared with an external court of law. Thus we find within us an accuser, who could not exist, however, if there were not a law; though the latter is no part of the civil positive law, but resides in reason, and is a law that we can in no way corrupt, nor dispute the rights and wrongs of it. Now this moral law underlies humanity as a holy and inviolable law. In addition, there is also at the same time in man an advocate, namely self-love, who excuses him and makes many an objection to the accusation, whereupon the accuser seeks in turn to rebut the objections. Lastly we find in ourselves a judge, who either acquits or condemns us. There is no deceiving him; it would be easier for a man not to consult his conscience at all; but if he does so, the judge pronounces impartially, and his verdict falls regularly on the side of truth, unless it be that he has false principia of morality. Men, to be sure, are more ready to listen to the defender; but on the death-bed they harken more to the accuser. The first attribute of a good conscience is the purity of the law, for the accuser must be on the watch in all our actions; in the judgement of actions we must have probity, and finally morality and strength of conscience in regard to carrying out the judgement in accordance with the law. Conscience should have principia of action, and not be merely speculative, and hence must have authority and strength to execute its judgement" (V-Mo/Collins. AA 27: 354).

[256] (TL, AA 06:400-401).

[257] (TL, AA 06:401).

[258] (TL, AA 06:401).

In fact, it is possible to err on moral issues, but this error is in judgment and not in the moral conscience as a court. Consequently, it is incumbent upon humans to cultivate, hone, and heed the voice of their inner judgment. For Kant, this duty is an indirect duty.[259] Moreover, the duty towards conscience entails self-knowledge, self-examination, and self-understanding.[260]

Conversely, in the *Religion Within the Boundary of Mere Reason*, Kant introduces the concept of conscience as a distinct type of moral judgment,

> So the *consciousness* that an action *which I want to undertake* is right, is unconditional duty. **Now it is understanding, not conscience, which judges whether an action is in general right or wrong**. And it is not absolutely necessary to know, of all possible actions, whether they are right or wrong. With respect to the action that *I* want to undertake, however, I must not only judge, and be of the opinion, that it is right; I must also be *certain* that it is. And this is a requirement of conscience [und diese Forderung ist ein Postulat des Gewissens] to which is opposed *probabilism*, i.e., the principle that the mere opinion that an action may well be right is itself sufficient for undertaking it. Conscience could also be defined as *the moral faculty of judgment, passing judgment upon itself*, except that this definition would be much in need of prior clarification of the concepts contained in it. **Conscience does not pass judgment upon actions as cases that stand under the law, for this is what reason does so far as it is subjectively practical (whence the *casus conscientia* and casuistry, as a kind of dialectic of conscience).** Rather, here reason judges itself, whether it has actually undertaken, with all diligence, that examination of actions (whether they are right or wrong), and it calls upon the human being himself to witness *for* or *against* himself whether this has taken place or not.[261]

In this context, as elucidated by Kant in the RGV, conscience is a judgment (of a specific type) that judges itself. When confronted with proposed actions, Kant posits that one must judge and form an opinion, thereby ensuring that the action is not morally reprehensible. This judgment is responsible for evaluating the morally diligent act; in this process, conscience would then enter as the specific judgment on the judgment of the acts projected by the agent. In the RGV, Kant grants a restricted authority to the application of the moral law. "The question here is not,

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[259] "The duty here is only to cultivate one's conscience, to sharpen one's attentiveness to the voice of the inner judge and to use every means to obtain a hearing for it (hence the duty is only indirect)" (TL, AA 06:401).

[260] "This command is 'know (scrutinize, fathom) yourself' not in terms of your natural perfection (your fitness or unfitness for all sorts of optional or even commanded ends) but rather your natural perfection (your fitness or unfitness for all sorts of optional or even commanded ends) but rather in terms of your moral perfection in relation to your duty. That is, know your heart – whether it is good or evil, whether the source of your actions is pure or impure, and what can be imputed to you as belonging originally to the substance of man or as derived (acquired or developed) and belonging to your moral condition. Moral self-knowledge, which seeks to penetrate into the depths (the abyss) of one's heart that are quite difficult to fathom, is the beginning of all human wisdom. **For in the case of man, the ultimate wisdom, which consists in the harmony of a being's will with its final end, requires him first to remove the obstacle within (an evil will actually present in him) and then to develop the original predisposition to a good will within him, which can never be lost. (Only the descent into the hell of self-knowledge can pave the way to godliness)**" (MS, AA 06:441 – own emphasis).

[261] (RGV, AA 06:186).

how conscience is to be guided (for conscience does not need any guide; to have a conscience suffices), but how conscience itself can serve as guiding thread in the most perplexing moral decisions. Conscience is a consciousness which is of itself a duty".[262]

In the secondary literature[263] one can map out an extensive debate on the function of the moral conscience in Kant's ethics. This debate concerns the role[264] and scope of the conscience, its relationship with moral motivation, and how to deal with the lack of uniformity in Kant's statements on this concept. In addition to the broader questions about the relationship between the moral conscience and Kant's moral theory, there are also questions inherent in the concept itself. One such question is whether the moral conscience is the locus of the internal court and if it does not err, can one then claim non-guilt or non-remorse since the agent acted in accordance with their own conscience? One might inquire as to whether the moral conscience is prior or subsequent to the moral judgment. Does the moral conscience differ from the conscience of the Moral Law?[265] If one cannot be certain that one acted out of duty, what does

[262] (RGV, AA 06:185).

[263] For instance, Wood (2009) posits that Kant distinguishes between two types of conscience: *conscientia artificialis*, which is acquired from the voice of society and education, and *conscientia naturalis*, which is a self-judgment based on genuine rational principles. Kant's distinction between these two types of conscience is significant because it highlights the issue of accountability. If we assume that there is only the artificial conscience acquired and apprehended socially, it could not be said that human beings as moral agents are considered morally responsible for their choices. In essence, according to Wood (2009), "in effect, then, to hold that all conscience is artificial in this sense would be for Kant to embrace an extreme skeptical position about all morality (and not merely to advance a theory about conscience)" (Wood, 2009, p.9).

[264] In the work of Esser (2013), the concept of moral conscience is not a central tenet of Kant's moral philosophy, but rather, it plays a relatively minor role. "Therefore, in Kant's moral philosophy conscience is assigned neither a causal role nor a leading role in terms of content, nor a generally or systematically important role, but only a marginal one. This determination of conscience is distinctly different from the traditional concept of conscience as well as from the modern notion of conscience. The fact that the *Doctrine of Virtue* deals with conscience at all cannot provide evidence for a revaluation of conscience, but is proof of Kant's ambition to find a place in his ethics even for this concept – of course, a place corresponding to its marginal position: the phenomenon 'conscience' is only relevant in connection with questions regarding the application of moral principles. It is a matter of no particular interest, unless the purpose of its examination is to further specify and elaborate the claims of the general moral law in consideration of the concrete conditions of human existence or to explore the concrete human conditions of the application of the moral law" (Esser, 2013, p.281).

[265] In the KpV, Kant addresses the conscience of the moral law. He states that: "[…] I ask from what our cognition of the unconditionally practical starts, whether from freedom or from the practical law. It cannot start from freedom, for we can neither become conscious of freedom directly, because the first concept of it is negative, nor infer it from experience, since experience allows us to cognize only the law of appearances and hence the mechanism of nature, the exact opposite of freedom. Therefore it is the moral law of which we become conscious directly (as soon as we draft maxims of the will for ourselves), which first offers itself to us, and which – inasmuch as reason exhibits it as a determining basis not to be outweighed by any sensible conditions and indeed entirely independent of them – leads straight to the concept of freedom. But how is even the consciousness of that moral law possible? We can become conscious of pure practical laws just as we are conscious of pure theoretical principles, by attending to the necessity with which reason prescribes them to us, and to the separating [from them] of all empirical conditions, to which that necessity points us. The concept of a pure will arises from the consciousness of pure practical laws, as the consciousness of a pure understanding arises from that of pure theoretical principles" (KpV, AA 05:29-30). Consequently, when analyzing the *moral conscience* in the KpV, Kant's objective was to demonstrate how human beings are aware of the moral law and how this awareness leads to the concept of freedom of the will. For Kant, *moral conscience* can be defined as the factum of reason. For

Kant mean when he states that the inner judge condemns or absolves moral agents? Does the conscience have a relationship to a sense of self-approval? In conclusion, it seems pertinent to pose one further question: what is the relationship between moral conscience and discipline in Kant's philosophy?

Among the interpreters, Thomas Hill (1998)[266] defends a limited role for the moral conscience in Kant's theory.[267] He posits that

> In the Kantian view, we must treat basic moral beliefs as known, or to be determined, through reason. When we deliberately try to apply general principles to particular kinds of problems, we use judgment, and whether we act on our moral beliefs depends on the strength and goodness of our wills. **Conscience, however, is not the same as reason, judgment, or will. In fact, Kant assigns conscience a limited role in his moral theory. It is not a moral expert with an intuition of moral truth or a moral legislator that makes moral laws or a moral arbitrator that settles perplexing cases.** Rather, the role of conscience is restricted to that of an 'inner judge' who scrutinizes our conduct and then imposes sentence on us as guilty or else acquits us of either of two charges: (1) that we contravened our own (reason-based) judgment

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further insight into this approach to moral conscience, please refer to Kleingeld (2010). With regard to the concept of conscience in the KpV, it is understood that there is a distinction to be made between *awareness of the moral law* and *moral conscience*. Consequently, this section is limited to investigating the concept of moral conscience, specifically that found in TL and the RGV.

[266] In his article, Hill (1998) distinguishes between four distinct conceptions of conscience. (i) A popular religious conception of conscience is based on a strong reliance on theological beliefs. This conception claims that through conscience one has instinctive access to moral truth and that this ability is given by God. (ii) A cultural relativist conception of conscience considers it to be an unreflective response to the values socially instilled in the agent's culture; (iii) Joseph Butler's idea of conscience as reason that makes reflected moral judgments about what conduct is morally appropriate for a given circumstance, and (iv) Kant's restricted and metaphorical conception of conscience, understood as an inner judge "that condemns (or acquits) one for inadequate (or adequate) effort to live according to one's best possible, though fallible, judgments about what (objectively) one ought to do" (Hill, 1998, p.16). He posits that the Kantian conception of conscience is distinct from the popular religious conception, as it is not based on theology or mystical access to truth. In fact, for Kant, it is only the use of reason that can finalize moral maxims. In contrast to realist positions, Kant's position assumes the possibility of objective moral judgments. Finally, in opposition to Butler's position, Kant avoids basing his ethics on natural teleology, thereby avoiding heteronomy. In contrast to Butler's perspective, Kant eschews the establishment of natural teleology as the foundational principle of ethics. Consequently, his theory is not contingent upon heteronomy. Furthermore, "Kant treats conscience not as our general capacity to reflect morally regarding our acts but, rather, as a special disposition to 'find' ourselves involuntarily warning, accusing, and judging ourselves when we compare our acts (as we conceived them) with our moral judgments about the sorts of acts that are right and wrong" (Hill, 1998, p.38).

[267] The position adopted by Hill (1998) is disputed, and interpreters such as Moyar (2008) do not deny the interpretative possibility of Hill's argument but oppose it. Moyar's objection to Hill's position is in relation to the scope of the functions in moral reasoning of his interpretation of conscience in Kant. Moyar asserts that Hill elucidates the emotional aspect of conscience by associating it with accountability and as a moral obligation to assess actions with due diligence. In the view of Moyar, the account of conscience in the RGV as described by Hill concerns about "Conscience involves an assessment of our deliberative effort, of our moral attentiveness and perspicuity in arriving at a moral judgment" (Moyar, 2008, p.340). In this interpretation, the limiting element of Hill's position for Moyar is the explanation that conscience is only active after a first-order moral judgment. One of the points of contention between the two interpreters is the separation of the activity of conscience from the general activities of moral deliberation, reasoning, and judgment. For further details on this and other objections, please refer to Moyar.

> about what is morally right or (2) that we failed to exercise due care and diligence in forming the particular moral opinions on which we acted.[268]

In the view of Kant, conscience does not provide an understanding of morality; rather, it serves as a tool within its limited sphere to bring moral judgments into focus. As Hill states,

> Although Kant himself had confidence that reason could provide certainty regarding basic principles and many substantive duties, the basic Kantian view of moral deliberation and judgment, as I understand it, leaves more room for uncertainty and error than Kant allowed regarding specific moral questions. The reason is that in the Kantian view, moral deliberation and judgment are processes by which we try to identify choices that we could justify to all other reasonable persons, and the processes require subtle application of fundamental moral principles to empirical circumstances that are often uncertain and only partially understood.[269]

Accordingly, for Hill, deliberation and moral judgment in Kant allow for uncertainty and error, as both are processes by which the agent attempts to identify which choices can be justified for all other people. Conscience is not an infallible guide to objective moral truth; rather, it is a judgment that the agent has violated his own principles.

Hill argues that conscience in Kant is judicial self-assessment. Consequently, it is not the faculty by which one makes moral judgments; rather, it is a facultative process that comes into play after one has already made a moral judgment. In this context, the moral judgment in question is the application of moral requirements, substantive moral laws, to specific circumstances. Since moral judgments are embedded in specific circumstances, he points out that

> The result is that although every moral agent is presumed to have an adequate grasp of the fundamentals of the moral point of view, errors of judgment are possible. Obviously, errors of fact, culpable or not, can lead us to a judgment that we would not make if we had a correct, realistic view of our circumstances. But this is not the only source of mistake. Inattention, wishful thinking, and self-deceptive special pleading all can result in misapplications of moral principles that in the abstract, we know well enough. Presumably, too, we might come to have unjustifiable moral opinions without making any direct judgments of our own, for example, by simply accepting the prevailing standards in our culture or placing complete reliance on the moral judgment of some other person.[270]

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[268] (Hill, 1998, p.16 – own emphasis).
[269] (Hill, 1998, p.21).
[270] (Hill, 1998, p.32).

According to Kant, conscience would thus function as an internal judge, analyzing and sentencing the moral agent after the moral judgment had been made. Hill outlines three main aspects of moral conscience in Kant's practical philosophy. These are: (a) All moral agents possess a conscience[271], which is distinct from practical reason and the faculty of judgment in its function of making moral judgments. (b) Conscience functions as an internal judge that issues verdicts of acquittal (generating relief) or condemnation (generating suffering). In Kant's metaphor, the moral agent himself is the subject of these verdicts. In addition, it is simultaneously the accuser, the defender, and the judge. Furthermore, (c) as the metaphor of the court suggests, conscience appears to play an active role. However, Kant describes it as an "involuntary" that we hear even when we do not want to hear it, and as something that "speaks inevitably".[272] Accordingly, Hill proposes that conscience be understood as a form of self-accusation that employs moral deliberation, reasoning, and moral judgment.[273]

With regard to Kant's two accounts, as set out in the *Religion Within the Boundary of Mere Reason* and the *Doctrine of Virtue*, Hill offers an explanation in an attempt to provide unity to both definitions:

> Conscience is an involuntary response to the recognition that what we have done, are doing, or are about to do is contrary to the moral judgments that we have made (by applying moral law to different types of circumstances). Prominent among the many moral judgments that persons of conscience will have made is that they have the special, second-order duty to submit their acts to the 'inner court' of conscience, scrutinizing them diligently, impartially, and sincerely. Once they submit their acts to appraisal, conscience gives its verdict and 'passes sentence' automatically, for this is just a metaphor for the painful awareness of wrongdoing that such sincere appraisal causes in a person with the basic dispositions of 'practical reason'. Combining Kant's two accounts, we can say that conscience can acquit or condemn with regard to accusations of both violations of first-order duties (e.g., truth telling) and failures to fulfill the second-order duty of due care in scrutinizing and appraising our acts diligently (by 'holding them up' to our judgment of the first-order duties).[274]

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[271] (TL, AA 06:400).

[272] "But if someone is aware that he has acted in accordance with his conscience, then as far as guilt or innocence is concerned nothing more can be required of him. It is incumbent upon him only to enlighten his understanding in the matter of what is or is not duty; but when it comes, or has come, to a deed, **conscience speaks involuntarily and unavoidably**" (TL, AA 06:401 – own emphasis).

[273] "In effect, conscience presupposes and uses the results of our general reasoning and judgment in answer to the question 'What sorts of acts, in what circumstances, are morally permissible, and what sorts are morally forbidden?' When we 'compare' or 'hold up' our past (or projected) acts (as we perceive these) to these answers (our general judgments about what is permissible and what is forbidden) and also realize that those acts are (or will be) imputable to ourselves as their 'free cause (without excuse), then conscience imposes (or threatens) 'sentence', that is, makes us (as the guilty party) feel bad and yet (as the sentencing judge) feel that the pain is warranted" (Hill, 1998, p.33).

[274] (Hill, 1998, p.34-35).

Having this passage in mind, Hill asserts that in both cases, conscience presupposes moral judgment, yet it is not the same as moral judgment. In particular, it is not the same as moral judgment in the sense of extracting a more determined specification of duties from the moral law. Nevertheless, conscience does make a specific kind of judgment about moral judgment. Another argument in favor of separating moral judgment from conscience is that, according to Kant, agents can be mistaken about their judgments, but there is no such thing as an errant moral conscience.[275] For Hill, Kant asserts that when we err in judgment, "is conscience that makes us feel the force of our wrongdoing and thus presumably aids in the recognition of these duties".[276]

Conversely, interpreters such as Trevisan (2018) argue that moral conscience should be accorded greater importance and scope in its relationship with Kant's moral theory. For him, *examining* and *judging* one's own actions are activities belonging to reason, which means that the moral conscience is a constituent part of the practical activity of reason. According to his analysis, the examining conscience deals with the correctness, subjective certainty and sincerity of the agent. Consequently, it encompasses three key elements: (a) self-examination of one's conduct; (b) subjective certainty of being bound by the law; and (c) an attitude of sincerity that accompanies the agent in the self-examination with a view to plausibility. Trevisan (2018) posits that moral conscience is a moral capacity that exists prior to or concomitantly with the awareness of duty, without interfering in the determination of moral duty. Consequently, moral conscience does not determine what is morally good or bad; rather, it is a form of introspective

[275] In contrast to Hill (1998), who defends the separation between judgment and moral conscience, Moyar (2008) equates them. For him, conscience is a comprehensive judgment of an action. One might inquire as to how equating conscience and judgment does not contradict Kant's position on the impossibility of an errant conscience. Moyar responds as follows: Consciousness is not erroneous insofar as it is a practical apperception. "Kant is taking conscience to be both a presupposed act of self-consciousness in the process of deliberation and the judgment of the unity of self-consciousness that closes deliberation. There is a basic act of self-consciousness that makes imputation possible in the first place, and there is an act of judging the unity of self-consciousness in a specific piece of moral deliberation" (Moyar, 2008, p.350). Moyar distinguishes between Kant's claims regarding consciousness as a constitutive presupposition and Kant's claims regarding consciousness as a deliberative activity. In this way, consciousness accompanies the process of deliberation as self-consciousness. It cannot be denied that Moyar has compelling arguments to support the claim that Kant advocates a moral conscience with a comprehensive role in his moral theory (through the distinction among *Post-Judgment Awareness View*, *Self-Consciousness in Deliberation View* and *Unifying Judgment View*), Furthermore, it prompts consideration of the potential limitations of a comprehensive moral conscience. However, the primary issue with Moyar's perspective is that it places undue emphasis on the *individual self*, thereby reducing the significance of the categorical imperative to a mere heuristic tool. For him, the moral law is a law of self-determination, thus opening the way for a voluntarist interpretation of the moral law and its obligation, reserving the moral law and the principle of autonomy a form without universality and summarizing the *factum* of reason to conscience. Perhaps the problem with Moyar's position is that it is a *Fichtian* reading of Kant, and not properly Kantian. Moyar himself acknowledges the potential shortcomings of his position, including "the possible 'subjectivism' of a first-person morality" (Moyar, 2008, p.360).

[276] (Hill, 1998, p.36).

examination that is "fully aware of the claims to correctness [*Richtigkeit*] raised in any given moral situation and, thus, of the unequivocal subjection to a duty or obligation in general".[277]

Trevisan (2018) posits that "as such a power to incline oneself to do what is right, moral conscience can be understood as an 'instinct' or 'moral faculty' that requires a subjective certainty as to the conduct that the agent should adopt".[278] For him, the conscience of duty appears to be objectively given and simultaneously autonomously self-imposed by the agent. In contrast, the moral conscience functions in the opposite manner, as it is "a 'subjective conscience' of the correctness of actions already or yet to be carried out".[279] In other words, since there is no room for error or truth in the moral conscience, it is up to it to be subjectively certain about its moral intention to act correctly. "Therefore, we can say that subjective certainty is a necessary prerequisite for the recognition and fulfillment of duties".[280] This subjective certainty[281] is what Kant refers to in the *Religion With the Boundary of Mere Reason* as *the postulate of moral consciousness* [*Postulat des Gewissens],* which may be defined as follows: "of all possible actions, whether they are right or wrong. With respect to the action that I want to undertake, however, I must not only judge, and be of the opinion, that it is right; I must also be certain that it is. And this is a requirement of conscience [*und diese Forderung ist ein Postulat des Gewissens*] [...]".[282] In article of Trevisan, the examining function of the moral conscience is defined as the capacity to judge the subject's attitude towards performing acts for the sake of duty. The authority of conscience is therefore understood to be the capacity to judge according to the categorical imperative.

In turn, Trevisan proposes that the judging moral conscience is conceived as a forum or court in which the perverse principle of human nature – insincerity and falsehood – must be processed and judged by an internal judge.[283] For Kant, this internal judge is God, because the

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[277] (Trevisan, 2018, p.60 – own translation).
[278] (Trevisan, 2018, p.60 – own translation).
[279] (Trevisan, 2018, p.61 – own translation). On this subject, he continues: "[...] from an external point of view, say, the subject can be ignorant as to what his pure practical reason requires to be done - now, if it is true that the subject can be completely mistaken when trying to fulfill his duties, his actions, however, cannot be evaluated by him as incorrect, that is, his actions should not be presented to his moral conscience as immediately incorrect actions to the realization of which he is naturally inclined" (Trevisan, 2018, p.61– own translation).
[280] (Trevisan, 2018, p.61 – own translation).
[281] In this regard, Trevisan (2018) explains that "[t]his subjective certainty must be accompanied, according to Kant, by an attitude of sincerity <*Aufrichtigkeit*> or truthfulness <*Wahrhaftigkeit*>. These are necessary and unavoidable presuppositions not only for the fulfillment of the duty, but also for its recognition" (Trevisan, 2018, p.61-62 – own translation).
[282] (RGV, AA 06:186).
[283] Cf. Trevisan, 2018, p.64-65.

ideal internal judge must be that person to whom all duties in general must be considered as his commandments.

> Such an ideal person (the authorized judge of conscience) must be a scrutinizer of hearts, since the court is set up *within* man. But he must also *impose all obligation*, that is, he must be, or be thought as, a person in relation to whom all duties whatsoever are to be regarded as also his commands; for conscience is the inner judge of all free actions. Now, since such a moral being must also have all power (in heaven and on earth) in order to give effect to his laws (as is necessarily required for the office of judge), and since such an omnipotent moral being is called **God**, conscience must be thought of as the subjective principle of being accountable to God for all one's deeds.[284]

In order for the judging moral conscience to fulfill its function, it is necessary to consider an ideal person who is aware of the reasons behind human conduct, is infinitely just, and is omnipotent, as Kant defines God. Therefore, "in fact the latter concept is always contained (even if only in an obscure way) in the moral self-awareness of conscience".[285] According to Trevisan (2018), "only God, a full and perfect moral being who not only knows everything that goes on in the human heart, but who is also infinitely powerful and just, can adequately fulfill the function of judge in the moral conscience".[286] However, for humans, conceiving of God as an internal judge implies the presence of the idea conveyed by practical reason according to an analogy. Consequently, according to him, in order to reinforce the moral disposition, it is necessary to incorporate the concept of God and religion[287] into our moral lives.

Whether one regards the moral conscience as playing a limited or an all-encompassing role in Kant's moral theory, it is evident that

> The doctrine of conscience is of the greatest importance in morals. **Conscientia, taken generally, is the consciousness of our self, like apperceptio**; in specie it

[284] (MS, AA 06:439).
[285] (MS, AA 06:439).
[286] (Trevisan, 2018, p.67 – own translation).
[287] It should be noted that according to Trevisan (2018): "From a Kantian perspective, therefore, a genealogical, psychological, sociological, psychoanalytical or political explanation for the phenomenon of religion and, in general, moral conscience, is not appropriate or desirable, but rather a rational one, based on the initial conditions that give rise to the possibility of a complete and coherent moral life" (Trevisan, 2018, p.70 – own translation). In other words, the religion to which Trevisan (2018) refers is pure rational religion, as Kant defines it in its formal aspect "and through using practical reason, but only in following out the analogy with a lawgiver for all rational beings in the world, men are merely pointed in the direction of thinking of conscientiousness (which is also called religio) as accountability to a holy Being (morally lawgiving reason) distinct from us yet present in our inmost being, and of submitting to the will of this Being, as the rule of justice. The concept of religion is here for man only 'a principle of estimating all his duties as divine commands'" (MS AA 06: 439-440).

> involves consciousness of my will, my disposition to do right, or that the action be right, and thus equals a consciousness of what duty is, for itself. Anyone, therefore, who in a theoretical concept is not aware of all the representations on which it is founded, is certainly deficient in knowledge, but conscience is not lacking in him.[288]

Kant defines moral conscience as an original, intellectual, and moral predisposition, representing duty. It is, therefore, both a natural predisposition related to human receptivity to duty and an act of self-examination, a kind of self-knowledge about moral issues. Subjective moral certainty can be understood as two distinct forms: the conscience that verifies foreseen cases through a practical examination and the conscience that judges and leads to an evaluation after the actions have been carried out. The judgment does not provide certainty as to whether the action will have or has had moral value. Rather, it refers to the awareness of the maxim's submission to the categorical imperative. This natural predisposition must be cultivated for the sake of duty. Moral conscience, as an indirect duty to be cultivated, is the exercise of moral reflection. This requires an active attitude from the agent, while also being involuntary and inevitable. On the one hand, conscience serves to verify foreseen cases through a practical examination. On the other hand, conscience functions to judge and lead to an evaluation after the actions have been carried out.

The assumption is made that moral conscience is a crucial element of Kant's moral philosophy because it is the location of the feeling of guilt and the attribution of responsibility to oneself. In other words, it is the faculty of judgment that is focused on the judgment of oneself. This leads to the question of what the difference is between self-discipline and moral conscience. Since moral conscience can be interpreted as self-reflection that generates internal control, it may be argued that it is equivalent to self-discipline or takes its place in Kant's moral theory. If moral conscience is a type of self-examination, what role does self-discipline play in Kant's philosophical system? The primary distinction between the two perspectives, as elucidated by Hill (1998) and Trevisan (2018), serves as a crucial element in addressing these inquiries.

On the one hand, according to Hill (1998), conscience examines the functioning of other faculties and arouses a feeling that arises from the judgment of guilt or innocence. In this way, the motivating force of the conscience is conditioned by the representation of the law. Conscience is not a guide; rather, it is a judgment that the agent has violated his own principles. This means that conscience only enters the “practical calculus” after the moral judgment has

[288] (V-MS/Vigil. AA, 27:613-614).

been made. According to Hill, conscience serves to examine the functioning of other faculties and to arouse a feeling of guilt or innocence. Consequently, the motivating force of conscience is conditioned by the representation of the law, which acts as an incentive rather than a motive for action. This is because, for Kant, the moral motive for acting in accordance with the moral law is always duty. This perspective is compatible with and differs from all the types and definitions found in the theory of discipline, whether theoretical, practical, or pragmatic.

Yet, the defense of a moral conscience with a comprehensive role in Kant's moral theory appears to occupy the space allotted to self-discipline. This is because it is a type of self-examination with the intention of correction, just as the discipline of reason is a system of precaution and self-examination. However, on the one hand, the difference is that this self-examination by the moral conscience takes place while the conscience "is the consciousness of our self, like apperception"[289], that is, while it is an apperception[290], it is the unity of the identity of the self. The self-examination in question pertains to the possibility of attaining substantive moral certainty. This is to say that it concerns the subjective ability to ascertain whether a given maxim has been subjected to the categorical imperative. It is the self-consciousness that acts upon the conscience. It therefore does not allow for objective certainty since (i) moral action is unknowable and (ii) apperception as an awareness of the "*I of reflection*", the "*I think*" of transcendental apperception is not the knowledge of a being that thinks, but is an awareness of the way in which thoughts are thought.[291] In contrast to the self-examination as a system of precaution presented by Kant in theoretical self-discipline, which (i) enables the foundation and legitimacy of knowledge free from errors and illusions; and (ii) as moral self-discipline, it also acts as self-coercion and is not related to the attribution of guilt or absolution in the internal court of reason. In this manner, the theory of discipline, as a significant step in the formation of the agent's moral character, facilitates the function of the moral conscience, both as an examiner and as a judge.

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[289] (V-MS/Vigil. AA, 27:613-614).

[290] In the KrV, Kant defines apperception as the unity of perceptions: "I call it the pure apperception, in order to distinguish it from the empirical one, or also the original apperception, since it is that self consciousness which, because it produces the representation I think, which must be able to accompany all others and which in all consciousness is one and the same, cannot be accompanied by any further representation. I also call its unity the transcendental unity of self-consciousness in order to designate the possibility of a priori cognition from it. For the manifold representations that are given in a certain intuition would not all together be my representations if they did not all together belong to a self-consciousness; i.e., as my representations (even if I am not conscious of them as such) they must yet necessarily be in accord with the condition under which alone they can stand together in a universal self-consciousness, because otherwise they would not throughout belong to me. From this original combination much may be inferred" (KrV, B 132-133).

[291] For further insight into this perspective on apperception in Kant, please refer to Clélia Aparecida Martins (1999).

3.1.2 Theory of discipline as compatible and necessary to the concept of autonomy

The purpose of this section is to demonstrate the compatibility and necessity of discipline and autonomy in Kant and in the secondary literature. In other words, we will attempt to illustrate that the theory of discipline is compatible with Kantian autonomy, whether it is explicitly stated in *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* or derived from interpretations in the secondary literature of what autonomy means for Kant. The path to autonomy is presented as a case study in the debate on the relationship between discipline and autonomy. I present two positions in order to demonstrate the compatibility and necessity of the theory of discipline for the concept of autonomy. It should be noted that Kleingeld and Willaschek (2019) oppose the position of O'Neill (2004). However, as I will demonstrate, these positions are not debating at the same methodological level and, therefore, are not opposites, but are complementary. The objective of Kleingeld and Willaschek is to substantiate the obligation of the Moral Law, whereas the central objective of O'Neill is to guarantee, through the justification of substantive moral laws, the obligation and, at the same time, plurality, thereby highlighting the double meaning of universalization. This subsection proposes an explanation and argument that both positions are not exclusive and that, in fact, they can coexist and be compatible with each other. This is because they are at different interpretative levels. Furthermore, they are compatible with Kant's theory of discipline.

The crucial point is that if we do not adopt the position that the Kantian system is composed of argumentative levels, and that the theory of discipline occupies a specific place within this system, we risk confusing the role of discipline with the justification of moral motivation in Kant. Therefore, this debate is important for the investigation because, while it clarifies the discussion and the distinction of levels regarding self-legislation in Kant's moral theory, it also opens the space to introduce an explanation of the place of Kant's theory of discipline in the moralization project. That is, it demonstrates that the theory of discipline (i) is not opposed to autonomy; (ii) does not exceed the function nor occupy the place of moral motivation in Kant's moral theory, since moral motivation is the duty; and (iii) that the theory of discipline is, in fact, necessary for Kant's moral theory. Although it is not sufficient, it is a path through which the agent can achieve autonomy, and at the same time, it is fundamental for the implementation of Kant's moralization project, that is, the application of moral theory to human beings.

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As outlined in Schneewind's analysis in the book *The Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral Philosophy* (1998), Kant is credited with the conceptualisation of morality as autonomy. Kant's proposal is that morality should be conceived as self-government. In her 2004 article, *Autonomy, Plurality, and Public Reason*, philosopher and Kant interpreter Onora O'Neill expresses her agreement with Schneewind's analysis. In her 2004 article, O'Neill asserts that the concept of autonomy is fundamental to Kant's understanding of morality. Nevertheless, as Allen Wood (1999) notes, there is a difficulty in constructing autonomy as the foundation of moral obligation, given the argumentative implications. This is due to the existence of an apparent paradox in the idea of self-legislation. Stating that the will is the author of obligations seems to leave the content and bindingness of this obligation up to the agent, which would contradict the idea that it exerts an obligation on the individual. In the secondary literature, various methods for resolving this apparent paradox are presented. In the context of this thesis, two positions can be identified: (i) that of Kleingeld and Willaschek (2019), who sought to demonstrate that autonomy is not self-determination, as it has often been interpreted; and (ii) the position of O'Neill (2004), who understands self-legislation as a specific understanding of self-government. In her view, legislation produces laws that are structured in a formal manner, thereby enabling them to be formulated as principles for all individuals within a given domain. Upon initial examination, these two positions appear to be opposed, as evidenced by the fact that Kleingeld and Willaschek (2019) explicitly counterposed themselves to the perspective espoused by Onora O'Neill (2004) in their written work.

On the one hand, there is the position of Kleingeld and Willascheck (2019). For them, Kant does not explicitly state that the principle of morality is self-legislated and is therefore not philosophically committed to this claim in his moral theory. When Kant states that the principle of morality is the principle of autonomy, he does not mean that the Moral Law is itself self-legislating. Rather, he claims that the Moral Law "*orders*" autonomy. This is because Kant asserts that we should act "*as if*" we were giving universal laws through our maxims, rather than "*actually*" giving substantive moral laws. It should be noted that the use of the term "*Moral Law*" with a capital letter is intentional. For Kleingeld and Willaschek, the use of the capital

letter indicates a reference to the highest moral principle. This distinction allows for the differentiation between the Moral Law and the substantive moral laws, which are written in lower case. The latter are defined as "the laws that we are said to impose on ourselves as we subject ourselves to them".[292] According to this interpretation, there is a *standard interpretation* of Kant's conception of the Moral Law as self-legislated. This interpretation maintains that obligatory force serves as the source of moral obligation. Those who interpret Kant in a constructivist and realist manner share the argument that autonomy consists in the self-legislation of the Moral Law. This implies that the Moral Law is not heteronomous, that is, it is not given by any tradition, by any divinity, or by any authority external to the agent's will. Consequently, the will endows the Moral Law with its own authority. According to them, authors who read Kant as constructivists, such as Rawls (1980), O'Neill (1989; 2004) and Korsgaard (1996), maintain that moral requirements are the result of deliberative procedures internal to practical reason. In contrast, realists, such as Guyer (2007) and Wood (2008), resist the idea that moral obligation depends on a volitional act. However, they assume that Kant affirms that the Moral Law is self-legislated in some sense, even if metaphorical. In general, Kleingeld and Willaschek (2019) point out that many interpreters are conflicted about the notion of Kantian moral autonomy and its relationship to the Moral Law, this conflict is about interpretation, but they, whether constructivists or realists, do not disagree that Kant actually stated that the Moral Law is self-legislated. For them, *the standard readings* do not resolve the profound paradox expressed in the relationship between obligation and autonomy, that is, the problem of the relationship between the obligatory force of the Moral Law depending on an act of self-legislation. Instead of this kind of *standard reading*, Kleingeld and Willaschek suggest that the idea of moral autonomy is linked to substantive moral principles, such as the duties not to lie and to promote the happiness of others. For them, Kant provides neither a realist nor a constructivist foundation. "Instead, he defends a third position that comes into view only once we move past the idea that the Moral Law is self-legislated. According to this position, the Moral Law is a fundamental a priori principle of pure practical reason that is not grounded in anything more fundamental".[293]

In general, the standard interpretation of autonomy is that it generates moral obligation. Kleingeld and Willaschek challenge this interpretation, arguing that claiming that an act of self-legislation generates moral obligation is at odds with the Kantian thesis of the unconditional

[292] (Kleingeld / Willaschek, 2019, p.9).
[293] (Kleingeld / Willaschek, 2019, p.2).

validity of the Moral Law. This is because it implies that the activity of the will to self-legislate is a condition for the validity of the Moral Law. It is problematic to claim that moral obligation depends on an act of the will because "it seems that one can release oneself from moral obligation by abolishing the Moral Law in a second act. It is clear, however, that this type of voluntarism is absolutely contrary to Kant's view".[294] To extricate oneself from this impasse, *the standard interpretation* maintains that the Moral Law is not a matter of choice, regardless of its degree of autonomy. To substantiate this stance, they distinguish between *the Legislating Self* of the Moral Law and *the Personal or Individual Self*. Consequently, when Kant discusses the "*I*" in morality, he is referring to an impartial notion based on practical reason. According to this interpretation, the primary philosophical justification for the standard interpretation is to safeguard the Moral Law from heteronomy. Consequently, the Moral Law must be self-legislated, as failure to do so would result in its being considered an external imposition. The normative authority of the principle of morality is derived from autonomy. This assumption posits that the obligation of the Moral Law must be founded on something more fundamental. For realists, this is a value. For constructivists, it is a principle or activity related to agency.

As outlined by Kleingeld and Willaschek, the Moral Law represents a foundational a priori principle of reason. Consequently, they comprehend that Kant employs the concept of moral autonomy "to articulate the procedure for determining the moral permissibility of maxims and thus for deriving substantive moral laws; autonomy does not concern the origin and binding force of the Moral Law".[295] Kleingled and Willaschek primarily rely on passages from the Second Section of the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* and the *Critique of Practical Reason* to substantiate their argument. In the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant asserts that the concept of the will of every rational being as a universally legislating will must be understood as a self-legislating will. Consequently, all maxims that cannot coexist with universal legislation itself must be rejected. This interpretation posits that the aforementioned does not signify the following: a) The universal legislation in question is the Moral Law. Therefore, it can be understood that Kant is referring to substantive moral laws, since he is discussing the universalization of maxims; b) The principle of autonomy is formulated in terms of self-legislation through maxims. This suggests that the law that is self-legislated is not the Categorical Imperative itself, but rather substantive moral laws; c) The law encompasses the agent within its scope. In accordance with GMS, AA 04:438, self-legislation must be interpreted

[294] (Kleingeld / Willaschek, 2019, p.3).
[295] (Kleingeld / Willaschek, 2019, p.5).

in two distinct ways: as given by itself and, "because it includes oneself in its scope, as also addressing oneself. The fact that I must regard myself as author of the moral laws to which I am subject says something important about my relation to those laws, namely that they are not alien impositions but expressions of my own will".[296] This implies that they are not external influences on the agent, but rather expressions of his own will; d) The notion of autonomy in Kant is introduced in a counterfactual manner and concerns substantive moral laws. For example, Kant does not say that the law is *really self-legislated*; rather, he suggests that it *should be viewed as such*, and that one should act *as if* one were giving a universal law.

In this manner, the expression "as if" is highlighted, as the concept of the will as self-legislating is presented as a means of contemplating the will, rather than as a genuine legislative act. Autonomy is defined as *the will being a law unto itself*. This implies that the principle of autonomy necessitates a specific method of selecting maxims. Consequently, the principle of autonomy can be expressed as "one ought to act only on maxims that one can simultaneously will ('comprehend in the same volition') as universal laws for all rational beings, including oneself".[297] These universal laws are those formulated by the universalization of maxims. Finally, Kleingeld and Willaschek contend that when Kant states that the Moral Law is the principle of autonomy, he categorizes this autonomy as *commanding autonomy* not as *resulting from it*. In other words, the Moral Law commands the agent's will and is not a result of their deliberation or choice. Given that the will of human beings is susceptible to the influence of sensitive inclinations, the principle of autonomy assumes a prescriptive form. Consequently, they posit that there is no evidence to suggest that the content or obligatory force of the Moral Law is the result of the autonomy of the will.

Kleingeld and Willaschek elucidate that Kant employs the term "moral law" on two distinct levels. The first is the Moral Law as the supreme principle of morality. It takes the form of a Categorical Imperative for human beings that formulates the normative criterion that guides the adoption of maxims, which can be simultaneously willed as universal laws. As universal laws, the very agents who adopt them are subject to them,

> In other words, the Moral Law in the singular is a meta-principle that demands that we regard ourselves as legislating, and self-legislating, universal laws in the plural. It is a formal principle in that it abstracts from all empirical matter of the will (i.e., from desires, inclinations, etc.) and thus determines specific moral obligations only when

[296] (Kleingeld / Willaschek, 2019, p.6).
[297] (Kleingeld / Willaschek, 2019, p.7).

> applied to particular maxims. If a maxim fails to meet this normative criterion, it is impermissible to act on it, and in this way the moral criterion leads to the formulation of substantive moral laws – moral laws at a second level.[298]

In the context of the discussion on autonomy, the issue at hand concerns the existence of moral laws in the plural, which can be understood as existing on the second level. The application of the formal moral law of particular maxims results in the formulation of substantive moral laws.

On the one hand, the position of Kleingeld and Willaschek can be questioned by asking whether Kantian theory allows for a law without a legislator. Anticipating this possible criticism, they note that Kant repeatedly speaks of laws when dealing with logical principles and does not suggest that there is a legislator for them, so it seems permissible in his theory to think of laws without a legislator. For them, therefore, it is possible to affirm that the moral law is a law independent of any legislator. Even when Kant mentions in the *Critique of Practical Reason* that it is possible to consider or think about the relationship between God and moral laws, this is not used as a justification for these laws, nor does it explain their content or their normative validity, i.e., even in the passages where Kant discusses the idea of God, the content and normative validity of the moral principle and moral laws *guide* his legislative activity rather than *depending on* him. In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant, demonstrating the sufficient conditions for the truth of the analytic and synthetic a priori, refers to the highest a priori principles as *Grundsätze*, and states that they serve as a basis (*Grund*) for other judgments and principles derived from them, but that they themselves are not based on other judgments. It is possible to defend these principles as subjective sources of the possibility of certain kinds of judgments. In this way, Kleingeld and Willaschek argue that the Moral Law, both when presented in the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* and in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, is characterized as a fundamental supreme principle that is valid a priori, that is, as a fundamental law of practical reason, which means that it grounds specific moral laws without being grounded in any other more general practical principle.

On the other hand, Kleingeld and Willaschek claim that in their proposed interpretation, the paradox and tensions regarding the theory of autonomy are overcome, since this interpretation does not contain any element of problematic voluntarism that contradicts the unconditionality of moral obligation. "Rather, with the idea of autonomy Kant formulates a counterfactual criterion for determining whether maxims are morally permissible and, through

[298] (Kleingeld / Willaschek, 2019, p.8).

this, for articulating substantive moral laws".[299] Since the counterfactual criterion is an a priori principle of reason, these moral laws are grounded in reason itself. In other words, the key point is that Kant does not claim that human beings actually give themselves moral laws, but he writes that one must consider the will as legislator, that agents must consider themselves as universal legislators. Counterfactually, one must assume that one is legislating a universal law by means of the maxim, and ask whether it is possible to act according to it without self-contradiction. "Thus, the idea of autonomy serves to articulate a criterion in light of which we are to determine the moral permissibility of our maxims".[300] For Kleingeld and Willaschek, this use of the idea of autonomy does not carry the problematic implication that the unconditional validity of moral laws depends on any real act of self-binding on the part of human agents. And since the binding force of substantive moral laws derives not from an act of will, but from a criterion articulated in the Moral Law, there is normatively no moral alternative to acting in disagreement with to the maxims that satisfy the criterion. Thus, for Kleingeld and Willaschek, the Moral Law is an a priori principle of reason whose normative force does not derive from its self-legislation or from the legislation of any other person or thing.

On the other hand, there is the position of Onora O'Neill (2004). According to her, the characterization of Kantian autonomy as an idea of the will of every rational being as a will that gives universal laws is familiar to anyone who knows Kantian language. As she points out, it is easy to understand a single political agent, divinity, or institution making laws for everyone, but it is not so easy to understand a plurality of legislators making laws for everyone in a common domain. According to her, however, these difficulties are resolved if the principles chosen by the agents who legislate for all satisfy two conditions:

> First, they must select principles that any, hence all, could select; otherwise, at least some agents could not be universal legislators. Second, they must select principles that all, hence any, could adopt as a basis for leading their lives; otherwise, at least some agents would be exempt from whatever principles are selected, which consequently could not be universal laws.[301]

Self-legislation, as a specific form of self-government, is based on the universality of its twofold reference, that is,

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[299] (Kleingeld / Willaschek, 2019, p.11).
[300] (Kleingeld / Willaschek, 2019, p.11).
[301] (O'Neill, 2004, p.184).

> Legislation or law-giving yields laws, and laws have a formal structure: they are formulated as principles for all within a certain domain. The idea of universal self-legislation contains a double reference to universality: it is the idea of legislation by all agents for all agents. From this we can see immediately that Kantian autonomy has its context not in the lives of individual agents, but in the lives of a plurality of agents. Its context is one in which the same plurality of beings are to be agents and subjects, law givers and law respecters.[302]

For O'Neill, the categorical imperative in its formulations does not enunciate content but establishes a procedure for determining what content is moral. Thus, for a coherent understanding of the Formula of Autonomy[303] it is necessary to recognize that in calling for universal legislation – *by* all and *for* all – it imposes a limit on the content of that legislation, i.e., universal legislators can legislate principles that can be chosen *by* all and prescribed *for* all.[304]

Therefore, O'Neill uses the principle of autonomy to formulate her position against the apparent paradox that exists in the idea of self-legislation, and her solution, it seems to me, does not focus on the foundation and justification of the moral law and its relationship with obligation and autonomy, in other words, on the metaethical level, but actually on the later level, in the structuring of ethics and on the level of applied ethics, in other words, in the relationship between autonomy, its function and agents. Therefore, O'Neill starts from a different point of view, on the second level of Moral Law, that is, in relation to the substantive moral laws, the will and the obligation of these principles.

> Autonomy, Kantianly conceived, is the practice of disciplining thought and action in ways that make them followable by others – and if we are fully autonomous, by all others. The lawlike structure and strategy that autonomous agents incorporate in their thinking and willing, considered in the abstract, are the basic structures and strategies of reason, to which all other reasoned principles are subordinate. The more determinate implications of autonomous willing and action define the range of permissible action, and the limits of autonomous willing determine the principles of

[302] (O'Neill, 2004, p.184).

[303] In his work, Kant identifies two key moments in the formulation of autonomy: (i) "That is to say that the ground of all practical legislation lies objectively in the rule and in the form of universality, which (according to the first principle) makes the rule capable of being a law (say, for example, a law of nature). Subjectively, however, the ground of all practical legislation lies in the end; but (according to the second principle) the subject of all ends is every rational being as an end in himself. From this there now follows the third practical principle of the will as the supreme condition of the will's conformity with universal practical reason, viz., the idea of the will of every rational being as a will that legislates universal law" (GMS, AA 04:431) and (ii) "never to act on any maxim except such as can also be a universal law and hence such as the will can thereby regard itself as at the same time the legislator of universal law" (GMS, AA 04:434).

[304] Cf. O'Neill, 2004, p.185.

> action that there is reason to reject, and thereby fix the basic shape of principles of obligation among a plurality.[305]

For her, Kantian ethics is not individualistic, and when Kant states that the principle of autonomy is a fundamental principle of the human will, he is trying to establish that the will should be subordinated neither to external authority nor to previously established norms.

Individuals are free to judge and will in different ways, so it is necessary to construct standards to structure thought, and this construction is a shared task, so it must be done by a plurality of free agents. As O'Neill states,

> The puzzle then is to grasp why some ways of judging or willing should be thought to have the sort of general authority that we may speak of as that of reason and others do not. How can Kant draw any distinction between reasoned and unreasoned ways of thinking and willing? If we do not 'transfer the source of obligation from my will to the canons of rationality', can there be any grounds for thinking that autonomous willing is reasoned? Can we have standards of reason without submitting to cognitive or moral despotism, and ultimately to a morality of obedience rather than autonomy?[306]

Kantian philosophy offers an answer to these questions in the relationship between the demands of reason in theory and in practice. O'Neill (2004) notes that both the demands of reason in practice and in theory are constructed by the same structure that must be imposed on thought and action so that a plurality of free agents can follow each other's thought or action. This minimum structure common to both uses of reason (theoretical and practical) is the discipline of reason. For her, free agents must discipline their thought and action in such a way that others can follow. Only when free agents discipline themselves do their thought and action exemplify the fundamental requirements of reason, because they have imposed upon themselves the "form of the law", that is, universality.

Therefore, O'Neill argues that

> Autonomy in thinking is no more – but also no less – than the attempt to conduct thinking (speaking, writing) on principles on which (we take it) all others whom we address could also conduct their thinking (speaking, writing). Autonomy in action is no more – and also no less – than the attempt to conduct ourselves on the basis of principles on which (we take it) all others could conduct their lives. Reason is then in the first place no more than a matter of striving for autonomy in the spheres of thinking

[305] (O'Neill, 2004, p.192-193).
[306] (O'Neill, 2004, p.187).

> and action. The difficult aspect of these claims is to show why just this way of disciplining thought and action should count as exemplifying the basic strategy of reason.[307]

For her, it is only this way of disciplining thought and action that counts as an example of the strategy of reason. Kant's objective is to establish a foundation for reasoning based on autonomy, rather than vice versa. This position is clearly delineated in both the *What is Englightenment*?[308] and *What Does It Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking?* [309]. Reasoning must be free, but its use requires discipline. The disorderly use of thought and the assertion of unjust claims, for example, do not result in the freedom of thought, but rather in incoherence. In order for rational thought, whether expressed verbally or in writing, to be autonomous, it must be free to adopt certain principles. In Kant's view, the capacity to judge autonomously is what we call reason. This is the only viable option, as O'Neill correctly asserts, in order to prevent thought from succumbing to despotic external coercion or languishing in the incoherence of anarchy.

> 'Self-legislation' is not then a mysterious phrase for describing a merely arbitrary ways in which a free individual might or might not think, but a characteristic of thinking that free individuals achieve by imposing the discipline of lawlikeness, so making their thoughts or their proposals for action followable by or accessible to others, hence in principle intelligible to them and open to their criticism, agreement or rebuttal.[310]

For Kant, enlightenment is not merely the act of questioning the guidance of authorities, experts, or state officials. Rather, it is a process of autonomy in the conduct of thought and life, as well as a form of freely imposed self-discipline in the use of one's capacities. The private use of reason must be constrained to a limited public domain and cannot be universally legislated, as it only offers reasons that are conditioned to external authority. In O'Neill's view, only

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[307] (O'Neill, 2004, p.187-188).

[308] "[…] Can thinking and willing that are wholly free allow for any claims of authority, even for the authority of reason? In 'What Does It Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking?' Kant makes it clear that he rejects this postmodernist fantasy about the thinking of free agents. He repeatedly characterises thought that is not disciplined in any way as a lawless use of our cognitive capacities that would lead not to freedom of thought but to incoherence, and thought that is disciplined by an external authority as deferential obedience. [...] Reasoned thought must have at least some discipline, which permits others to follow it. Indeed, on Kant's view, the discipline of lawlikeness provides the only fundamental standard of reason that we can attain. [...] Reasoned thinking (speaking, writing) must be autonomous in the strict Kantian sense of freely following or adopting some law or principle rather than deferring to some supposed authority who ordains or prescribes the law. It must therefore incorporate a structure by which others can follow the thinking (speaking, writing). This is the basic strategy of any exercise of reason" (O'Neill, 2004, p.188-189).

[309] As an example: WDO, AA 08:146 e WDO, AA 08:303-304.

[310] (O'Neill, 2004, p.189).

thinking and willing that do not presuppose external authority are capable of achieving universality; only autonomous and disciplined reasoning is fully public and lawful.[311] As Kant states, the touchstone of everything that can be decided as law for a people is whether a people could impose such a law on themselves. The objective of fully public reasoning is to reach a universal audience. It is not possible to impose the legal use of freedom; similarly, it is not possible to force the individual to be autonomous in thought and action. However, if the individual so chooses, thought and action will be self-legislated. For those who lack the courage to think for themselves and therefore are not autonomous, Kant presents the *Aufklärung* as a path towards enlightenment, autonomy, and morality.[312]

According to O'Neill, reason needs to provide structure and patterns of organization for thought and action. Without these, it would be impossible to give, receive, exchange, and refuse reasons. These patterns are not innate; rather, they must be constructed. It is not possible to assume that any given reasoning will suffice, nor that any reasoning must be employed by a plurality of autonomous beings. One must be dedicated to the pursuit of reason and devise methods of thinking and willing that can coexist and interact with plurality, that can be universally applied.

> In matters of explanation and knowledge, we do not give others reasons unless we produce thoughts that (we take it) they can follow in thought and so find intelligible: communication, agreement and disagreement will all be disrupted between those who cannot follow one another's line of thought. Equally, in matters of action we do not give others reasons for action unless the principles and proposals that we set before them are ones that they could in principle follow: others may refuse to adopt some principle and proposal that is set out for them, but if the principle or proposal is one that they could not adopt, they will not have been offered anything that could count as a reason for action for them.[313]

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[311] "Private uses of reason are designed to be followed only by some restricted audience: they presuppose at least some arbitrary assumptions, which define and are shared by that restricted audience. The principles of private reasoning cannot therefore be universally legislated. Insofar as we rely on partial, private uses of our reasoning capacities, we conform to or obey some given authority, for which we can give no reason, so can offer only reasons that are conditional on that authority. For example, insofar as we simply rely on or accept the demands of officials or priests, of received views or local ideologies, we merely assume their authority, and our thinking and acting cannot be fully reasoned. In some contexts of life, reliance on such arguments from authority may be enough, but in others it will be question-begging. Only thinking and willing that do not presuppose any such arbitrary authorities are fit to reach all others; only such reasoning is fully public and fully lawlike" (O'Neill, 2004, p.190).

[312] "We have profound, practical and pressing needs to understand others' beliefs and to communicate our own, to give others reason to act and to receive reasons from them. Insofar as we fail to discipline our thinking and acting by giving it a form that (we take it) others can follow in thought or in action, we will fail to engage with others in ways that permit any exchange of reasons. Reason's authority grows out of the mere fact that its standards – lawlikeness without a law – provide the only means for a plurality of free beings to avoid thought that dissipates in anarchic fragmentation or subservience to groundless categories and standards and the edicts of bogus 'authorities'" (O'Neill, 2004, p.190).

[313] (O'Neill, 2004, p.191).

Accordingly, for O'Neill, Kantian autonomy is manifested in the practice of disciplining both thought and action in a manner that renders them accessible to others for followership. The legal structure and strategy of thinking and acting, considered in abstraction, are the basic structures and strategies of reason to which all principles are subordinated.

In light of the aforementioned considerations, it can be asserted that both positions are not mutually exclusive. Kleingeld and Willaschek's (2019) position is predicated on the division of levels within the moral law. With regard to the second level, that is, the level of substantive moral laws, their position can be considered to be in alignment with Onora O'Neill's (2004) position, given that it concerns autonomy in relation to substantive moral laws. Nevertheless, a counterargument can be made. The separation into levels is not sufficient to resolve the impasse between the two positions. Even though they are debating on different levels, O'Neill justifies her position with regard to the paradox existing in the relationship between Moral Law and self-legislation by differentiating between the *Legislating Self* of Moral Law and the *Personal or Individual Self*. This premise is not used by Kleingeld and Willaschek, who defend Moral Law as a meta-principle without a legislator. Consequently, in order for this approximation of positions to be feasible, it would be necessary to abandon O'Neill's argument.

I then propose the following solution: I concur with Kleingeld and Willaschek that the distinction assumed by O'Neill is insufficient to address the unconditional obligation of the Moral Law. However, this distinction is not incompatible with Kleingeld and Willaschek's point of view if we assume that O'Neill is debating at the second level, that is, at the level where autonomy and its binding force are related to substantive moral laws. This is because the agent in giving himself substantive moral laws needs to put himself in a legislator's point of view. (i) The agent must consider the point of view of the legislator while simultaneously being subject to the substantive moral law. (ii) In the public sphere, for instance, human beings must propose a public reasoning that is designed to reach everyone. This reasoning must be distinguished from the reasoning of the *Legislating Self* of the moral law and the reasoning of the *Personal Self*. In this case, it is necessary to adopt the perspective of an "I" capable of incorporating universality and plurality as its presuppositions. However, it is important to recognize that disagreement is a fundamental aspect of human nature, even if it is a reasonable disagreement. Furthermore, it is impossible to eradicate our unsociability and our resistance to the choice of others, because in addition to disagreements related to the burdens of reasons, we also find in society disagreements generated by unsocial passions. Therefore, it is essential to be aware and

self-aware of our contexts. In other words, human beings still require the idea of a *Legislating Self* in order to disengage from their resistance to sociability and achieve political and social maxims that can become universal political and social maxims that can be accepted by everyone. In this manner, communication between the *Legislating Self* and the *Personal Self* is feasible, as the agent must not only be aware of his rational capacity to be constrained by these substantive moral/political/social laws, but also presuppose that he is capable of implementing them, applying them in the world through his autonomy and the discipline of reason.

Thus, by adopting Kleingeld and Willaschek's position of the Moral Law as a meta-principle, we guarantee the unconditionality of its moral obligation at the level of justification of Kant's moral theory, i.e., the normative force derives from it being a principle of *a priori* reason and not from some kind of voluntarism. This position would in no way contradict the theory of discipline. At the same time, by accepting O'Neill's position, we do not conflict with Kleingeld and Willaschek's position. Therefore, I agree with Onora O'Neill's position on Kantian discipline and its use as a common standard for structuring thought to organize the plurality of free agents.

It can be concluded that there is a compatibility between autonomy and discipline, as well as a need for discipline in Kant's moral theory and its application. Here are the evidences for affirming compatibility:

(i) Kant's theory of discipline is predicated on the premise that the will must be liberated from the despotism of desires. Accordingly, "the will is thus not merely subject to the law but is subject to the law in such a way that it must be regarded also as legislating for itself and only on this account as being subject to the law (of which it can regard itself as the author)"[314]. Therefore, the moral obligation to which it refers does not concern the Moral Law, as defended by Kleingeld and Willaschek (2019), but rather the fulfillment of autonomy as a prescriptive principle and the choice of maxims. This is because the maxims of agents are not immediately moral maxims, and thus require the discipline of reason. In this manner, autonomy is defined as "the concept of every rational being as one who must regard himself as legislating universal law by all his will's maxims, so that he may judge himself and his actions from this point of view […]".[315] Consequently, in the relationship

[314] (GMS, AA 04:431).
[315] (GMS, AA 04:433).

between morality, choice [*Willkür*], and autonomy, the maxim must become a universal law. That is to say, it must become a universally valid substantive moral law. This is necessary so that the choice [*Willkür*] corresponds to practical reason. The concept of autonomy is related to the capacity of rational beings to act according to the representation of laws. This relationship concerns the qualification of this will, which is defined as "autonomy of the will is the property that the will has of being a law to itself (independently of any property of the objects of volition). The principle of autonomy is this: Always choose in such a way that in the same volition the maxims of the choice are at the same time present as universal law".[316] In other words, for Kant, the will, as defined in the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, is the capacity of rational beings to act in accordance with the representation of laws. Kant adopts the premise that all phenomena in nature are governed by laws. He asserts that "only a rational being has the power to act according to his conception of laws, i.e., according to principles, and thereby has he a will. Since the derivation of actions from laws requires reason, the will is nothing but practical reason".[317] In *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant endeavors to elucidate the concept of human will, positing that it is both rational and sensitive. To this end, he draws a parallel between the human will and the will of a being that is infallibly determined, regardless of inclinations, by reason. In this case, actions are recognized as objectively and subjectively necessary. However, in the case of human beings, our will is not entirely in accordance with practical reason. Consequently, actions are recognized as objectively necessary, but subjectively contingent. Thus, on the one hand, the human will that relates to both reason and sensibility is the will as choice [*Willkür*], which is to say, this will that is not yet practical reason requires practical and theoretical discipline in order to manifest itself as autonomous. On the other hand, the will [*Wille*] as practical reason is universally legislating[318]. In accordance with Kant's principle of the universally

[316] (GMS, AA 04:440).
[317] (GMS, AA 04:412).
[318] "This principle of humanity and of every rational nature generally as an end in itself is the supreme limiting condition of every man's freedom of action. This principle is not borrowed from experience, first, because of its universality, inasmuch as it applies to all rational beings generally, and no experience is capable of determining anything about them; and, secondly, because in experience (subjectively) humanity is not thought of as the end of men, i.e., as an object that we of ourselves actually make our end which as a law ought to constitute the supreme limiting condition of all subjective ends (whatever they may be); and hence this principle must arise from pure reason [and not from experience]. That is to say that the ground of all practical legislation lies objectively in the rule and in the form of universality, which (according to the first principle) makes the rule capable of being a law (say, for example, a law of nature). Subjectively, however, the ground of all practical legislation lies in the end;

legislating will, maxims that are not in accordance with the legislation of free will [*Wille*] itself are rejected.[319]

(ii) In the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant also defines autonomy[320] as opposed to heteronomy[321]. The theory of discipline, by also acting through the external scope of the agent, can also be considered as heteronomy, but since it is based on Kant's moral teleology, its purpose is not the object of desire; rather, it is the human being under moral laws. Its function is to remove obstacles arising from reason itself and inclinations in order to facilitate the construction of a moral character and deliberation related to the choice of maxims. Although it is not autonomy, discipline is a means by which human beings may achieve it.

(iii) Another instance in which Kant develops his argument about autonomy is when he defines it as the foundation of the dignity of human nature and of all rational nature[322]. For Kant, humanity's capacity for moral action is the sole source of its dignity.[323] Consequently, dignity is the condition under which a subject can be

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but (according to the second principle) the subject of all ends is every rational being as an end in himself. From this there now follows the third practical principle of the will as the supreme condition of the will's conformity with universal practical reason, viz., the idea of the will of every rational being as a will that legislates universal law" (GMS, AA 04:431).

[319] "Hence morality is the relation of actions to the autonomy of the will, i.e., to the possible legislation of universal law by means of the maxims of the will. That action which is compatible with the autonomy of the will is permitted; that which is not compatible is forbidden. That will whose maxims are necessarily in accord with the laws of autonomy is a holy, or absolutely good, will. The dependence of a will which is not absolutely good upon the principle of autonomy (i.e., moral necessitation) is obligation, which cannot therefore be applied to a holy will. The objective necessity of an action from obligation is called duty" (GMS, AA 04:439).

[320] For a comprehensive analysis of the concept of autonomy in GMS, refer to Falkenbach (2022) and Trevisan (2022).

[321] "If the will seeks the law that is to determine it anywhere but in the fitness of its maxims for its own legislation of universal laws, and if it thus goes outside of itself and seeks this law in the character of any of its objects, then heteronomy always result. The will in that case does not give itself the law, but the object does so because of its relation to the will. This relation, whether it rests on inclination or on representations of reason, admits only of hypothetical imperatives: I ought to do something because I will something else. On the other hand, the moral, and hence categorical, imperative says that I ought to act in this way or that way, even though I did not will something else. For example, the former says that I ought not to lie if I would maintain my reputation; the latter says that I ought not to lie even though lying were to bring me not the slightest discredit. The moral imperative must therefore abstract from every object to such an extent that no object has any influence at all on the will, so that practical reason (the will) may not merely minister to an interest not belonging to it but may merely show its own commanding authority as the supreme legislation. Thus, for example, I ought to endeavor to promote the happiness of others, not as though its realization were any concern of mine (whether by immediate inclination or by any satisfaction indirectly gained through reason), but merely because a maxim which excludes it cannot be comprehended as a universal law in one and the same volition" (GMS, AA 04:441).

[322] (GMS, AA 04:436).

[323] "Now morality is the condition under which alone a rational being can be an end in himself, for only thereby can he be a legislating member in the kingdom of ends. Hence morality and humanity, insofar as it is capable of morality, alone have dignity. Skill and diligence in work have a market price; wit, lively imagination, and humor have an affective price; but fidelity to promises and benevolence based on principles (not on instinct) have intrinsic worth. Neither nature nor art contain anything which in default of these could be put in their place; for their worth consists, not in the effects which arise from them, nor in the advantage and profit which they provide, but in mental dispositions, i.e., in the maxims of the will which are ready in this way to manifest themselves in action, even if

considered an end in himself, with no relative value or price. It is unclear why the moral attitude is entitled to ascribe dignity to human beings but not other faculties, such as ability, imagination, or humor. However, it seems that Kant attributes this function to moral attitude, since it enables the rational being to act as both legislator and subject of his own laws, of substantive moral laws. In other words, "thereby is he free as regards all laws of nature, and he obeys only those laws which he gives to himself. Accordingly, his maxims can belong to a universal legislation to which he at the same time subjects himself".[324] Therefore, the Kantian approach to integrating reason with intuition entails articulating the moral judgment inherent in maxims and acting in accordance with that maxim which, simultaneously, represents a universal law for the human being. The assumption that discipline is only necessary for beings who act according to maxims is based on the premise that moral discipline acts as self-discipline in the deliberative moment when individuals choose their maxims and in moral judgment, transforming a general maxim into a moral maxim. This is therefore compatible with and necessary for Kant's moral theory.

(iv) Finally, as O'Neill (2004) posits, autonomy is linked to the adoption of maxims. Therefore, it requires the discipline of reason as a fundamental aspect of the organization of thought and action. This is because only in this way can one give, receive, touch, or refuse reasons in public reasoning. In the public sphere, discipline is the commitment made by agents to live and interact together in a pluralistic society. Consequently, the discipline of reason is the foundation of autonomous reasoning.

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they are not favored with success . Such actions also need no recommendation from any subjective disposition or taste so as to meet with immediate favor and delight; there is no need of any immediate propensity or feeling toward them. They exhibit the will performing them as an object of immediate respect; and nothing but reason is required to impose them upon the will, which is not to be cajoled into them, since in the case of duties such cajoling would be a contradiction. This estimation, therefore, lets the worth of such a disposition be recognized as dignity and puts it infinitely beyond all price, with which it cannot in the least be brought into competition or comparison without, as it were, violating its sanctity" (GMS, AA 04:435).

[324] Kant continues: "For nothing can have any worth other than what the law determines. But the legislation itself which determines all worth must for that very reason have dignity, i.e., unconditional and incomparable worth; and the word 'respect' alone provides a suitable expression for the esteem which a rational being must have for it. Hence autonomy is the ground of the dignity of human nature and of every rational nature" (GMS, AA 04:435-436).

3.1.3 The moral progress of the individual and the role of discipline

The purpose of this section is to elucidate the relationship between the concept of individual progress, understood here as a type of moral development of the agent, and the theory of discipline. This is done in order to demonstrate the continuous and progressive role of self-discipline. It is important to note that humans are neither inherently evil nor perfectly moral spontaneously. Therefore, it is necessary to discipline our reason, temperament, and feelings. For this purpose, it is first necessary to understand the relationship between human evil and the proposal of discipline as a possible alternative for dealing with those evils that the human being himself is guilty of. That is to say, what the human being himself places as a hindrance and obstacle to his own moral action. It is argued that the propensity for evil is never overcome, but it can be disciplined. Once it is assumed that discipline can act to this end, the idea of individual moral progress is presented as a possibility within Kant's philosophy. This is because it is necessary both for the theory of discipline and for the Kantian project of moralization.

It is important to acknowledge that the debate about moral progress in Kant's philosophy is extensive. There is no consensus on this topic, because there is no consensus among interpreters about its status, its role in practical philosophy or its relation to moral theory and the philosophy of history. With regard to the philosophy of history, on the one hand, interpreters such as Höffe (2005), for example, claim that the overly optimistic perspective on progress, understood as the development of humanity for the better which was a fundamental idea of the European Enlightenment, did not affect Kant. According to him, excessive hopes for progress were considered by Kant a delirium of reason [*Schwärmerei*].[325] Like Höffe, Yovel (1980) also argues that Kant's philosophy of history only addresses progress as progress in the political perspective. In fact, going further, Yovel considers Kant's writings on philosophy of history,

[325] "The progress of history does not lead to the consummation of morality, nor does it immediately lead to the development of art, science, and technology. Kant does not share the optimism that survives until today in naive enlighteners, who believe that after the elimination of fallible political institutions, perhaps even of religious superstition, the natural instincts of friendship would return and regal mankind with a conflict-free community of solidarity, in presumptuous harmony and love. Kant limits progress to political justice, to legal relations in the national and international sphere, which as legal relations include the power to coerce. Because history is about external events, neither is it at all possible that its ultimate meaning is to be found in an 'inner' progress, in a development of the moral disposition. Progress can only be expected in the outer realm, in the institution of right relations according to the criterion of pure practical reason" (Höffe, 2005, p.274-275 – *own translation*).

such as *Universal History* and the *Conjectural Beginning of Human History*, peripheral texts that transgress the limits of reason.[326]

On the other hand, there are interpreters such as Pauline Kleingeld (1999), Mavis Biss (2015), Jens Timmermann[327] (2018), and Eva Buddeberg[328] (2019), for example, who argue for moral progress in Kant's philosophy. Timmermann and Mavis Biss defend their positions by drawing on Kant's moral theory, their theses have the moral agent as their main focus and aim at the improvement of agents as virtuous persons and the strengthening of the practical will. In turn, Kleingeld and Buddeberg defend their positions by interpreting moral progress as a

[326] "These essays –: mainly the Idea for a *Universal History*, the *Conjectural Beginning of Human History*, and the second appendix to *Perpetual Peace* – tend to reduce history at large to political history. They also attribute historical progress to a hidden purposive scheme working unconsciously in nature through violence and strife; and by affirming the existence of such a natural teleology, they seem to transgress the boundaries of critical reason and commit a 'dogmatic' fallacy" (Yovel, 1980, p.127). Be noted that Yovel does not discard these texts, his objective is to develop a reading of them in the light of the critical system. "I think it is both necessary and possible to reintegrate Kant's philosophy of history into his critical system. But in order to do so, one must first reconstruct the foundations of Kant's philosophy of history from his systematic work […], and then appraise the lesser essays upon this background. In addition, before discussing these texts specifically" (Yovel, 1980, p.127).

[327] Timmermann in his article Autonomy, Progress and Virtue (2018), in an attempt to argue that Kantian ethics is not overly demanding, states that "moral progress goes hand in hand with the – gradual, and maybe initially painful – realization that morality is an expression of our own rational will. That is why autonomy is equated with freedom" (Timmermann, 2018, p.388). According to him, vice and virtue, goodness and badness, merit and demerit are scalar and therefore allow for degrees. For Timmermann, moral progress is constituted by the way agents consider and respond to duty. On imperfect duties, for example, he states that a virtuous person gives priority to cases that less virtuous people might consider less important or optional. For him, the Kantian moral agent is someone who by his own will is interested in acting according to the laws of practical reason. Virtue goes hand by hand with the reshaping of sensibility under the guidance of reason. Therefore, Timmermann asserts that doing our best is doing what we can do, that is, what may be seen as too demanding for one agent, such as the issues surrounding imperfect duties, may be easy for another agent. Crucially for Kant, it lies within our power to improve. "We do not have to be perfect, let alone produce perfect results (which we cannot do). We just need to do our best (which we can). […] The old adage that practice makes perfect applies to Kantian and Aristotelian ethics alike" (Timmermann, 2018, p.391). It should be noted that Timmermann's view is questionable. John Skorupski (2018), for example, claims that Kant's ethics is overly demanding, which is not a problem.

[328] Eva Buddeberg (2019) argues that the idea of moral progress in Kant, especially in the RGV, is an idea that is equivalent to a guiding principle of action, i.e., it should not be interpreted as factual moral progress identified in society. This means that Kant's intention is not to look for progress in history, but to adhere to an idea of future moral progress. According to Buddeberg, moral progress – individual or social – in the third part of the RGV is one of the central themes of Kant's analysis. Kant's main focus is on how morality can be realized in a community with other human beings and how it is possible to overcome the propensity for evil. Therefore, according to her the idea of moral progress has a regulatory function in the RGV, since human beings are always subject to surrender to inclinations contrary to the moral law. It is with this perspective in mind that one should interpret the passages in the RGV in which Kant talks about the *maxim of the sanctity of disposition*, that is, it is a regulative idea, *a maxim of constant progress toward sanctity*. This maxim, therefore, is a maxim that aims at moral progress, the adoption of it does not imply actual moral improvement, but only refers to the idea that it is possible to improve. Therefore, for her, moral progress in Kant is a duty common to all and not a fact. According to Buddeberg (2019) we must also believe in God's grace. Since human beings must do as much as they can and their strength is insufficient, one must have the hope that God will forgive their imperfect efforts to reach complete perfection. According to her, God is necessary for the relationship between happiness and virtue. "Only the assumption of a God who accomplishes what human beings could not despite all their virtuous efforts – namely to rationally organize the world as a whole – allows the virtuous to hope for happiness" (Buddeberg, 2019, p.338).

regulating ideal, Kleingeld does this through Kant's philosophy of history and Buddeberg through the philosophy of religion.[329]

On the one hand, we can observe that the debate about whether and how moral progress is made in Kant's philosophy is an open discussion. Each position is open to criticism not only on the concept of progress presented, but also on the consistency of these positions with respect to the Kantian system. On the other hand, regardless of the position taken, i.e. those interpreters who take only political-legal progress or those who take moral progress in Kant, on may consider that (i) these positions don't have to be contradictory, they can be complementary, because to say that institutions should be reformed and the spheres of freedom of citizens should be expanded is not incompatible with saying that human beings should become moral, even if this requires effort and practice; and (ii) it seems that both positions share a committed perspective of the agent in the political and moral spheres, that is, they seem to share a rational hope that exists in Kant's philosophy.

Regarding the possibility of moral progress in Kant's moral theory, one might wonder: if Kant distinguishes moral actions between moral, immoral, and amoral, would it be possible to claim that in the passage from actions *in accord with duty* (amoral) to actions *from duty* (moral) there would be some kind of moral progress? On the one hand, moral action is unknowable, so there is no real knowledge if the agent in fact only acted according to the moral law. But on the other hand, the agent must act according to the moral law to become a virtuous agent. The human beings must rise from the brute state of their nature and move more and more toward humanity, they must set ends for themselves, they must cultivate their will seeking an approach to morally practical inner perfection.[330]

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According to Kant in *Religion within the boundaries of mere reason* (1793), human beings have a disposition (*Gesinnung*) to good and a propensity (*Hang*) to evil.

[329] The development of the perspective of progress as a regulatory ideal related to the philosophy of history and the species will be presented in section 3.2.1, entitled Progress of the species: the relation to unsociable sociability and role discipline.
[330] (MS, AA 06:386-387).

> It is distinguished from a predisposition in that a propensity can indeed be innate yet may be represented as not being such: it can rather be thought of (if it is good) as acquired, or (if evil) as brought by the human being upon himself. Here, however, we are only talking of a propensity to genuine evil, i.e. moral evil, which, since it is only possible as the determination of a free power of choice and this power for its part can be judged good or evil only on the basis of its maxims, must reside in the subjective ground of the possibility of the deviation of the maxims from the moral law. And, if it is legitimate to assume that this propensity belongs to the human being universally (and hence to the character of the species), the propensity will be called a natural propensity of the human being to evil.[331]

Kant had already outlined this perspective, that evil is caused by man himself, in *Conjectural Beginning of Human History*, when he reflected on the relationship between the dominance of instinct and the dominance of reason in humankind. When dealing with the departure from the purely animal state of human beings towards the exercise of reason, he states that:

> The history of nature begins therefore with the good, for it is the work of God. The history of freedom begins with evil, for it is the work of the human being. For the individual that regards only itself in the use of its freedom, such a change was a loss. For nature, which sets its end for the human being in the species, this was a gain. The former therefore has cause to attribute **all the afflictions** [alle Übel] **that it endures**, and **all the evils** [alles Böse] **that it perpetrates**, to its own fault, but also as a member of a whole (the species) the individual has cause to admire and praise the wisdom and purposiveness of the arrangement.[332]

We can see that for Kant, human beings are the cause of the physical evils [*Übel*] they endure and of all the moral evils [*Böse*] they commit. The former concern our sensibility, the feeling of contempt, and the way in which sensibility produces this feeling. On the other hand, the evils they commit concern their will, their frailty, their impurity, and the perversion of their heart. In the *Critique of Practical Reason*, Kant clarifies these distinctions by saying:

> Well-being or bad [Das Wohl oder Übel] always signifies only a reference to our state of agreeableness or disagreeableness, of gratification or pain; and if we desire or loathe an object on that account then we do so only insofar as it is referred to our sensibility and the feeling of pleasure and displeasure that it brings about. But good or evil [Das Gute oder Böse] always signifies a reference to the will insofar as the will is determined by the law of reason to make something its object – as, indeed, the will is never determined directly by the object and the presentation of it, but is a power to make a rule of reason the motivating cause of an action (through which an object can

[331] (RGV, AA 06:29).
[332] (MAM, AA 08:115-116 – own emphasis).

> become actual). Hence good or evil is in fact referred to actions rather than to the person's state of sensation and if something is to be good or evil absolutely (and in every respect and without any further condition), or to be considered so, then what could be so called would be only the way of acting, the maxim of the will, and hence the acting person himself as a good or evil human being, but not a thing.[333]

One should note that these concepts are not determined before the moral law, but only after and through it.[334] Therefore, since human beings suffer evil and cause evil, it is legitimate to ask: can we hope to overcome them? Can we hope to overcome our tendency to place our desires above obedience to the moral law? Can we even have a rational hope of overcoming our perversity of heart? To extinguish our unsociability, perhaps? Is such an end possible or even desirable?

Kant's theory gives us a vision in which the future can be better than the present[335] because one generation educates another, but this vision is not based on a future free of human evil, it is not consistent with the concept of overcoming our own nature. On the one hand, error, fragility, impurity, perversity of heart, and unsociability make up human nature, and our sensitivity and reason cannot be overcome, extinguished, or eradicated. Therefore, neither the tendency to exceed the limits of reason as a theoretical problem nor evil as a practical problem can be definitively overcome. On the other hand, we can try to avoid the influence of certain tendencies and vices that may hinder our ability to act within the limits of our reason and according to the categorical imperative. The aim of the theory of discipline, then, is not to eliminate our animality or our judgments, because they may be in error or incline us toward evil, but rather to serve as a means, a mediator, capable of harmonizing our animality and our reason (through subjection to reason), as a bridge between what ought to be and what is, between the adoption of moral maxims and the implementation of those maxims, with the

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[333] (KpV, AA 05:60).

[334] "Now, this is the place to explain the paradox of method in a critique of practical reason: viz., that the concept of good and evil must be determined not prior to the moral law (it would, so it seems, even have to be laid at the basis of this law) but only after it and by means of it (as is indeed being done here). For even if we did not know that the principle of morality is a pure law determining the will a priori, yet – in order not to assume principles quite gratuitously (gratis) – we would at least have to leave unestablished at first whether the will has only empirical determining bases or also pure a priori ones. For we go against all basic rules of philosophical procedure if already in advance we assume something as decided when we are yet to decide on it in the first place" (KpV, AA 05:62-63).

[335] Onora O'Neill, in chapter 11 of her book *Constructing Authorities* (2015), argues that for Kant we must have hope for the future of humanity, and this is compatible with practical reason. Therefore, the idea of reason, or the idea of a universal history with a cosmopolitan purpose, is a practical matter that serves as a guiding principle that contributes to the realization of a better future for humanity. This idea does not generate a guarantee of progress for the better, but as a regulating principle for action. Thinking about universal history without linking it to empirics is possible if it is taken as a practical matter, as the adoption of attitudes that contribute to a better future. From this perspective, one can actively commit oneself to a particular future and thus make it more likely.

removal of obstacles that hinder moral action (whether it comes from our sensitive impulses or from our inadequate use of reason and judgment).

On the one hand, the inability of human beings to confront our propensities for evil is related to the fact that human beings are influenced by sensitive impulses, corrupt thinking, and the incessant search for exceptions for themselves. On the other hand, these same human beings are capable of acting according to the categorical imperative, even if moral action is unknowable – even in the absence of objective certainty and knowledge regarding the possibility to distinguish in one's own behavior or the behavior of others between acting out of duty and acting in accordance with duty, we must still act in accordance with the former –, we must believe that human beings are capable of being under moral laws. The theory of discipline is therefore based on the idea of progress and rational hope. The adoption of rational hope is important for a perspective based on the idea of continuity, a continuous process, progress and development. This development is the exercise and strengthening of reason, which is done by cultivating it through discipline and learning. In other words, the theory of discipline generates a permanent activity, a continuous process of exercise, improvement, and learning. Therefore, rational hope is important for the *commitment* of agents to their own decisions, the formation of their maxims and their general actions and moral actions, in other words, their relationship with the world and with themselves.

In *Religion Within the Boundary of Mere Reason* Kant enumerates three degrees of the propensity to evil, namely, frailty, impurity, and depravity. The first level, the frailty of the human nature occurs when the human being, subjectively, assumes the moral maxim, that is, when it is accepted and by choice, however, when he needs to project this maxim as an action in the world, that is, objectively, receives influences from sensitivity causing a loss in the potentiality of realizing the moral maxim.[336] The second level, the impurity of the human heart, is nothing more than conformity to duty. It consists of the maxim that it is good, but

> it is not purely moral, i.e. it has not, as it should be [the case], adopted the law alone as its sufficient incentive but, on the contrary, often (and perhaps always) needs still other incentives besides it in order to determine the power of choice for what duty requires; in other words, actions conforming to duty are not done purely from duty.[337]

[336] "First, the frailty (fragilitas) of human nature is expressed even in the complaint of an Apostle: 'What I would, that I do not!' i.e. I incorporate the good (the law) into the maxim of my power of choice; but this good, which is an irresistible incentive objectively or ideally (in thest), is subjectively (in hypothest) the weaker (in comparison with inclination) whenever the maxim is to be followed" (RGV, AA 06:29).
[337] (RGV, AA 06:30).

And, finally, the evil or corruption of the human heart, is the propensity of the will to place non-moral motives ahead of the motives of the moral law, which can be called the perversity of the human heart, as it reverses the moral order by targeting other motives and corrupting the moral order's way of thinking. As much as the action is, for example, legally good, if the agent's internal perspective, regarding his/her moral intention, is corrupted at its root, it has no moral value.[338]

One can observe that what is common between frailty and impurity of the heart is the relationship with sensitivity insofar as sensitive impulses take the place of moral maxims. Moral discipline, as the self-discipline that gives voice to the moral law, can generate in the individual the necessary strength to overcome these obstacles in favor of duty. Apparently, this perspective is very similar to that of the Stoics.[339] These philosophers defined freedom as independent of inclinations and based their universal moral principle on the dignity of human nature. Therefore, the Stoics attributed to the individual a human will which is capable of being moral and not corrupted in the face of the struggle between sensitive impulses and their discipline. This perspective concerns, for example, the first two levels of evil. Like Kant, the Stoics assumed

[338] "Third, the depravity (*vitiositas, pravitas*) or, if one prefers, the corruption (*corruptio*) of the human heart is the propensity of the power of choice to maxims that subordinate the incentives of the moral law to others (not moral ones). It can also be called the perversity (*perversitas*) of the human heart, for it reverses the ethical order as regards the incentives of a free power of choice; and although with this reversal there can still be legally good (*legale*) actions, yet the mind's attitude is thereby corrupted at its root (so far as the moral disposition is concerned), and hence the human being is designated as evil. It will be noted that the propensity to evil is here established (as regards actions) in the human being, even the best; and so it also must be if it is to be proved that the propensity to evil among human beings is universal, or, which here amounts to the same thing, that it is woven into human nature. So far as the agreement of actions with the law goes, however, there is no difference (or at least there ought to be none) between a human being of good morals (*bene moratus*) and a morally good human being (*moraliter bonus*), except that the actions of the former do not always have, perhaps never have, the law as their sole and supreme incentive, whereas those of the latter always do. We can say of the first that he complies with the law according to the letter (i.e. as regards the action commanded by the law); but of the second, that he observes it according to the spirit (the spirit of the moral law consists in the law being of itself a sufficient incentive). Whatever is not of this faith is sino (in attitude). For whenever incentives other than the law itself (e.g. ambition, self-love in general, yes, even a kindly instinct such as sympathy) are necessary to determine the power of choice to lawful actions, it is purely accidental that these actions agree with the law, for the incentives might equally well incite its violation. The maxim, by the goodness of which all the moral worth of the person must be assessed, is therefore still contrary to law, and the human being, despite all his good actions, is nevertheless evil" (RGV, AA 06:30-31).

[339] "Thus when the Stoic thought of the human moral battle simply as a human being's struggle with his inclinations, so far as these (innocent in themselves) must be overcome as obstacles in the compliance to his duty, he could locate the cause of the transgression only in the *omission* to combat them, since he did not assume any special positive principle (evil in itself); since this omission is, however, itself contrary to duty (a transgression) and not just a natural error, and its cause cannot in turn be sought (without arguing in a circle) in the inclinations but, on the contrary, only in that which determines the power of choice as free power of choice (in the first and inmost ground of the maxims which are in agreement with the inclinations), we can well understand how philosophers – to whom the basis of an explanation remains forever shrouded in darkness and, though absolutely necessary, is nonetheless unwelcome – could mistake the real opponent of goodness with whom they believed they had to stand in combat" (RGV, AA 06:59).

the discipline of inclinations as necessary for the agent to be able to submit to principles. The difference between Kant's perspective and that of the Stoics[340] lies in the fact that the moral struggle of the human being does not reside only in being able to subordinate the inclinations to the moral law, but also in achieving autonomy, not corrupting the way of thinking and, therefore, overcome the third level of evil, the evil of the heart.

Kant asserts in RGV that the problem of evil, is not in sensitivity itself.[341] For him, once we think about evil or even the foundation of evil, we have that it "cannot lie in any object determining the power of choice through inclination, not in any natural impulses, but only in a rule that the power of choice itself produces for the exercise of its freedom, i.e., in a maxim".[342] In other words, the human being is the author of his/her own guilt for being bad and for the merit of being good, because even though the propensity for evil exerts an influence on the individual, it was not what determined him/her.[343] Thus, the reason for acting contrary to the moral law should not be sought in the sensitive nature of human beings, but in a maxim based on their free will. Thus, "[…] the former [the human being] therefore has cause to attribute all the afflictions that it endures, and all the evils that it perpetrates, to its own fault".[344] Therefore, starting from the perspective that the discipline submits human beings to the laws of humanity and begins to make them feel the force of the laws themselves, it can be thought of as a tool able to avoid evil by lowering obstacles.

Kant affirms in *Religion Within the Boundary of Mere Reason* that the origin of evil is not sensibility. The problem of frailty is in passage from subjectivity to objectivity, and from impurity to intention, therefore, discipline as coercion internal, or self-discipline, linked to

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[340] "However, those valiant men [the Stoics] mistook their enemy, who is not to be sought in the natural inclinations, which merely lack discipline and openly display themselves unconcealed to everyone's consciousness, but is rather as it were an invisible enemy, one who hides behind reason and hence all the more dangerous. They send forth *wisdom* against *folly*, which lets itself be deceived by inclinations merely because of carelessness, instead of summoning it against the *malice* (of the human heart) which secretly undermines the disposition with soul-corrupting principles" (RGV, AA 06:57).

[341] "Considered in themselves natural inclinations are good, i.e. not reprehensible, and to want to extirpate them would not only be futile but harmful and blameworthy as well; we must rather only curb them, so that they will not wear each other out but will instead be harmonized into a whole called happiness. Now the reason that accomplishes this is called prudence. Only what is unlawful is evil in itself, absolutely reprehensible, and must be eradicated" (RGV, AA 06:58).

[342] (RGV, AA 06:21).

[343] "One cannot, however, go on asking what, in a human being, might be the subjective ground of the adoption of this maxim rather than its opposite. For if this ground were ultimately no longer itself a maxim, but merely a natural impulse, the entire exercise of freedom could be traced back to a determination through natural causes – and this would contradict freedom. Whenever we therefore say, 'The human being is by nature good,' or, 'He is by nature evil,' this only means that he holds within himself a first ground (to us inscrutable) for the adoption of good or evil (unlawful) maxims, and that he holds this ground qua human, universally – in such a way, therefore, that by his maxims he expresses at the same time the character of his species" (RGV, AA 06:21).

[344] (MAM, AA 08:116).

virtue and internal freedom can make the individual, through the adoption of moral maxims, leave his/her heteronomy and reach his/her autonomy.

Kant, in his *Opus postumum*, states that the responsibility of being good or bad lies in the human being himself/herself. "It is true that God can command man to act rightly, but this cannot be done or forced by him [...]".[345] Since a human being is responsible for being moral or immoral, then he/she must also be responsible for try avoiding his/her evil. "God can create a human being as a natural being (*demiurgus*), but not as a moral being with principles of justice, goodness and holiness [...]".[346] Therefore, the human being must seek to become a moral agent, and in his Kant's practical philosophy means can be found for this, once moral development is possible, one can argue that it is also possible to overcome evil, at least in a certain progressive and gradual sense.

At the same time that Kant has a moral theory, he has a *theory of moralization*.[347] By moralization theory I mean the project that he himself calls in *Idea for a universal history with a cosmopolitan aim* "the moral whole".[348] This project is broad and, it seems to me, the whole set of Kantian work corroborates it. It is true that in Kant's strictly moral perspective, the Moral Law is the only moral motivation, one must act out of duty – as he states in GMS and KpV. But in its broader project found in its practical philosophy, the republic is a means of moral development of individuals, as well as education, as enlightenment, as religion (the one subordinated to Kantian morality), as the development of natural dispositions that they aim at the use of reason. In turn, while contributing to reducing obstacles to moral action, the theory of discipline can be part of this broader moralization project that we find in Kant's philosophy.

In *Religion Within the Boundary of Mere Reason*, Kant makes room for this interpretation insofar as he considers the possibility of gradual reform in the character. This reform makes room for human beings to have the tools to avoid evil. I agree with Klein's thesis[349] (2016) that the revolution of the fundamental maxim is the *ratio essendi* of the reform,

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[345] (Opus Postumum, 21:57 – own translation).
[346] (Opus Postumum, 21:66 – own translation).
[347] "Now we come to the question whether the human being is by nature morally good or evil. He is neither of the two because by nature he is not a moral being at all; he only becomes one when his reason raises itself to the concepts of duty and of law" (Päd, AA 09:492).
[348] "And here all of the talents are gradually developed, taste is formed, and, even, through continual enlightenment, the beginning of a foundation is laid for a manner of thinking which is able, over time, to transform the primitive natural predisposition for moral discernment into definite practical principles and, in this way, to ultimately transform an agreement to society that initially had been *pathologically* coerced into a *moral* whole" (IaG, AA 08:21).
[349] Klein uses the argumentative structure presented by Kant in *Critique of Practical Reason*. "This can be perceived when Kant affirms that for God the change would be a revolution, because it happens in the noumenal

just as the gradual reform of the way of thinking is the *ratio congnoscendi* of the revolution. In addition to this argument, also through the idea of gradual reform, one can better understand the statement that in Kant's practical theory there is a theory of moralization, that is, of the development of moral disposition in human beings, thus enabling the idea of moral progress as a learning process. Kant claims that,

> But if a human being is corrupt in the very ground of his maxims, how can he possibly bring about this revolution by his own forces and become a good human being on his own? Yet duty commands that he be good, and duty commands nothing but what we can do. The only way to reconcile this is by saying that a revolution is necessary in the mode of thought' but a gradual reformation in the mode of sense' (which places obstacles in the way of the former), and [that both] must therefore be possible also to the human being.[350]

Finally, what was sought to be highlighted was the human capacity to give oneself maxims and pursue ends and, regarding morality, the human capacity to act according to the categorical imperative. In this sense, avoiding the evil found in frailty and impurity is possible with moral discipline/self-discipline and the same, while necessary for mastering oneself and achieving autonomy, is the first step towards changing the way of corrupt thinking, this is, is the first step for the gradual reform of the way of thinking, since it impels and fosters the disposition of mind capable of obeying the moral law.

The concept of individual moral progress can be defined as the gradual reform that can occur when an individual is educated through freedom, thereby allowing itself to be free. The theory of discipline is a key element in this debate on progress for two reasons. Firstly, it is based on the idea of temporality, continuity, the exercise of reason, learning and the agent's own efforts. Secondly, it is a means of pursuing individual moral improvement. Kant identifies at least two distinct relationships between morality and temporality. In the first instance, temporality can be understood as a projection made by the agent himself when he acts in accordance with the categorical imperative. This temporality is related to the question "what

scope, which for us is inaccessible cognitively; already for the judgment of men, that is, at the phenomenal level, it is a question of a gradual reform of the character through mastery of sensitivity" (Klein, 2016, p.142-143 – own translation).

[350] About this, Kant continues: "[...] That is: If by a single and unalterable decision a human being reverses the supreme ground of his maxims by which he was an evil human being (and thereby puts on a 'new man'), he is to this extent, by principle and attitude of mind, a subject receptive to the good; but he is a good human being only in incessant laboring and becoming i.e. he can hope – in view of the purity of the principle which he has adopted as the supreme maxim of his power of choice, and in view of the stability of this principle – to find himself upon the good (though narrow) path of constant progress from bad to better" (RGV, AA 06:47-48).

can I expect when I fulfill my duty?". The idea of a future time, as presented in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, is one in which Kant relates this aspect of the idea of temporality to the highest good and the postulates of reason. It should be noted that this projected expectation concerns the implications of the moral law and not the motivation of action, its determination, and its justification.[351] In the second sense, temporality is related to the active participation of individuals in the process of moral improvement. In this second sense of temporality, the theory of discipline is inserted. This temporality is more geared towards the implementation of Kant's moralization project, which is geared towards the idea of progress as a moral development related to education, institutions, and the active participation of the subject in order to strengthen the moral disposition and to act morally in the world.

Kant, in TL, makes it clear that self-perfection is an end that is also a duty in the broadest sense. Whether it's physical perfection as the cultivation of the faculties in order to promote the ends proposed by reason, or practical-moral perfection as the cultivation of morality in us, human beings need discipline because it helps them remove obstacles to their maxims. For Kant, the cultivation of the will must progress until it reaches the purest virtuous intention. The Moral Law must become the moral motive for action.[352] If we assume that Kant presupposes discipline when dealing with this progression in the cultivation of morality, we must ask which attitudes contribute to the cultivation and strengthening of the will.

Biss in her article *Kantian Moral Striving* (2015) states that the process *of strengthening the will* is best understood when one interprets moral striving as a potentially continuous process of principled choices. According to her, moral improvement in Kant has four characteristics: (i) it is a two-stage process; (ii) it begins with the establishment of a certain moral orientation in oneself and (iii) moral progress can be achieved through continuous activity, although iv) the propensity to evil cannot be eliminated.[353] Kant proposes the idea of continuous moral improvement, even if perfection is not achieved. That is, there is a duty to seek, to continually progress, the human being must strive to fulfill his duty, even if he cannot in life achieve perfection. In TL the approach to moral progress is highlighted by a gradual view, whereas in RGV there is a revolutionary view on the process of moral self-improvement. According to Biss, what is common between the conception of moral progress in TL and RGV is that both concern the moral agent's choice of moral orientation. Biss argues that although a moral

[351] More on this perspective of temporality can be found in Figueiredo and Martinazzo (2023).
[352] (TL, AA 06: 387).
[353] Cf. Biss, 2015, p.2-3.

revolution transforms agents, this does not leave them immune to the temptations to act contrary to duty. The propensity for evil still remains in individuals, so one must strive to strengthen the will and strive to resist such temptations. To strive for virtue is to strive to strengthen one's will.[354] She sees in the propensity to evil a double meaning. On the one hand, this propensity is the strongest opponent against the idea of moral progress, but on the other hand, it legitimizes the idea of progress, since the ability to choose not to act on behalf of the moral law is necessary for the notion of moral goodness as an achievement for which the agent himself is responsible.[355]

According to Biss, the Kant's seeking for moral perfection should be read as the continuous effort to strengthen one's own will. The search for self-knowledge (knowledge of one's own motivations) and the contemplation of the moral law are two methods of moral effort proposed in TL. However, the question is: How does the knowledge of one's own motives facilitate the strengthening of the adoption of moral maxims? According to her, it is possible to answer this question by combining self-knowledge and contemplation of the moral law[356], since self-knowledge[357] combats false narratives about moral perfection and careless actions arising from bad maxims – thus being responsible for recognition – while contemplation of the moral law, based on attention, is responsible for reform, since it is through it that moral self-cultivation is developed.[358] Therefore, as she sees it, the gradual moral improvement takes place by strengthening the will. It can be strengthened through self-knowledge and through contemplation of the moral law. However, she emphasizes that since moral action is unknowable, ultimately an agent has no certainty and knowledge/self-knowledge of the development of the moral disposition, he/she can only have a rational hope that it is possible. Thus, according to her, Kant's goal is not to guarantee that moral progress will take place, but only to develop an argumentation that makes it possible and probable.

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[354] Cf. Biss, 2015, p.4.
[355] Cf. Biss, 2015, p.4.
[356] Mavis Biss approach is based on "Emer O'Hagan's analysis of moral self-knowledge and Jeanine Grenberg's analysis of moral contemplation to develop a more adequate account of Kantian moral striving as a temporally extended reflective practice integrated into our pursuit of the full range of duties of virtue" (Biss, 2015, p.6).
[357] Biss (2015) argues that self-knowledge is a method of fundamental moral effort for the agent, as it is through it that one becomes aware of one's own transgressions and moral weaknesses, patterns of rationalization of self-deception and distorted self-narratives.
[358] "In this way, moral contemplation as attentiveness is a method of combating the temptation to believe oneself incapable of doing what one ought. Confidence in one's moral capacities may be developed through striving in the sense that attentiveness re-engages past experiences of agency that may 'brighten' a presently dim acknowledgement of one's nature. [...] Setting the end of moral self-perfection makes moral transformation possible for the striving agent because it necessarily involves the agent in an ongoing practice of attentiveness to the experience of obligation" (Biss, 2015, p.16-17).

We agree with Biss's (2015) position that the subject should seek out activities that put the duty of moral self-improvement into practice. However, we disagree that only self-knowledge and contemplation of the Moral Law are the only activities capable of promoting moral improvement. In conclusion, from a broader perspective of Biss's position, I suggest that self-discipline is as much a part of the effort of the agent who seeks to be moral as it is the cultivation and strengthening of the moral will in agents.

The moral agent needs to remove the obstacles that conflict with the moral law. Moral discipline assists virtue in removing these obstacles to the observance of the moral law, since human beings are endowed with reason and sensibility, there is no spontaneous goodness of mind that does not need discipline. On the one hand, self-discipline is a way to achieve virtue, it is a constituent part of its exercise, since it is self-coercion. On the other hand, virtue when thought in its fullness is moral action, since it is directly linked to the free will, that is, the autonomy of the will. Like self-discipline, virtue can and should be taught because both are not innate, so the doctrine of virtue is teachable. For Kant, all moral discipline is self-discipline and it is a necessary condition for morality.

Based on Kant's statements about improvement through education and the ability to act according to ends given to oneself, as presented in Anth:

> in order to assign **the human being** his class in the system of animate nature, nothing remains for us than to say that he has a character, which he himself creates, **in so far as he is capable of perfecting himself according to ends that he himself adopts**. By means of this the human being, as an animal endowed with the capacity of reason (animal rationabile), can make out of himself a rational animal (animal rationale) – whereby he first preserves himself and his species; second, trains, instructs, and educates his species for domestic society; third, governs it as a systematic whole (arranged according to principles of reason) appropriate for society. **But in comparison with the idea of possible rational beings on earth in general, the characteristic of the human species is this: that nature has planted in it the seed of discord, and has willed that its own reason bring concord out of this, or at least the constant approximation to it. It is true that in the idea concord is the end, but in actuality the former (discord) is the means, in nature's plan, of a supreme and, to us, inscrutable wisdom: to bring about the perfection of the human being through progressive culture, although with some sacrifice of his pleasures of life**.[359]

This progressive culture promoted by unsociable sociability includes both the discipline of unsociability and the idea of progress, since human beings can improve themselves according

[359] (Anth, AA 07:321-322 – own emphasis).

to the ends they adopt. Once they have a moral character, these ends are moral ends. Also considering the passage in the MS on self-perfection:

> When it is said that it is in itsel a duty for a man to make his end the perfection belonging to man as such (properly speaking, to humanity), this perfection must be put in what can result from his deeds, not in mere gifts for which he must be indebted to nature; for otherwise it would not be a duty. **This duty can therefore consist only in cultivating one's capacities (or natural predispositions), the highest of which is understanding, the capacity for concepts and so too for those concepts that have to do with duty. At the same time this duty includes the cultivation of one's will (moral cast of mind), so as to satisfy all the requirements of duty.** 1) Man has a duty to raise himself from the crude state of his nature, from his animality (quoad actum), more and more toward humanity, by which he alone is capable of setting himself ends; he has a duty to diminish his ignorance by instruction and to correct his errors. And it is not merely that technically practical reason counsels him to do this as a means to his further purposes (of art); morally practical reason commands it absolutely and makes this end his duty, so that he may be worthy of the humanity that dwells within him. **2) Man has a duty to carry the cultivation of his will up to the purest virtuous disposition, in which the law becomes also the incentive to his actions disposition is inner morally practical perfection**.[360]

While human beings must cultivate their capacities, they must also cultivate their will. Thus, both in the passage from the Anth (quoted above) and in this passage from the MS, Kant raises the question of the progressive and continuous cultivation of both capacities and will as fundamental to the human being's capacity for self-legislation. Therefore, one can argue that moral improvement is a form of progress. And for moral improvement to occur in human beings, the development of discipline is necessary.

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One can therefore conclude that the theory of discipline in its various aspects in practical philosophy fits into the debate on individual moral progress in various ways: (i) as an educational discipline aimed at building moral character and (ii) as a self-discipline related to maxims and deliberation on moral issues. Now we need to analyze *whether* and *how* pragmatic discipline is necessary in the public sphere and in the public use of reason.

[360] (MS, AA 06:387).

3.2 PRAGMATIC DISCIPLINE AND THE FOSTERING OF REPUBLICANISM

The purpose of this section is to elucidate the role of discipline theory with regard to the intersection between the moralization project, politics, and society. This intersection can be exemplified by the relationship between patriotism and education, as well as by the relationship between theory of discipline and some issues that permeate contemporary democracies, such as the relationship between pluralism and reasonable consensus. There are two presuppositions for this intersection: (i) The concept of progress in the philosophy of history as a type of moral development of the species, made possible by learning, be it self-learning or external teaching-learning processes; (ii) the concept of active participation in the political and social field. In the field of socio-political action, agents must engage in rational and reasonable participation in order to facilitate the construction and maintenance of an increasingly fair democratic state and for this state to function properly, citizens must also participate.

3.2.1 Progress of the species: the relation to unsociable sociability and role discipline

According to O'Neill (2015), Kant would certainly take the position that we must be committed to a vision of the future, and that this makes us agents committed to action. To adopt a rational hope is to adopt a commitment to knowledge, to action in the world, and to moral action in the world. We agree with her position on the role of rational hope in human progress. For example, she states that if we don't believe that there is a future, all that is left is despair, and total despair suppresses all commitment and action. “In acting we look to the future; if we can bring about any change, it can only be change in the world, in the future. Those who think action that changes the future is impossible can aim for nothing: we cannot aim to achieve what we know to be unachievable”.[361]

In Kant it is possible to catalog two types of *hope*. One is found in the postulates of practical reason in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, and the other is linked to progress. As O'Neill points out, the modality of hope in the KpV is a more religious interpretation of hope – since it takes into account God and the immortality of the soul – in which we should hope that moral intention can be inserted into the world and, furthermore, that the moral and natural

[361] (O’Neill, 2015, p.228).

orders can be coordinated in such an ideal way as to link happiness and virtue. What we should expect are the consequences of certain postulates of practical reason. However, O'Neill makes it clear that these postulates about the highest good are plausible if, and only if "we find good reasons for the assumption that we must take it that a *complete* coordination of happiness and virtue in each of us is our destiny".[362]

The other form of hope in Kant is the connection between rational hope and human progress. In this worldview, neither God nor the immortality of the soul is taken into account, so that agents are committed to the natural and moral order. In this way, nature and morality are coordinated in earthly life and linked to history and progress. "The broad sense in which hopes for the future in which action and morality are possible may be reasoned is that they render Kant's theoretical and practical philosophies consistent".[363] Therefore, the hope for a future in which it is possible to act and to act morally in the world can be a kind of bridge between the two points of view, the theoretical and the practical.

> Kant does not provide any basis for boasting that we know that there is a God and a future life, or even that we know that history will allow for progress. His account of what we must hope is, after all, only an account of the required core of hope which we must 'postulate' or adopt to achieve consistency.[364]

It is important to note that, according to O'Neill, the rational hope proposed by Kant is cognitively simple and indeterminate. Unlike other types of hope that are tied to divine determinism or specific modes of historical progress, Kantian hope is related to the agent's commitment to morality, regardless of whether the world in reality is corrupt or whether we cannot find an example of pure morality in the world. Kantian hope simply seeks to provide the agent with a commitment to his own actions, even knowing that the future and the development of humanity towards an increasingly just world are indeterminate. Moreover, it is a rational hope that does not derive from external conditions such as religious revelations, metaphysical systems, churches, or states. Finally, Kantian hope is a regulative ideal that can be shared by anyone who is committed to knowing, acting, and intervening in the world.

I agree with Kleingeld (1999) about the difference between dissertating about the reality of an ideal and dissertating about its possibility. Interpreting moral progress as a regulative ideal

[362] (O'Neill, 2015, p.230).
[363] (O'Neill, 2015, p.232).
[364] (O'Neill, 2015, p.232).

is not the same as historically guaranteeing that human behavior gradually becomes more moral. Therefore, Kant assigns only a regulative status to the perspective of moral development, but this does not negate its conceptual consistency. This principle is found in Kant's philosophy of history. According to her, the teleological view of history is a regulative principle which characterizes history by the development of humanity's rational potential. This "rational development manifests itself in progress not only in the arts and sciences, but also in politics, education, religion, and morality. Moral development is to culminate in the 'moralization' of humanity and the transformation of society into a 'moral whole'".[365]

Kleingeld elucidates that sometimes Kant's philosophy of history is criticized for being incompatible with three principles of his moral theory, namely, universal validity, timelessness, and moral equality.[366] Contrary to these criticisms, Kleingeld believes that without the perspective of rational and moral development imperatives such as the pursuit of one's own perfection and promotion of others' happiness, which are central imperatives in Kant's moral theory, would be incoherent. Therefore, she suggests that these criticisms are derived from a misinterpretation of the rational development model. For her, understanding sufficiently and correctly what the predispositions for the use of reason consist of remedies these criticisms. As stated by Kleingeld, the regulative idea of history in Kant's view is based on the view that nature enables humans to use their reason and exercise their freedom of agency. "As result, humans develop their rational predispositions, which leads to progress in all areas in which reason is employed, from science to politics to morality and religion".[367]

The process of development is arduous due to the *unsociable sociability*[368] which is a human psychological characteristic that inclines agents both toward social interaction or toward isolation and conflict. Moreover, it is commonly thought that intrinsic to the concept of development is the concept of change. So one has to be careful about linking the concept of

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[365] (Kleingeld, 1999, p.59).

[366] Kleingeld explains that: "To many commentators, the very idea of moral development has seemed inconsistent with some or all of the following basic Kantian tenets. First, his notion of rational development has been said to be incompatible with his claim that the moral law is unconditionally and hence universally valid (the universal validity problem). Second, his notion of rational development, especially the notion of 'moralization', seems to run counter to his thesis that moral agency is noumenal and hence atemporal (the atemporality problem). Finally, the notion of moral progress seems to contradict the dignity and moral equality of all humans by declaring some 'freer' than others (the moral equality problem)" (Kleingeld, 1999, p.59).

[367] (Kleingeld, 1999, p.60).

[368] About social antagonism Kleingeld says: "The resulting social antagonism leads to consequences that are so harmful that people will leave the state of nature for self-interested reasons and create a state that will regulate their interaction according to laws. The same dynamics of self-interest, in turn, will lead states to wage war at first, but later pursue an international federation to bring about peace. Peace, both within and between states, is the condition under which the predispositions of humanity can be further developed, because peace provides a more hospitable environment for enlightenment and moral education than does war" (Kleingeld, 1999, p.61).

development to the concept of reason. Because if reason itself were to change in a really significant way, one would also have to assume that the moral law would change, since it is the fundamental principle of practical reason.[369] Therefore, according to Kleingeld, the relationship between development and reason, occurs not in reason itself, but in the *predispositions for the use of reason*. That is, what actually develops are the rational predispositions. There are three predispositions for the use of reason, they are: technical, pragmatic, and moral dispositions.

Conforming to her, in the 18th century the concept of development was predominantly discussed as a biological concept and there were two ways to describe it as a teleological process: either as growth and strengthening or as the continuous emergence of new organic structures. Kant uses this concept in *Critique of Pure Reason* as growth and strengthening.[370] This means that it is possible for an organism to grow and strengthen all its essential elements without a change of proportion or addition because they were already there from the beginning. Analogously, importing this view of the concept of development, Kant defends "the view that our capacities of judging and acting morally, which are always already present in an unrefined form, are gradually improved and strengthened".[371] According to Kleingeld, this is precisely why Kant in IaG and MAM claims that predispositions are rough and are like seeds that need to be cultivated with a view to moral discernment. Therefore, for her, there is no incompatibility between rational development as strengthening and perfecting the rational faculties with the universal validity of the moral law.[372]

Even if we assume his position that development is not a development of reason itself, but of rational predispositions, one could still claim that the development of natural predispositions aimed at the use of reason entails different steps, which implies that some humans are less capable of acting morally than others. This claim would be a problem because "if humans are not all equally capable of acting morally, they cannot all have equal moral standing".[373] However, Kleingeld argues that Kant has a biological theory in which it is possible to claim that all human beings, regardless of age, share exactly the same predispositions. What varies is their development. According to her, for Kant, the development of human rational

[369] For Kleingeld, "for Kant, who argues that the moral law is universally normatively valid – at all times, in all places, for every rational being – it is impossible to allow for different moral principles and forms of 'ethical life' being justified at different stages in history" (Kleingeld, 1999, p.62).
[370] See KrV, B 861.
[371] (Kleingeld, 1999, p.63).
[372] "On the premise that all humans have a moral consciousness that is structurally similar, Kant's analysis of the consciousness of moral obligation in the *Critique of Practical Reason* applies to all humans equally, regardless of their developmental level" (Kleingeld, 1999, p.64).
[373] (Kleingeld, 1999, p.64).

faculties is a learning process.[374] "The results of this process are transmitted to the next generations not biologically, but educationally[375], mediated through pedagogy as well as through social and cultural institutions".[376]

Kleingeld's approach to history as a learning process is shielded from criticism on the problem of timelessness and equality insofar as this approach does not hurt the a priori validity of morality because

> [i]n saying that history is a learning process in which a crude capacity for moral discernment develops into a refined one, Kant is not claiming that the moral demands are created at a point in time, but rather that they gradually come to be fully understood. This is a plausible distinction to draw. The fact that one does not immediately fully understand something but has to learn it does not mean that it was not true or valid before one learned it. Similarly, the fact that a clear understanding of morality as autonomy is the result of a long historical learning process is not by itself incompatible with the absolute and timeless validity of the moral law.[377]

This is because for Kant the normative validity of the moral law does not depend on its subjective recognition. Kleingeld argues that it is not because moral judgment requires development that it is generated by this process; instead, it is grounded in reason. This means that it is not morality that needs this process of development and learning, but human understanding about it.[378] In Kant's philosophy of history there is an ahistorical core, because Kant elevates the absolute validity of the moral principle above historical contingency. If the moral principle is not determined at one moment in history, then it is timeless, the process of learning only makes it clearer over time.[379] "It was and has always been objectively valid, since

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[374] "Although it is not literally true that they have to take all the steps taken before, later individuals need to appropriate the skills and knowledge acquired by previous generations. Only then are they in a position to add a step" (Kleingeld, 1999, p.66).

[375] According to Kleingeld, "In his *Lectures on Pedadogy* and in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, Kant claims that the Enlightenment has produced, for the first time in history, pedagogical methods that encourage children to think for themselves and be morally autonomous. The older, authoritarian methods aim at producing blind obedience, leading mainly to behavior that is guided by the inclination to avoid punishment and earn rewards. The new methods take a Socratic, maieutic approach, and Kant develops his own version in the *Doctrine of Method* of the *Critique of Practical Reason*" (Kleingeld, 1999, p.66).

[376] (Kleingeld, 1999, p.66).

[377] (Kleingeld, 1999, p.68).

[378] Kleingled demonstrates through an analogy with passages from KU (KU, AA 05:265) that Kant himself makes the distinction between something being generated or discovered when talking about the judging of the sublime which requires culture, but the judging itself is not generated by culture and introduced into society by social convention.

[379] Cf. Kleingeld, 1999, p.69.

it is grounded in reason, but it is only gradually subjectively acknowledged and understood as such".[380]

According to her, the main problem about the prospect of moral progress is not whether it is possible as a regulative ideal, but whether there is actually an increase in moral behavior, because moral agency is unknowable. On the one hand, Kant seems to suggest that some moral advance has been made in his time with the Enlightenment, for example. But on the other hand, Kant always made it clear in his philosophy of history texts that he had no intention of claiming the status of knowledge about the course of history. Therefore, his examples sometimes seem to suggest an increase in moral behavior, but they are only related to the regulative idea for heuristic purposes. Moreover, Kant himself acknowledges for moral purposes it is possible to think about character change and whether moral agency is unknowable, i.e., "if nothing can be known about it, there is no reason to rule out the possibility of moral improvement, even if our cognitive powers are inadequate to grasp it".[381]

The most frequent critique addressed to Kant's philosophy of history is that his notion of moral perfection conflicts with the idea of the equality and dignity of human beings.[382] According to Kleingeld (1999), on the one hand, Kant denies that there is a conflict since he claims that all human beings are free and have the capacity to act morally, as well as possess a sense of right and wrong. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that the notion of moral progress forces Kant to say that earlier generations are more morally blameworthy than later ones.

> Because history is a learning process, clearer moral insight and improved moral education enable later generations to lead more virtuous lives than earlier ones. Therefore, someone might [...] charge that it is morally unfair to condemn earlier generations who do not have this educational advantage and who cannot help falling short in comparison to later ones.[383]

[380] (Kleingeld, 1999, p.69).
[381] (Kleingeld, 1999, p.71).
[382] Kleingeld puts the criticisms, like that of Emil Fackenheim, in the following terms: "First, if Kant says that humans gradually become more free in the course of history and that earlier generations transmit their insight to later ones, he is forced to qualify the concept of freedom historically. But this is inconsistent with Kant's calling every human agent free without qualification. Second, since earlier generations pass their insight on to later ones without themselves being fully able to act morally, this re duces earlier generations to mere means to progress from which later generations profit" (Kleingeld, 1999, p.71).
[383] (Kleingeld, 1999, p.72).

Kleingeld divides her answer into three moments: (i) the problem concerning the possible 'educational advantage' is inherent to the idea of moral education and not necessarily a problem of Kant's philosophy of history; (ii) for Kant to assume the idea of moral progress he needs to assume that there is a possibility that earlier generations were morally worse than later ones; but this does not nullify (iii) the guilt of agents for their actions, i.e., later generations can blame earlier generations for their moral failures, because everyone is free and capable of acting morally. "Although later generations can benefit from improved education and the insights achieved from earlier ones, any moral progress is the result of spontaneous acts of freedom".[384]

In agreement with Kleingeld, one should believe that the possibility of rational and moral progress is indispensable in Kant's moral theory. But in terms of grounding his moral theory, she argues that this idea is only a teleological regulative model, for even if there were no hope for progress, moral obligation would remain. Kant's position that *duty* implies *can* means that recognizing duty implies considering it possible to do so. Which implies assuming the existence of the conditions of possibility. Kleingeld points out that stating that reason develops gradually does not imply that human beings are moral, each person must achieve the development of his moral disposition through an individual struggle.

Concerning moral progress based on the philosophy of history, I add the need to discipline unsociability to Kleingeld's perspective on moral development through the development of the predispositions of the use of reason through learning. Indeed, as already mentioned above, if on the one hand social antagonism can be harmful, on the other hand it is the means for the development of natural dispositions aimed at the use of reason and, once unsociability is disciplined, it can be the springboard of progress. For Kant, it is through social antagonism that

> […] the first true steps are taken from brutishness to culture, which consists, actually, in the social worth of human beings. And here all of the talents are gradually developed, taste is formed, and, even, through continual enlightenment, the beginning of a foundation is laid for a manner of thinking which is able, over time, to transform the primitive natural predisposition for moral discernment into definite practical principles and, in this way, to ultimately transform an agreement to society that initially had been pathologically coerced into a moral whole.[385]

[384] (Kleingeld, 1999, p.75).
[385] (IaG, AA 08:21).

Beginning from the premise that discipline assists social antagonism in the development of the natural dispositions that aim at the use of reason, it follows that "all the culture and art that decorates humankind, as well as its most pleasing social order, are fruits of an unsociability that is forced by its own nature to discipline itself and thereby develop fully the seeds that nature planted within it by means of an imposed art".[386]

The moral teleological perspective of the development of dispositions, which is the presupposition of the concept of discipline, also plays a role in the external sphere of human beings. While auto-discipline aims at autonomy and requires the individual to rise ever higher from the coarseness of his nature to humanity, external discipline aims at disciplining natural dispositions so that the will becomes free, and at establishing a just state in which these free wills can coexist, and for this the discipline of unsociability is fundamental.

Social antagonism creates resistance[387]. For Kant,

> It is this resistance that awakens all human powers and causes human beings to overcome their tendency to idleness and, driven by lust for honor, power, or property, to establish a position for themselves among their fellows, whom they can neither endure nor do without. Here the first true steps are taken from brutishness to culture, which consists, actually, in the social worth of human beings.[388]

From this tension between sociability and unsociability there arise not only social problems, but also progress. Moral progress is not impeded by a series of problematics feelings and inclinations that arise from the failure to discipline unsociability, but only hindered. Unsociability must be disciplined so that this propensity can be used as a driving force for human progress. According to Kant, in order for this force, which constantly threatens to dissolve society, to be transformed into a springboard for progress, a civil constitution is necessary, for it is only in this state that the inclinations produce their best results.

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386 (IaG, AA 08:22).

387 "Here I take antagonism to mean the unsociable sociability of human beings, that is, their tendency to enter into society, a tendency connected, however, with a constant resistance that continually threatens to break up this society. This unsociable sociability is obviously part of human nature. Human beings have an inclination to associate with one another because in such a condition they feel themselves to be more human, that is to say, more in a position to develop their natural predispositions. But they also have a strong tendency to isolate themselves, because they encounter in themselves the unsociable trait that predisposes them to want to direct everything only to their own ends and hence to expect to encounter resistance everywhere, just as they know that they themselves tend to resist others" (IaG, AA 08:20-21).

388 (IaG, AA 08:21).

3.2.2 The relationship between patriotism, education and the theory of discipline

In the fifth proposition of the *Idea for a universal history with a cosmopolitan aim*, Kant states that "the greatest problem for the human species to which nature compels it to seek a solution is the achievement of a civil society which administers right universally".[389] This society seeks maximum freedom for its members, and therefore must limit each individual freedom so that they can coexist. Therefore, the highest task of humanity is to achieve a society that strives for a just civil constitution.

> Since every limitation of freedom through the will of another is known as coercion, it then follows that the civil constitution is a relation among free human beings who (notwithstanding their freedom in the whole of their union with others) are nonetheless subject to coercive laws, since reason wills it to be this way, specifically pure, a priori legislating reason, which pays no regard to any empirical end (all of which are conceived under the general name of happiness). For with respect to their empirical end and what it consists in human beings think very differently, such that their will cannot be brought under a common principle and hence also under no external law that is in harmony with the freedom of all.[390]

Reason bases the civil state on three a priori principles, namely the freedom of each member, equality with all others and independence as a citizen. Law, therefore, must relate these principles to the just civil constitution, since it is the limitation of the freedom of each individual to the condition of the coexistence of the freedom of all.

In the *Doctrine of Right*, Kant defines law as the set of conditions under which the will of each individual can be reconciled with the will of all others according to a universal law of freedom. The universal principle of law is formulated as follows: "Any action is right if it can coexist with everyone's freedom in accordance with a universal law, or if on its maxim the freedom of choice of each can coexist with everyone's freedom in accordance with a universal law".[391] In this way, an unjust act occurs when a subject places an illegitimate obstacle in the way of another's will, and in order to correct such injustice, coercion is needed, so we can say

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[389] (IaG, AA 08:22).

[390] (TP, AA 08:290). About this, Kant continues: "The civil condition, considered purely as a legal condition, is grounded on the following a priori principles: 1. The freedom of every member of society, as a human being. 2. The equality of every member with every other, as a subject. 3. The independence of every member of the commonwealth, as a citizen. These principles are not so much laws that the already established state promulgates, rather, only on the basis of these principles is it possible at all to establish a state in accordance with pure rational principles of external human right" (TP, AA 08:290).

[391] (MS, AA 06:230).

that law and coercion are the same thing. Any obstacle to freedom must be coerced. Coercion is therefore understood as an impediment to freedom. External coercion is a resistance imposed on that which serves as an obstacle to external freedom in accordance with universal laws. This external coercion comes from the civil constitution, since interpersonal relations take place in civil society and need to be regulated by law, since an individual action affects the community. Restrictions are therefore necessary so that one individual does not impede the freedom of another.[392]

According to Onora O'Neill (2015) the central requirement of law and justice in Kant is applicability, which affects the external aspects of action. Therefore, Kant circumscribes the duties of law in terms of their enforceability and fulfillment. Thus, with respect to the maxims of the agent, the requirement is that when they relate to the duties of law, they should be neutral with respect to the duties of virtue, because the purpose of law is to guarantee equality of external freedom for all. "So duties of right must authorize coercive action in order to secure the same external freedom for all by subordinating them to common laws".[393] According to O'Neill, in a just society, reciprocal and equal coercion is a fundamental principle of law that must be applied. In addition to providing us with a formulation of law that defines what should be enforced, Kant also provides arguments about public justice, which requires that all people can enjoy their rights. Therefore, coercion and the civil state are interlinked because it is the best way to enjoy rights safely.[394]

Law is coercion, and in a sense it is an external discipline that disciplines human unsociability. It should be noted that in an illegitimate state the abuse of discipline has no legitimacy; however, not all external pragmatic discipline is illegitimate. In a just state, for example, the concept of coercion is legitimate. For Kant, the concept of legitimacy is fundamental to the justification of law and the state. In the Anth, he distinguishes four political conditions: barbarism, anarchy, despotism, and the republic. The two axes around which these four conditions are distinguished are freedom and law. The combination of freedom and law is decisive not only for the maintenance of the state, but also for its legitimacy.

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[392] "Therefore, if a certain use of freedom is itself a hindrance to freedom in accordance with universal laws (i.e., wrong), coercion that is opposed to this (as a hindering of a hindrance to freedom) is consistent with freedom in accordance with universal laws, that is, it is right. Hence there is connected with Right by the principle of contradiction an authorization to coerce someone who infringes upon it" (MS, AA 06:231).

[393] (O'Neill, 2015, p.202).

[394] "[...] the only way to enjoy rights with any security is to enter a civil condition, where enforcement is provided by a duly constituted public authority. Outside a civil condition there can be no assurance of others' restraint, and individuals would do no wrong if they coerced others whom they saw as threatening them" (O'Neill, 2015, p.204).

For Kant, since human beings cannot avoid living together, the creation of a legitimate political and legal condition is necessary to establish a common public authority. This authority is explained by the concept of law and not by the concept of force, domination, domestication, or absolute obedience. Public authority serves as the legal-political means by which citizens legitimately assert their rights against one another. Coercion, therefore, derives its legitimacy in the civil state from omnilateral decisions that deal with legal obstacles to freedom.

On the one hand, the law is coercive and should not take into account the intentions of agents. On the other hand, the law can create spaces for agents to engage in behavior that is beneficial to intersubjective relations. The law regulates actions that are contrary to the law and should not require any kind of moral intention on the part of the agent. At the same time, through the Kantian civic patriotism that exists in the idea of republicanism, it is possible to *foment* actions that conform to the law and rational and reasonable actions by political agents in order to make the existing state an increasingly just state.

For Kant, it is normatively necessary to establish a just state, and this necessity derives from the human right to freedom and the conditions for its protection. With this intention in mind, it is proposed that in the "state-citizen" relationship, the law and the institutions can provide spaces for dialogue and guarantees of communicative freedoms for action in the public sphere. In the "citizen-state" relationship, once these spaces have been created, it is up to citizens to exercise their active role as co-legislators, i.e. to participate actively in public debates and decision-making, to demand social improvements through reforms, and to fulfill their duty towards a just democratic state. This exercise is compatible with a kind of Kantian civic patriotism capable of establishing an increasingly just state. Kant defines patriotism in his discussion of the nature of republicanism. It is explained in contrast to despotism. Therefore, in addition to creating spaces for dialog in the public sphere, the state must guarantee quality education for all.

In Kant's philosophy, there are several ways of linking education and politics, one of which is through Kant's change of view on whose responsibility it is to provide access to education, that is, he shifts his support from private education to public education, so education should have public oversight and government financial support.[395] In agreement with Louden's (2016) elucidation, since the right rests on equality of action, the fundamental principle of justice does not allow the universalization of the idea that access to education should be

[395] (Päd, AA 09:447; 455).

exclusively private and domestic (either from the initial periods or university), "for not everyone has the financial means to pay the costs for private education. For this simple but powerful reason, private education is thus at odds with Kantian moral and political philosophy".[396]

In addition, the questions that permeate the educational and state contexts are linked when Kant asks himself how to create a better civil society: should a fairer civil state be established first and then citizens can seek to improve themselves, or should citizens first be educated so that they can establish an increasingly fair civil society?[397]. According to Louden (2016), Kant in *Friedländer* seems to advocate transformation in schools so that everyone receives a good education, while in SF Kant seems to change tack and now argues that change should first be governmental. However, the positions need not be mutually exclusive.

For Kant, both general education and moral education are fundamental to the formation of human beings and citizens. On the one hand, there is no denial of the tension presented by some interpreters, such as Beck (1978) for example, about the controversial relationship between Kant's moral theory and moral education, that is, about the relationship between autonomy as an internal requirement and moral education which is external, so for these interpreters moral education is consequently incompatible with Kant's moral theory. However, on the other hand, one agrees with Louden when he argues that there is room for moral education within Kant's philosophy and it is not incompatible with moral theory and the endorsement of autonomy in his mature writings. I believe that on the one hand, the relationship between discipline and moralization is that both are linked to self-government. On the other hand, since education is external, there is a tension between discipline and moralization, because while human beings must submit to the laws of humanity, they must also be educated to autonomy, so that they feel the power of their own laws.

In fact, according to Leonel Ribeiro dos Santos (2016), this issue is the seventh paradox of education, according to him, education for freedom is done through coercion/discipline, analogously, for the coexistence of freedoms, coercion is needed. We agree with the positions of Santos and Dalbosco (2004) that education is an important part of Kant's philosophy, not only in itself, but also because it is intertwined with other parts of Kant's work such as anthropology, ethics, philosophy of history and political philosophy. We agree with Dalbosco's

[396] (Louden, 2016, p.13).
[397] (V-Anth / Fried 25:01).

hypothesis that Kant attributes a fundamental role to education for two main reasons: (i) because it is indispensable to human sociability and to the construction of universal citizenship as a fundamental basis for a state that aims to be ever more just; and (ii) that education is connected to the internal demands of enlightenment in his practical philosophy.

Education has both general and practical aims; it is a process that prepares the individual for reflection. Therefore, moral education – as part of Kant's project of moralization, in its broad and formative aspect of moral culture – has as its objective the moral and political formation of agents. Education prepares individuals for the exercise of citizenship. In Päd, AA 09:455, we see this relationship when Kant states that education also consists of pragmatic formation, in terms of examples, we have political participation and critical thinking about the political-governmental sphere.

For Kant, in an pedagogical perspective, education must be through freedom and for the subject to achieve freedom. In this way, pragmatic-educational discipline is introduced through education as a first educational step that removes obstacles and enables the individual to think for himself/herself and to be able to exercise his public use of reason in the spaces of dialogue established by law, thus promoting a fair, rational and reasonable "citizen-citizen" relationship in the public sphere. This virtuous circle can allow both moral progress (self-discipline and autonomy) and political-legal progress (a just and democratic state), because in the "citizen-state" relationship the demands and claims previously debated in the public sphere reach the institutions as guidelines to be implemented constitutionally. In the Kantian proposal presented by Kleingeld (2000), the citizen has a duty to a just democratic state, and to this end the state also needs the participation of its citizens in order to continue to function. Through participation, the citizen seeks to make the state more internally just and, consequently, more respectful of people's rights and human rights.

Kant, in his *Reflections on Anthropology*, states that the national spirit must be replaced by the maxims of reason, that national mania must be eradicated, and that patriotism and cosmopolitanism must take its place.[398] In TP, Kant claims

> A government that would be established on the basis of the principle of benevolence toward the people, as a father vis-à-vis his children, that is, a paternalistic government (*imperium paternale*) would be the greatest imaginable despotism (a constitution that nullifies all freedom of the subjects, who thus have no rights). Such a government is

[398] (Refl., AA 15:591).

> one where the subjects, as dependent children, cannot decide what is useful or damaging to them and are required to behave merely passively. [...] Not a paternalistic, but rather only a patriotic government (*imperium non paternale, sed patrioticum*) is the one which can be conceived for human beings who are capable of rights, and also the only one that can be conceived for a benevolent ruler. [...] He, the member of the commonwealth, is entitled to this right of freedom as a human being to the extent that the latter is a being capable of rights in general.[399]

Kant relates patriotism both to the attitude of the citizen – as co-legislators – and to the attitude of the state – in treating the citizen as a co-legislator. In MS, Kant also contrasts patriotic government with despotic and paternalistic government.[400] Kant claims,

> Therefore only the concurring and united will of all, insofar as each decides the same thing for all and all for each, and so only the general united will of the people, can be legislative. The members of such a society who are united for giving law (*societas civilis*), that is, the members of a state, are called *citizens of a state* (*cives*). In terms of rights, the attributes of a citizen, inseparable from his essence (as a citizen), are: lawful *freedom*, the attribute of obeying no other law than that to which he has given his consent; civil *equality*, that of not recognizing among the *people* any superior with the moral capacity to bind him as a matter of Right in a way that he could not in turn bind the other; and third, the attribute of civil *independence*, of owing his existence and preservation to his own rights and powers as a member of the commonwealth, not to the choice of another among the people. From his independence follows his civil personality, his attribute of not needing to be represented by another where rights are concerned.[401]

For him, the members of a state must unite to legislate, and citizens have the attributes of legal freedom, civil equality and civil independence.[402]

As Kleingeld (2000) notes, the concept of patriotism in Kant is a topic of contention in the secondary literature. She identifies three additional, more controversial forms of patriotism that have been advocated by various interpreters of Kant's political philosophy and philosophy of history. These forms of patriotism are: (i) civic patriotism, found in the republican tradition, which is political in nature and thus does not imply a notion of nation in the ethnic sense; (ii) nationalist patriotism, which focuses its attention on the national group to which it belongs and is linked to the ideal of the nation-state; and (iii) trait-based patriotism, which is inspired by certain characteristics that make its inhabitants lovable and active. We agree with Kleingeld

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399 (TP, AA 08:291).
400 (MS, AA 06:316-317).
401 (MS, AA 06:314).
402 On the concept of citizen in Kant, specifically on passive and active citizens and who these civil classifications are aimed at, there is a huge debate in the secondary literature, mainly on the role of women and workers. More on this debate can be found in: Mosser (1999), Weinrib (2008), Varden (2015), Pascoe (2015), Durğun (2020), Moran (2021), Davies (2023), Kleingeld (2023).

(2000, 2003) that the only type of patriotism that truly consists of and is compatible with Kant's philosophical system is civic patriotism.[403] This duty of civic patriotism is a duty to the just democratic state.[404]

> The duty of civic patriotism is the duty to promote the functioning and improvement of the republic as an institution of justice. It is not originally a duty to support one's compatriots but, rather, a duty to promote the institutionalization of justice. It is likely that there will be cases in which one's compatriots receive certain benefits as a result, but this is then not simply because they are one's compatriots but rather because they are members in the just republic that one ought to sustain and support as an institution of justice.[405]

The institutions of justice are the kind of institutions that require citizen participation in order to function. According to Kleingeld (2000), civic patriotism is in itself an instrument of cosmopolitan justice[406], "for example, in striving to make my own state more just, I can also strive to make it more just toward other states and more respectful of human rights in its dealings with foreigners".[407]

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[403] It should be noted that patriotism in general can degenerate into fanaticism, which is why it needs to be properly delimited. For Kleingeld (2000, 2003), "of course, if patriotism today is treated with suspicion by many, this is because many acts have been committed in its name that were not in accord with duty at all, and that instead were unjust to other states and nations or the individuals therein – or even to individuals within the state who were claimed to be a threat to the fabric of the state or the nation. All too often patriotism has degenerated into a fanaticism that attributes a higher moral standing to compatriots and co-nationals than to other human beings. And in such cases, it violates the basic tenets of Kant's moral and political theory. What I have argued in this essay, however, is that Kant's moral and political theories do leave room for permissible forms of patriotism, and even for a form that is a duty, namely, civic patriotism" (Kleingeld, 2003, p.315-316).

[404] "'Patriotism' is the term for identification with and civic activity on behalf of the political commonwealth. This can take many different forms and may range from governing the republic or defending it to promoting the well-being of its citizens. The republic (res publica, commonwealth) is regarded as serving the common political good of the citizens. The citizens are regarded as free and equal individuals (and, often, as male and propertied). Civic patriotism does not imply the notion of a nation in an ethnic sense. Thus, it is not in principle (conceptually) impossible to give up one's citizenship in one state in favor of that in another, although it depends on immigration and emigration laws whether it is a real option. Finally, civic patriotism does not require that one abstain from criticism of the republic's institutions. Indeed, many eighteenth-century authors present their criticisms of social and political practices as an indication of their patriotism, since they intend to enhance the quality of the republic by calling for reforms" (Kleingeld, 20003, p.304).

[405] (Kleingeld, 2003, p.309).

[406] According to Kleingeld (2003), there are two domains of cosmopolitanism in Kant's work, a moral one, since Kant defends the view that all rational beings belong to a single moral community, and a political cosmopolitanism, expressed in his theory of the league of states and in his cosmopolitan law. Kleingeld (2003) emphasizes that part of Kant's discussion of cosmopolitan law is a critique of colonialist practices; he also anticipates some of the refugee rights established in 20th century international legislation.

[407] (Kleingeld, 2000, p.334).

Defending the relationship between patriotism and cosmopolitanism[408], Kleingeld explains that

> I believe that this can be done, and that there is an argument that closes the gap between my general duty to promote justice and my particular duty to my particular state. This argument starts from the idea, to which Kantians typically subscribe, that a just state is a democratic state, that is, a system of political self-government. A democratic state can exist only when its citizens are committed to its institutions, at least to a minimal degree. It does not just need citizens who comply with the laws and pay their taxes. In addition, a just and democratic state also needs the political involvement of citizens in order for democracy to function properly. What exactly is required from the citizens will depend on the further details of one's view of democracy, and the demands will be greater on the more republican-oriented views than on the more liberal ones. What matters here is only that it is more than nothing.[409]

It is therefore desirable that citizens adopt the maxim of civic patriotism. For Kant, the more republican forms of government there are, the closer we will be to the cosmopolitan ideal and world peace.

According to Saito (2020), Kant's patriotism is not only a duty, but also *a way of thinking*. According to him, Kant's patriotism based on this perspective provided by practical reason is used to develop the idea of a republican constitution that protects rights in representative democracies and develops a new understanding of the concept of citizen dignity, and this concept is the key to thinking about socio-political relations.[410] In Saito's analysis, the term *way of thinking* is a concept of cause for a practical purpose. It refers to the way of thinking that gives priority to the practical moral order. In his analysis, he shows that Kant introduced this term to distinguish it in the KrV from the concept of understanding. Understanding only knows what exists, while thinking is the ability to generate ideas spontaneously and independently of their realization in the world, and attributes an intelligible character to human agency.[411] Therefore, "'way of thinking' provides objective grounds that the rational agent can spontaneously deem as reasons for his own action".[412] In the practical sphere, the term way of

[408] For more views on the compatibility of cosmopolitanism and patriotism, see Baron (1989), Gewirth (1988), Rawls (1971) e Waldron (1993).
[409] (Kleingeld, 2000, p.327).
[410] "The patriotic way of thinking and governing is a radical denial of despotism: Kant's patriotism theory not only logically derives the principle of republicanism from the idea of the original contract, but also implies criticism of a government that does not fulfill this principle and thereby threatens the 'dignity of a citizen'" (Saito, 2020, p.314).
[411] (KrV, B 559, 576 e 578).
[412] (Saito, 2020, p.306).

thinking is used to develop the concept of moral autonomy as a guide for the general orientation of the will.[413]

For Saito,

> Kant conceptualizes patriotism as a 'way of thinking' which is guided by the principle of the 'common will.' This 'way of thinking' offers the practical reasoning which opens up for the members of a state the possibility to question and even transform the political principles that have shaped the 'fatherland' as a historically developed institution in the light of the original contract. Through the concept of 'way of thinking,' Kant provides the perspective of enlightened patriotism, rather than the naïve sentimental attachment to one's native land, its nature, and the customs and languages of the inhabitants [...].[414]

For Kant, the only thing worth clinging to is a political constitution that protects the equal rights of each member by law.

We share the position of Kleingeld (2000, 2003) and Saito (2020) that the only patriotism that is truly consistent with Kant's theory and that can be considered a duty is civic patriotism.[415] From a republican perspective, it is argued that the minimum for either improving a just state or maintaining a just state is the active participation of citizens, such as in public debates, and the promotion of enlightened education.

From an educational perspective, by stating that Kant's pedagogical proposal is shaped by freedom and for autonomy, so that students think for themselves, it is assumed that virtue is not innate, it must be taught. In the Päd, Kant makes it clear that educational discipline should not be used to shape behavior in order to make it servile; on the contrary, discipline should be used so that students always feel their freedom.[416] Kant in MS, when dealing with Teaching Ethics, states that the teacher must make it clear to his student that "your own reason teaches you what you have to do and directly commands you to do it".[417] For Kant, you don't learn ready-made thoughts or formulas. What you should be taught and learn is *to think*. Kant, in WDO, explains that "To think for oneself means to seek in oneself (that is, in one's own reason) the supreme touchstone of truth; and the maxim of always thinking for oneself is the Enlightenment (*Aufklärung*)".[418]

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[413] (GMS, AA 04:435 and RGV, AA 06:46).
[414] (Saito, 2020, p.311-312).
[415] For more interpretations of Kant's patriotism see: Kleingeld (2012, 2014), Williams (1983), Müller (2007) e Pinzani (2009).
[416] (Päd, AA 09:464).
[417] (MS, AA 06:481).
[418] (WDO, AA 08:146).

For Kant, the use of reason in an autonomous way, whether thinking for oneself, giving moral law for oneself, or sharing in the creation and debate about state laws, is at the heart of the development of his entire theory. Education and access to education is fundamental for society to progress and for human beings to move from a heteronomous to an autonomous state. Kant makes it clear when he states that the art of governing human beings and the art of educating them are among the most difficult of human discoveries (Päd, AA 09:477), however, despite not being easy, it is not an impossible task.

It is therefore evident that the process of enlightenment, whether individual or collective, is a prerequisite for individuals to develop the capacity for independent thought. This process, which also occurs in the public sphere, is manifested in the relationship between patriotism and education, with reasoned discourse serving as its foundation. In this context, the demand for social participation inherent to republicanism encounters the plurality of agents and the contemporary understanding of pluralism. Moreover, the Kantian theory of discipline is pertinent to contemporary democracies, as it is necessary for the establishment of a normative standard that can be an alternative to political theories that seek to account for plurality and reasonable consensus in constitutional democracies. The role of the theory of discipline in this context is multifaceted. On the one hand, pragmatic discipline is necessary to discipline unsociability. On the other hand, educational discipline is essential for training individuals. Furthermore, self-discipline is crucial for individuals to become not only good citizens but also moral citizens. Finally, the discipline of reason is indispensable for providing a normative standard capable of navigating the constant relationship between plurality and the search for consensus in society.

So, about the discipline of reason as a normative standard related with democracies, we can map out at least two ways of interpreting this role of discipline presented in the KrV and its relationship with contemporary democracies. One is the position of Roberta Pasquerè (2023) and the other is the position of Onora O'Neill (2015). For Pasquarè,

> a comprehensive reading of Kant's critical production reveals that reason's legislation entails norms that place on the participants in public reasoning specific constraints and pursues the establishment of ethical and political communities committed to the regulative ideas of pure practical reason. I term these norms discursive self-discipline. The adjective 'discursive' refers to the context of public communication and the noun 'discipline' to the aspect of normativity. The prefix 'self-' specifies that this discipline

> is not enforceable by positive law but requires the voluntary commitment of the participants in public reasoning.[419]

Pasquarè's definition of discursive self-discipline as norms that impose specific restrictions at first glance seems correct and in line with O'Neill's. However, since this discursive self-discipline is not limited to restriction, but goes further and demands a specific content that can/should be debated in the public sphere, it goes beyond the role of the discipline of reason in its internal sphere – self-discipline. She argues that

> Reason's self-legislation also informs the agenda of public discourse, recommending giving priority to topics that advance the regulative ideas of pure practical reason. For instance, Kant urges not discussing 'figments of the brain' (WDO, AA 08: 137; Kant, 2001, p. 11), i.e. supersensible objects whose examination does not advance morals. He invites giving up investigating 'the mechanical element in the human being' (Anth, AA 07: 214; Kant, 2001, p. 319) because such discussions do not yield any finding upon which human beings can act. In several other places, he urges theologians not to dwell on discussing divine rewards and punishments because such depictions engender a false conception of morality. In *The Conflict of the Faculties*, Kant contrasts the non-critically informed public use of reason (by the scholars of theology, law, and medicine) with the critically informed public use of reason (by the scholars of philosophy). The result is that the former violates both the ruler's interest and reason's.[420]

On the one hand, one cannot deny these passages in which Kant insists on the content of the political agenda, but at the same time, on the other hand, one should interpret these passages as being the descriptive part of these texts, that is, when Kant gives voice to these issues it is because at his time they were on the agenda, they made sense within those circumstances, not that there were a specific normative content that should be demanded or insistently recommended as a topic. The role of the state is to foster spaces for debate and provide quality education, just as the role of the citizen is to take an active part in the political agenda and decision-making. Clearly, the aim of Kant's critical endeavor is the enlightenment of agents in all their contexts, political, moral, legal, theoretical, educational, etc., but this aim of his project does not require a demand for content or even an insistence on what the agenda of public discourse should be.

On the one hand, we agree with Pasquarè that to a certain extent reason self-legislates which arguments are valid. She states that,

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[419] (Pasquarè, 2023, p.4-5).
[420] (Pasquarè, 2023, p.5).

> As for its contents, reason's self-legislation stems from the results of the critical enterprise. From the theoretical point of view, critical philosophy concludes that the pure concepts of the understanding are only applicable to objects of possible experience. From the practical point of view, the critical enterprise yields that the only valid grounds of ethical and political practice are the regulative ideas of freedom, dignity, and equality. In the light of these results, reason's self-legislation indicates what arguments are theoretically valid and practically permissible in public reasoning. For instance, an argument intended to intimidate or seduce is practically impermissible since it violates the regulative ideas of freedom and dignity, and an argument based on the cognition of God is theoretically invalid since it violates the condition of the applicability of the understanding to objects of possible experience.[421]

There is no doubt that normativity and its procedural aspect can distinguish which publicly expressed opinion can claim validity and legitimacy, so it is agreed that in political practice it is possible to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate public reasoning in terms of its claim to validity in the public sphere. However, on the other hand, this does not mean that it is possible to maintain that "reason's self-legislation also informs the agenda of public discourse".[422] We therefore disagree with Pasquarè's position, because in order to account for the plurality, universality and timelessness of a normative conception, the agendas of public discourse cannot be predefined; the content of what will be discussed in the public sphere is demanded by the contingent needs of each group or community. Kant is categorical in stating that the discipline is not directed at any content, but only at the method of knowledge based on pure reason.[423] Therefore, the role of the discipline of reason is restricted to its negative aspect as a system of precaution against error and self-examination, as Kant states. Furthermore, what should be on the political agenda are the demands of the people and not merely the interests of the ruler.[424]

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[421] (Pasquarè, 2023, p.5).

[422] (Pasquarè, 2023, p.5).

[423] "But it is well to note that in this second main part of the transcendental critique I do not direct the discipline of pure reason to the content but rather only to the method of cognition from pure reason. The former has already taken place in the Doctrine of Elements. But there is so much that is similar in the use of reason, whatever object it may be applied to, and yet, insofar as it would be transcendental, it is so essentially different from all other uses, that without the admonitory negative doctrine of a discipline especially aimed at them the errors could not be avoided that must necessarily arise from the inappropriate pursuit of such methods, which might be suitable for reason elsewhere but not here" (KrV, B 740).

[424] This concern for the interests of the ruler in certain passages of Kant can be interpreted as a use of rhetoric. Roberta Pasquarè (2023) maps out how interpreters are relating the public use of reason and rhetoric in Kant. She states that: "As argued in recent scholarship, with *What is Enlightenment?* and the introductory section (SF, AA 07: 5-36; Kant, 2001, pp. 239-262) to *The Conflict of the Faculties*, Kant casts the political ferment of his age in philosophical terms and composes two masterpieces of rhetoric. The philosophical import consists in advocating the free public use of reason as a means to discipline politics through pure practical reason, and the rhetorical prowess consists in championing the free public use of reason by appealing to the ruler's pragmatic practical reason. According to Michael Clarke, Kant aims to 'mak[e] authority more reasonable' (Clarke, 1997, p. 71), to

Pasquarè gives us an excellent example to support her position that reason requires the substance of politics,

> The Austrian legal philosopher Hans Kelsen (1920; 1953) warns against a relativistic drift of a merely procedural understanding of the people's will and raises the question of whether the commitment to popular sovereignty requires accepting that a scoundrel like Barabbas be pardoned by plebiscite over a just man like Jesus. A Kantian reply could be that a public opinion contrary to specific principles may not claim validity. Applied to contemporary democracies and populisms, Kant's lesson is that political decision-makers who limit themselves to recording a critically unqualified common opinion are only simulating legitimacy. Conversely, citizens who value freedom need to cultivate free public reasoning and the cognitive and moral self-discipline it requires.[425]

On the one hand, there is no disagreement that the Kantian response would be precisely that a public opinion contrary to specific principles cannot have validity, or even less that public reasoning requires self-discipline. However, on the other hand, what gives or does not give validity to public reasoning is not the strength of a social group or, as in the case of the plebiscite example, the number of voters, but from a Kantian point of view, it is precisely the procedure of reason, the possibility of universalizing or not universalizing that demand or that political maxim and the decision-making process taking into account all those involved who can accept or reject that "reason/motive" or "action/decision" that gives validity to the reasoning that seeks legitimacy and validity. In other words, validity or legitimacy is not given prior to the procedure. Just as in moral philosophy, maxims need the categorical imperative to become moral maxims, I believe that in political philosophy, maxims need to pass through the sieve of reason, the discipline of reason and public scrutiny to become political maxims. Furthermore, on the one hand, arguing that the "reason's normativity places on politics substantial, not merely procedural, demands" as Pasquarè does, can open the door to a despotic reason, but on the other hand, it is uncontroversial that the discipline of reason is necessary in both the theoretical and practical spheres. Self-discipline as a commitment to the cultivation of public reasoning which,

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which end 'we see him veil the fundamental justification of the public use of reason […] beneath highly rhetorical political appeals' (*ibid*., p. 55). On Jesús González Fisac's reading, *What is Enlightenment?* is pervaded by a rhetorical paradox consisting in the apparent contradiction between freedom and obedience. More precisely, Kant presents two apparently contradicting terms, namely the scholar's unrestricted freedom to make public use of his reason, i.e. 'the true interest […] of the people', and the public official's duty to obey, i.e. 'the interest of the prince' (González Fisac, 2005, p. 40), and succeeds in showing that they actually are compatible" (Pasquarè, 2023, p.2).

[425] (Pasquarè, 2023, p.6).

the more it is exercised, the more it opens up the possibility for legitimate consensus in constitutional democracies.

We therefore agree with O'Neill's (2015) position that the legislation of reason through discipline must be without content.[426]

> Any lawgiving that is to be both self-imposed and negative – that is, without content – can impose no more than the mere form of law. The discipline of reason can require only that no principle incapable of being a law count as a fundamental principle for governing thought and action. Any fundamental principle with determinate content would implicitly subject thought and action to some or other 'alien' and unvindicated 'authority'. Hence Kant views the fundamental principle of reason as that of governing both thinking and doing by principles that others too can adopt and follow.[427]

Her main objective is to demonstrate the authority of reason, and to do this she argues that the norms of human reasoning and their legitimacy must be built from the resources available to human beings, and this resource is the discipline of reason.

As a contemporary unfolding of this distinction in society, one draws on O'Neill's position when she states that in the public sphere, one must differentiate the reasons that underlie arguments as *good reasons* from *bad reasons* if constitutional democracies are to have the potential for consensus.[428] This distinction is crucial because we need to test our judgment not only by scientific verification, but also by the understanding of others. Kant talks about the

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[426] "It certainly does not provide sufficient instructions for thinking and doing. This is not inadvertence on Kant's part: he constantly rejects conceptions of reason, such as the Principle of Sufficient Reason, which supposedly give sufficient instructions for all thinking and acting (for example, see CPR A 783 / B 811) that there is no algorithm that fully determines the content of reasoned thought and action. Nor should we 'expect from reason what obviously exceeds its power' (CPR A 786 / B 814). Reason offers only necessary conditions for thought and action – in Kant's terminology a 'Canon' for adequate thought and action (CPRA 795 I B 823ff.; cf. G 4:424). Since the non-speculative theoretical use of reason has only regulative warrant, we can aim at the systematic unity of knowledge, but only in awareness that the ideal of completeness is not attainable (CPR A 568 / B 596): The regulative principles of reason serve only 'to mark out the path toward systematic unity' (CPRA 668 / B 696). In the case of the spurious speculative employment of reason, we have even less than a canon. Here the discipline of reason can be used only as a dialectical 'system of precautions and self-examination' that curbs unwarranted metaphysical speculation. Kant's conception of reason cannot rehabilitate any of the speculative proofs of God's existence, although the idea of a supreme being may still be used to regulate and integrate, indeed may be needed to regulate and integrate, thinking and doing" (O'Neill, 2015, p.28-29).

[427] (O'Neill, 2015, p.28).

[428] "If 'lawless' thinking ends not in freedom of thought and communication, but in gibberish and isolation, even in superstition and cognitive disorientation, and vulnerability to tyrants and demagogues, then any activity in human life that can count as reasoned must be structured. In particular it must have enough structure for us to distinguish thoughts and proposals that provide good reasons from those that provide only poor reasons, so enabling us to decide which we ought to accept and which we ought to reject. Reasoning, whether theoretical or practical, must have some normative force" (O'Neill, 2015, p.64-65).

need to test judgments by exposing them in the public realm thus removing logical egoism through pluralism[429], in which citizens behave as citizens of the world.[430]

3.3 KANTIAN RESPONSES TO FOUCAULT AND ARENDT'S CONCERNS

This thesis dissertation speaks for itself in terms of analyzing and investigating a theory of discipline in Kant's philosophical system. This theory is shown to be indispensable to Kant's system, and its development within the context of Kant's practical philosophy is presented. This unfolding entails in different registers, including anthropology, pedagogy, morality, legal and political philosophy. Furthermore, the theory of discipline can be seen to of great significance for normative theories which fall within the scope of moral and political philosophy. In other words, this doctoral thesis sought to demonstrate that this thesis dissertation is not merely a contribution to research, interpretations, and debates on Kant's work, but also can contribute to the debate on the use of the discipline of constitutional democracies, for example. In this section, we will endeavor to develop two of its specific purposes: (i) The aim of this section is to demonstrate the implications and comparison of discipline from the perspectives of Foucault, Arendt, and Kant. This will be done in order to argue about the need for discipline in order to achieve our autonomy. In order to do this, we will try to engage in a dialogue and answer some concerns that we can extract from the works of Foucault and Arendt. Regarding the relationship between autonomy and discipline and the use of discipline in society, and as an example of the need for theory of discipline for theories that seek to deal with the implementation of moral and political theories, we will present the uses of discipline as a possible solution to problems that plague constitutional democracies.

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[429] "The opposite of egoism can only be pluralism, that is, the way of thinking in which one is not concerned with oneself as the Whole world, but rather regards and conducts oneself as a mere citizen of the world" (Anth, AA 07:130).

[430] "The logical egoist considers it unnecessary to test his judgment also by the understanding of others; as if he had no need at all for this touchstone (*criterium veritatis extermum*). But it is so certain that we cannot dispense with this means of assuring ourselves of the truth of our judgment that this may be the most important reason why learned people cry out so urgently for *freedom of the press*. For if this freedom is denied, we are deprived at the same time of a great means of testing the correctness of our own judgments, and we are exposed to error" (Anth, AA 07:128-129).

In the first chapter, some questions were raised with the aim of elucidating some of Foucault's and Arendt's concerns about discipline. From the agent's internal point of view, we questioned the relationship between self-care and self-discipline. From an external point of view, we questioned whether any discipline is the expression of punitive practices, whether they are illegitimate, and whether discipline is necessarily a practice of power. In Arendt's account, we questioned whether discipline negates reflection. This is because it demands behavior that is obedient to external authority from the agent's internal point of view. Furthermore, from the agent's external point of view, we asked whether externally imposed discipline necessarily aims to train subjectivity and domesticate bodies and thoughts.

On the one hand, the assumptions made by Foucault and Arendt can be used to demonstrate that the abuse of discipline is illegitimate. This abuse of discipline denies reflection and can express punitive practices. On the other hand, when we base ourselves on Kant's theory of discipline, we can demonstrate that discipline is not a practice of power that produces oppression and fosters thoughtlessness. It is not inevitable that discipline will subjugate agents, transform free agents into servile individuals, or massify and dominate human beings. The problem is not discipline itself, but rather its abuse.

With regard to the dialogue with Arendt, it can be observed that the debate on discipline is focused on the discipline found in society and used by politics and by military and totalitarian regimes. In other words, the debate is located at the moment when discipline is implemented in society. Consequently, for discipline to be authoritative, those subjected to it must comply with the regulations imposed by others. Arendt therefore raises concerns about the obedience and unthinking consent that has sometimes been demanded in political regimes that maintain themselves through hierarchy and discipline. Arendt identifies a lack of judgment as one of the most significant challenges facing humanity. Arendt's argument is that we must question the meaning and significance of things. This is because she believes that the intelligibility of actions is crucial. In other words, she is concerned with how we relate and use our faculties (thought, will and judgment) to give meaning to human action, life, historical events and, ultimately, to question the meaning and significance of the rules and norms that we are expected to follow. These can be imposed by others or by ourselves.

With regard to the concept of obedience, both Arendt and Kant consider blind obedience to any rule or imposition to be a form of thoughtlessness. Kant's theory can elucidate the

distinction between domestication and discipline and between obedience and blind obedience. For Kant, educational and pragmatic disciplines, for example, while taking human beings out of their own savagery – independence from laws – and dealing with the temperaments of feeling and activity, generate a type of obedience to social dictates and yet do not nullify the ability of agents to submit to the precepts of the authority of their own reason. This kind of obedience is necessary for the functioning of society and for respecting pluralities. From an educational perspective, it is a mistake not to put up resistance during youth; it is important for human beings to be able to polish their own brutality. Therefore, discipline, as the first educational step, should help human beings to build their character and control their temperament. This does not entail subjugation or abuse; rather, it is an exercise for the individual to subsequently become a moral agent and obey the Moral Law, as well as follow the substantive moral laws that he or she has legislated in accordance with the categorical imperative.

For Kant, obedience is an essential element in the formation of moral character, which varies according to age and the exercise of one's reason and reflection. Since character can be built according to the habit of following certain rules, moral character consists of the habit of following certain moral maxims. The exercise of "following moral maxims" requires obedience and discipline. Conversely, blind obedience, especially in adulthood, is contrary to morality and enlightenment and stems from a servile mindset. In the context of education, for instance, Kant posits that education should be rigorous but not oppressive.

According to Kant, the capacity to think is a fundamental aspect of autonomy. In the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, he enumerates three maxims that may serve as a guide:

> The following maxims of the common human understanding do not belong here, to be sure, as parts of the critique of taste, but can nevertheless serve to elucidate its fundamental principles. They are the following: 1. To think for oneself; 2. To think in the position of everyone else; 3. Always to think in accord with oneself. The first is the maxim of the unprejudiced way of thinking, the second of the broad-minded way, the third that of the consistent way.[431]

The first is the principle that reason should never be passive. It liberates us from prejudices and superstitions, thereby preventing us from having a reason that is passive and guided by others. The second requires a capacity for broad thinking, which entails the ability to adopt the perspective of others. The third way of thinking, the consequent way, can only be achieved after

[431] (KU, AA 05:294).

combining the first two: thinking in agreement with oneself.[432] The capacity to think and to make judgments is a prerequisite for the agent to be able to exercise the three maxims that Kant enumerates. These concepts are related to Kant's theory of discipline, as they aim to encourage individuals to think for themselves, to be autonomous, and to act morally. However, it is important to note that the Kantian theory of discipline is not an end in itself and does not obey any kind of law (but only a moral one). This distinguishes it from the "obedience" invoked by the Nazis, as reported by Arendt.

In turn, with regard to the dialogue with Foucault, we can state that for him discipline massifies subjectivities and makes plurality impossible. This is because, while it is found in all contexts of the subjective and intersubjective life of individuals, it simultaneously watches over and punishes them in their private and public spaces. Furthermore, it is a practice that produces behavior, shapes the way of thinking and acting, and therefore subjects become mere results, products, of disciplinary power. Foucault's account elucidates the use of totalizing discipline, thereby establishing a causal relationship between the agents' subjectivity and the disciplinary process. In contrast, Kant's theory of discipline does not consider discipline as an end in itself. Rather, subjects are not the result of discipline; the end is human beings under moral laws, the exercise of autonomy, and discipline is a possible way to achieve these ends. For Kant, the value of discipline is not intrinsic, but rather arises from its function within the context of morality and the development of natural dispositions that facilitate the use of reason. Discipline is thus a means of guiding human beings out of their state of savagery and into a state of moral responsibility.

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[432] "The tendency toward the latter, hence toward heteronomy of reason, is called prejudice; and the greatest prejudice of all is that of representing reason as if it were not subject to the rules of nature on which the understanding grounds it by means of its own essential law: i.e., superstition. Liberation from superstition is called enlightenment, since, although this designation is also applied to liberation from prejudices in general, it is superstition above all (in sensu eminenti) that deserves to be called a prejudice, since the blindness to which superstition leads, which indeed it even demands as an obligation, is what makes most evident the need to be led by others, hence the condition of a passive reason. As far as the second maxim of the way of thinking is concerned, we are accustomed to calling someone limited (narrow-minded, in contrast to broad-minded) whose talents do not suffice for any great employment (especially if it is intensive). But the issue here is not the faculty of cognition, but the way of thinking needed to make a purposive use of it, which, however small the scope and degree of a person's natural endowment may be, nevertheless reveals a man of a broad-minded way of thinking if he sets himself apart from the subjective private conditions of the judgment, within which so many others are as if bracketed, and reflects on his own judgment from a universal standpoint (which he can only determine by putting himself into the standpoint of others). The third maxim, namely that of the consistent way of thinking, is the most difficult to achieve, and can only by achieved through the combination of the first two and after frequent observance of them has made them automatic. One can say that the first of these maxims is that maxim of the understanding, the second that of the power of judgment, the third that of reason" (KU, AA 05:294-295).

On the one hand, Foucault's critique of the disciplinary society is unambiguous. That is to say, based on Foucauldian assumptions, there is no doubt about his position on a discipline that oppresses and massifies. In his course at the *College de France* on January 14, 1976, Foucault posited that:

> Against the usurpations of disciplinary mechanics, against the rise of a power linked to scientific knowledge, we are today in such a situation that the only apparently solid resource left to us is precisely the recourse or return to a right organized around sovereignty. **When you want to object to disciplines and all the effects of power and knowledge that are linked to them, what do you do in practice, what does the magistrates' union and other similar institutions do, if not invoke precisely this right, this famous formal, so-called bourgeois right, which is nothing more than the right of sovereignty? I believe, however, that we have reached a kind of dead end: it is not by resorting to sovereignty against discipline that the effects of disciplinary power can be limited, because sovereignty and discipline, the right of sovereignty and disciplinary mechanisms are two intrinsically constitutive parts of the general mechanisms of power in our society. In the fight against disciplinary power, it is not towards the old law of sovereignty that one must march, but towards a new law that is anti-disciplinary and, at the same time, liberated from the principle of sovereignty.** Here we find the notion of repression. In its usual use, it has a double drawback: on the one hand, it refers obscurely to a particular theory of sovereignty – that of the sovereign rights of the individual – and, on the other, it uses a system of psychological references taken from the human sciences, that is, from the discourses and practices that belong to the disciplinary domain. I believe that the notion of repression remains a juridical-disciplinary notion, regardless of the critical use we want to make of it. In this way, the use of the notion of repression as the flagship of political critique is vitiated, undermined in advance by the reference – legal and disciplinary – to sovereignty and normalization.[433]

Accordingly, it is postulated that Foucault is opposed to the notion of external discipline as a component of society and institutions, even when employed in an appropriate manner. By establishing a correlation between discipline and power, it becomes impossible to regulate the latter. Consequently, the only viable strategy to combat disciplinary power is not through its legitimate application or by disciplining power, but by enacting a novel anti-disciplinary legislation.

One may argue that for many philosophers and interpreters, Foucault is fundamentally opposed to any form, use, or function of discipline. This is because the debate in Foucault revolves around the concept of discipline, which is analyzed at an individual, collective, and institutional level in order to elucidate and report that disciplinary power is structuring society and the subjectivity of agents. In other words, disciplinary power is in everything. The concept of disciplinary power is not limited to the 18th-century idea of sovereignty; rather, it has

[433] (Foucault, 1998, p. 190-191– own translation).

permeated all aspects of human life, from language to institutions. Consequently, there is an idea of completeness that makes disciplinary power a tool for social and individual organization. In other words, society and subjects are nothing more than the result of disciplinary power. Therefore, the discipline presented by Foucault is analyzed in itself, as being simultaneously what organizes and structures society and a power technique that produces subjectivity. This discipline is thus what massifies bodies. Hence, Foucault's concept of the disciplinary society does not differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate forms of coercion.

One illustrative example of this type of reading of Foucault's work is the interpretation presented by Agamben. In light of this critique of "state discipline" as problematic and oppressive, we can examine Giorgio Agamben's position in his recent publication, *Where Are We Now? The Epidemic as Politics* (2021), regarding the Covid-19 pandemic and the lockdown.[434] Agamben (2021) draws upon Foucault's work to illustrate the discrepancy between governance and the security paradigm[435]. He also cites Kant's philosophy as an alternative to those who defend lockdown in order to show that lockdown is unjustified even by those who philosophically use Kant to defend it. We can see that the same outrage perpetrated by Eichmann is perpetrated again, this time by Agamben, when he states that

> No doubt someone will retort that the sacrifice, serious as it is, has been made in the name of moral principles. I would remind them that Eichmann never failed to reiterate – apparently in good faith – that he did what he did according to his conscience, in order to obey what he believed were the precepts of Kantian morals. A norm which

[434] "Thanks to various emergency decrees, the executive power has superseded the legislative, effectively abolishing the separation-of-powers principle that defines a democracy. Never before, not even under Fascism and during the two world wars, has the limitation of freedom been taken to such extremes: people have been confined to their houses and, deprived of all social relationships, reduced to a condition of biological survival. This barbarity does not even spare the dead: those who die are being deprived of their right to a funeral, their bodies instead burned. Doubtless someone will rush to respond that what I'm describing is only a temporary situation, after which things will go back to how they were before. It is astonishing that anyone could say this in good faith, given that the very authorities which proclaimed the emergency endlessly remind us that, when the emergency is over, we will have to keep observing the same directives, and that 'social distancing' (as it has euphemistically been termed) will be society's new organising principle" (Agamben, 2021, p.32-33).

[435] "'Invention' in the political sphere should not be understood in a purely subjective sense. Historians know that there are, so to speak, objective conspiracies that seem to function as such without being directed by an identifiable subject. As Foucault showed before me, governments that deploy the security paradigm do not necessarily produce the state of exception, but they exploit and direct it once it occurs. I am certainly not alone in thinking that, for a totalitarian government such as China's, the epidemic was the ideal tool for confirming the possibility of isolating and controlling an entire region. And the fact that in Europe it is possible to refer to China as a model to follow only goes to show the degree of political irresponsibility to which fear has reduced us. We should also question the rather suspicious fact that the Chinese government declares the epidemic over whenever it is convenient for it to do so" (Agamben, 2021, p.24).

> affirms that we must renounce the good to save the good is as false and contradictory as that which, in order to protect freedom, imposes the renunciation of freedom.[436]

This perspective elucidates his misapprehension of Kant's interpretation of practical philosophy. Firstly, the social isolation measures implemented during the Covid-19 pandemic were designed to prevent further spread, mutation, and transmission of the virus, as well as to reduce the number of deaths. In this way, the measure had a public health justification. Secondly, Kant's philosophy entails a robust state that prioritizes justice over specific notions of the good, rather than a state that privileges one particular conception of the good over another. The concept of discipline is evident in the state, in law, and in any democracy that aspires to be just. A legitimate principle of law that regulates democracies employs discipline without massifying and fabricating subjects. A society that employs discipline as a form of coercion becomes illegitimate to the extent that it imposes a particular concept of the good life upon its citizens. Conversely, when this discipline is employed to safeguard the rights to freedom and is within a legitimate state, it not only protects but also reinforces the possibility for all individuals to exercise their freedoms. Consequently, the lockdown imposed by the state during a pandemic period can be regarded as an illustration of the appropriate utilization of a specific and temporary form of coercion (pragmatic discipline) that ensures the freedom of citizens.

It thus appears that, according to Foucault, any form of coercion is illegitimate. In contrast, Kant posits that coercion is a legitimate and necessary instrument in any state that aspires to be just. Foucault's objective was to analyze the role of external discipline in societies. In contrast, Kant's focus was on the nature of discipline itself. By comparing the two positions, it becomes evident that there is a distinction between an abusive use of discipline and its proper use. This distinction can be observed in the differences between domestication/attachment and servility, on the one hand, and self-government and reflection, on the other. Kantian educational discipline, for instance, does not aim to adapt behavior to the pleasure of others or to current social norms. Instead, it is oriented towards rationality and freedom. From Foucault's perspective, the external discipline used by the state will always be dominant.

Conversely, when we undertake a comprehensive examination of Foucault’s work and delve into its intricacies – through the care of the self – and against Foucault himself – as presented in the aforementioned passage from his course at the *College de France* on January

[436] (Agamben, 2021, p.31).

14, 1976 – to say that Foucault was against the abuse of discipline in society and in the lives of individuals, but at the same time he does not appear to be opposed to the practice of the care of the self which can be read as a type of discipline, as self-discipline. While Foucault does take up the idea of classical ethics and the analysis of the care of the self as an expression of freedom, conscious self-control, and an appropriate way of relating to oneself and others, it can be interpreted that even Foucault could agree that not every discipline is an expression of domination and oppression of subjectivity. As he himself states,

> The history of the 'care' and the 'techniques' of the self would thus be a way of doing the history of subjectivity; no longer, however, through the divisions between the mad and the nonmad, the sick and nonsick, delinquents and nondelinquents, nor through the constitution of fields of scientific objectivity giving a place to the living, speaking, laboring subject; but, rather, through the putting in place, and the transformations in our culture, of 'relations with oneself', with their technical armature and their knowledge effects. And in this way one could take up the question of governmentality from a different angle: the government of the self by oneself in its articulation with relations with others (such as one finds in pedagogy, behavior counseling, spiritual direction, the prescription of models for living, and so on).[437]

Kantian discipline and self-discipline are not a form of Christian confessional science, nor are they social disciplines that require citizens to be "decent and self-disciplined" as they are understood today. The practice of self-examination in Christian confessional science, as analyzed by Foucault, subjects individuals to mortification in this world through confession, penance, and self-flagellation. Over time, this practice has institutionalized subjectivation through uniforms and numbers. This form of positive discipline, which fosters individual and social capacities for training, is distinct from Kant's theory of discipline. It draws upon Christian pastoral techniques.

Specifically with regard to the relationship between self-discipline and care of the self, there is a similarity between Foucauldian care of the self and Kantian self-discipline. As in Kantian self-discipline, Foucault's care of the self does not seek to eliminate desire. Indeed, it would be contrary to nature for human beings to eliminate the natural power of desire. Accordingly, Foucault proposes that the regulation of the movements of the body and soul through the practice of the care of the self is the appropriate course of action. This form of self-discipline, which Foucault could accept, involves a specific kind of care of the self. The self-discipline espoused by Kantian philosophy has a negative function, namely, the overcoming of

[437] (Foucault, 1997, p.88).

obstacles posed by the despotism of desires. It is an exercise that requires continuous practice. As in the practice of the care of the self, self-discipline is necessary because to care for oneself is not to be a slave to desires; to respect oneself is to train the mind, body, and soul.[438] For Foucault, the capacity for self-awareness is a prerequisite for the perception of the world and the comprehension of the ways in which power relations affect all individuals; It is through this process of awakening and awareness that individuals can transform these harmful and oppressive power relations. "[T]he risk of dominating others and exercising a tyrannical power over them arises precisely only when one has not taken care of the self and has become the slave of one's desires".[439] In his analysis of the care of the self, Foucault does not rely on self-interested acts or an individualistic conception that excludes the other. In contrast, Foucault posits that the care of the self is a means of relating to oneself and to others in a manner that allows for the exercise of freedom[440] in a continuous process of self-cultivation, which entails a distinctive form of self-discipline.

In contrast, while Kant's self-discipline is similar to Foucault's care of the self, Foucault's proposal differs from Kant's in that it is not based on a moral teleology and is not subordinated to universal morality. These two interpretative presuppositions of Kant's theory of discipline make its misuse and abuse theoretically and normatively impossible. Although Foucault's concept of the care of the self may be a means of regulating and limiting the abuse of power, it is not based on a moral teleological perspective. Instead, it is grounded in the art of self-government, self-care, and the pursuit of self-control. This lack of a guiding principle and

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[438] "I think that insofar as freedom for the Greeks signifies nonslavery – which is quite a different definition of freedom from our own – the problem is already entirely political. It is political in that nonslavery to others is a condition: a slave has no ethics. Freedom is thus inherently political. And it also has a political model insofar as being free means not being a slave to oneself and one's appetites, which means that with respect to oneself one establishes a certain relationship of domination, of mastery, which was called *arkhe*, or power, command" (Foucault, 1997, p.286-287).

[439] (Foucault, 1997, p.288).

[440] In this regard, Sousa Filho (2008) analyzes the care of the self and its relationship with freedom. For him, freedom is a persistent theme in Foucault's work. He states that: "But what freedom is it? To be free from what? Is it possible to constitute the subject without subjection? For Foucault, this implies the transformation of the subject as an object of knowledge, an object of its own truth, with freedom being constructed in a process, in a life constructed in the way each person determines. Thus, in the paths he chooses to follow – no matter where he ends up – and what's more, in the choice itself is what freedom is, the subject will build his life as he decides, but creating the conditions for coexistence with the other, because there can be no freedom only in the subject, but experienced by him in relations with everyone else" (Sousa Filho, 2008, p.18 – own translation). It is in this freedom in constant construction found in the care of the self that the subject finds an orientation for his action. The care of the self is not a self-interested action for privileges or power, but a philosophical exercise, an aesthetic of existence. According to Sousa Filho (2008), the freedom of the care of the self "can only be experienced as such if it is an ethical-moral experience of the subject in their own truth, an experience that is always singular and non-transferable. Freedom in thought, freedom in independent movements of the soul, without final liberation" (Sousa Filho, 2008, p.19 – own translation). Therefore, the care of the self is a type of philosophical asceticism whose function is to constitute oneself as a subject of ethical action.

defined end can give rise to internal and external conflicts. The domination of desire by the mere domination of desire, following a self-given rule for the sake of following it, does not guarantee that this domination or this rule is good in itself, that it has a moral and autonomous purpose.

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Given the explanation above, it can be argued that, unlike Arendt's and Foucault's accounts, Kant's theory of discipline – rooted in moral teleology – yields entirely different conclusions about the formation of subjectivity and the processes of thinking, judging, and acting in the world. In the debate with Foucault, it was concluded also that: (i) Foucault posits that discipline functions as a repeated disciplinary action that leads to a behavioral norm. In contrast, Kant, unlike Foucault, conceptualizes discipline as a free and self-imposed habit that facilitates the construction of subjectivity. This is particularly evident in the reinforcement of the capacity to act in accordance with maxims. Human beings striving to fulfill the duty of self-improvement can cultivate self-discipline to develop habits [*Fertigkeit*] that enhance skills, empowering them to become free agents; (ii) Foucault postulates that discipline imposes rules and assigns a unique status, thereby massifying the subject and exerting a direct influence on the production of personal identity. Foucault asserts that the modern subject is a synthesis of despotic and disciplined reason. This interpretation diverges from Kant's, as he posits that discipline does not result in the massification of subjects but rather plays a role in the formation of character and moral character; (iii) Foucault reports that disciplinary power exerts violence, however minimal, for example through the principle of panopticon. In contrast to the panoptic self-discipline found in disciplinary society, Kant's self-discipline is agreement with oneself, it is a kind of self-control, because it helps to dominate and subordinate sensibility to reason; (iv) Foucault understands discipline as a technique of power that introduces asymmetries and excludes reciprocities. In Kant's theory of discipline, discipline is a tool that supports the participatory, plural and reciprocal exercise of citizens in the public sphere, for example, pragmatic discipline linked to civic patriotism reinforces reciprocity in the public sphere; And (v) Foucault equates self-care, as self-discipline, with moral conscience, a kind of Greek self-examination that seeks to evaluate the relationship between the self and what is represented. Unlike Foucault, for Kant, self-discipline is not the same as moral conscience; for Kant, moral conscience refers both to being a kind of court of reason and to the self-examination of one's conscience as a self-examination related to what Kant calls “substantive moral certainty”, that

is, it is a kind of self-knowledge that analyzes conscience. Moral self-discipline, in turn, is related to the moral maxims of the agent and the removal of obstacles to the moral law, and not to the attribution of guilt or absolution for the acts committed.

In turn, in the debate with Arendt, it was concluded also that: (i) For Arendt, discipline is about following rules. At first glance, we might think that this is a common point, since Kantian discipline is related to following rules, but for Kant the crucial point is that not all rules are worth following. Let's look at Kant's example of Sulla in *Anthropology*: following rules without any moral teleological presuppositions behind them made him a man who was admired for his achievements and who followed his subjective principles, but at the same time he was a bad man who was repulsive for his cruelty. In other words, discipline in Kant, unlike the concept of discipline described by Arendt, is not merely about following rules or simple obedience; it goes beyond that; (ii) For Arendt, reason has insufficient authority in the political sphere, this insufficiency is expressed in the relationship between authority and discipline, because according to her, only a few place themselves in the public sphere as citizens who subject their sensibility and affections to reason, therefore reason loses its capacity as valid for the multitude that makes up the body politic; on the other hand, for Kant, reason has authority and everyone is capable of using their reason either internally or externally in the public sphere. For Kant, reason has authority and makes it possible to share knowledge, recommendations, and guidelines for action, and can communicate content to a plurality of agents, so that this authority is sufficient to establish and justify normative criteria in the political sphere that must be followed by citizens in the public sphere; (iii) Arendt's position on the concept of authority can give rise to a type of authority that is incompatible with normativity and that makes external discipline in terms of "following imposed rules" dangerous in its external, coercive, and political function; for Kant, on the other hand, the authority of reason is compatible with normativity and the theory of discipline, be it theoretical and/or practical, because it provides a normative standard for guiding action in the world; (iv) for Arendt, thinking is not necessarily linked to determining criteria for how we should act or how we should judge events in the world. In other words, Arendt attributes unrestricted freedom to the faculty of thought, which generally allows thought to be relieved of the function of providing normative answers for practical life. In contrast to this position, there is no unrestricted freedom in Kant's theory of discipline, because if thought wants to externalize itself, that is, if it wants to be communicable in the public sphere, it needs a method and normative criteria; And (v) For Arendt, the activity of thinking is linked to moral conscience. According to Arendt, once there is a refusal to think,

moral conscience loses its place in moral deliberation. Like Arendt, Kant understands that moral conscience is linked to the faculty of thinking and judging, but unlike Arendt, for Kant a refusal to think does not cause moral conscience to lose its place in deliberation, because moral conscience is a natural predisposition of the reason of all human beings, and when it comes to the examination of actions that have already taken place, moral conscience speaks to the agent involuntarily and inevitably. But even if we think only from Arendt's point of view, we still need Kant's discipline to remedy this concern about "moral consciousness losing its place in deliberation", since the refusal to think is the absence of self-discipline. Moral conscience, as Kant understands it, can play its role more easily with the implementation of the theory of discipline, because the agent, committed to his duties, will exercise his self-discipline in order to come closer and closer to the ideal of practical reason, that is, to be under moral laws. Moreover, since moral discipline is linked to maxims, it can support the function of moral conscience as a tribunal.

Kant's theory of discipline is therefore fundamental to Kant's work, but also to philosophy and the history of philosophy. Even authors such as Foucault and Arendt, who in their accounts have highlighted the problems of the abuse of discipline, could agree with the position taken here that: (i) the art of governing oneself, or self-discipline, is fundamental to the individual and political spheres, so Foucault and Kant would agree that political virtue is acquired through self-culture or, in Kant's words, self-discipline, which involves, for example, mastering passions and affections, setting limits to oneself, and being able to respect and set limits to others; and as for Arendt and Kant, we can say that both would agree that (ii) in matters of politics and morality there is no obedience without consent. This statement necessarily implies understanding that Arendt opposes thinking for oneself to absolute and blind obedience, so the relationship between self-discipline and thinking is necessary because thinking for oneself requires self-discipline, and furthermore, it is in the relationship between self-discipline and judgment that reflection comes into play and avoids blind obedience, the non-submission of reason to totalitarian ideologies, because judgment guides decision-making in the political sphere because it requires us to understand ourselves and to strive to understand those whose point of view we do not share. In response to Arendt's concerns, Kant might reply that the absence of thinking for oneself is not a lack of ability or capacity, but rather a lack of self-discipline. In other words, rehabilitating the concept of discipline within the practical and political spheres in Kant's work, and for philosophy as a whole, is of utmost importance.

3.3.1 Discipline as an alternative to the problem of social irrationality

Therefore, one can observe that one of Foucault's and Arendt's primary concerns is that discipline effectively precludes the possibility of human beings being free. This is because discipline, when employed politically and socially, is frequently utilized as a power technique or as a reinforcement of hierarchies that domesticate and address agents, thereby generating a type of obedience to external authorities. This, in turn, hinders the possibility of individuals being autonomous and reflective agents. This concern is legitimate, and Foucault, Arendt, and Kant agree on this. Furthermore, as presented in this doctoral dissertation, Kant's theory of discipline is not only distinct from these other notions of discipline but also satisfactorily addresses the concerns of Foucault and Arendt, as well as other philosophers and critical theorists who follow in the wake of Foucault and Arendt. In order to illustrate the return to Kant's philosophy and especially the use of his theory of discipline in contemporary times, I will now address the problem of social irrationality present discipline as a solution for this problem. This example aims to elucidate that in addition to self-discipline, other uses of discipline are also necessary in society and politics. Kant's theory of discipline does not, in any way, lead to a disciplinary society or even less to totalitarian regimes. Rather, it is a means for agents to achieve individual and collective enlightenment.

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For Kant, reason has authority. Critics of the Enlightenment project, whether contemporary communitarians or postmodernists, rely on the apparent failure of the Enlightenment to defend the standards of reason. According to them, this project criticizes, attacks, and destroys other authorities such as church, state, and tradition, but it is nothing more than a false authority; reason and its foundation do not have the authority they seek. As O'Neill (2015) points out, the suspicion of the authority of reason and its many critiques are particularly threatening, not to the Enlightenment project, but to the critics of the Enlightenment themselves, because they raise the possibility that anything can be considered a justification of reason. As O'Neill states,

> This line of attack is sometimes formulated as a trilemma. Any supposed vindication of the principles of reason would have to establish the authority of certain fundamental constraints on thinking or acting. However, this could only be done one of three ways. A supposed vindication could appeal to the presumed principles of reason that it aims to vindicate – but would then be circular, so fail as vindication. Alternatively it might be based on other starting points: but then the supposed principles of reason would lack reasoned vindication, so could not themselves bequeath unblemished pedigrees. Finally, as a poor third option, a vindication of reason might hat reasoning issues in uncompletable regress, so that prospects of vindicating any claim, including claims to identify principles of reason, never terminate: To reason is only to keep the door open to further questioning. In each case the desired vindication eludes. These unpromising thoughts lend some appeal to Pascalian faith, to Humean naturalism or even to postures of postmodernity as responses to the challenge of scepticism about reason.[441]

In contrast to those contemporary positions that "reject the authority of reason", for Kant it is reason that legitimates the basis of knowledge and practical judgments: such as moral questions, questions of justice, and the fairness of political and institutional arrangements. By situating Kant's theory of reason in the contemporary context, we have democracies as a good example for thinking about how the theory of reason can be used to investigate, for example, the problem of social irrationality. It is generally agreed that in constitutional democracies, the conscience and public relevance of certain issues should be open to debate and contestation. Therefore, in order to prevent social irrationality from invading public spheres, political agents must act through normative standards that serve as criteria for communicating thought, judgment, and action. To do this, individuals must have as a precondition the idea of changing their point of view, just as Kant suggests that when using reason it is necessary to change the point of view, in this case from the theoretical to the practical, or even when differentiating the uses of reason (private and public), it is understood that in the public sphere the individual, when placing himself/herself in the role of citizen, must have: (i) a change of perspective, and (ii) the use of the self-discipline of reason as a tool to assist in this complex process of deliberation, judgment, and decision to act.

Within the context of democratic societies, one can define the social rationality, investigated for practical purposes, as the area dedicated to defining the most appropriate means for achieving social ends and the realization of certain values with the function of identifying obstacles, investigating them, and defining how to overcome them, social irrationality besides being its opposite – that is, the thoughtlessness that makes the proper use of social rationality

[441] (O'Neill, 2015, p.13-14).

impossible – is also understood as a set of tendencies that compromise the sources of objective knowledge and corrupt moral action.

Therefore, it is necessary to think of ways to understand and avoid social irrationality, since its unfoldings affect society, politics, science, law, and morality. Kant, in his theoretical philosophy, proposes the philosophical method as a way to avoid error and illusion; analogously, this method is able to avoid some of the effects of social irrationality, such as negationism and mysticism. In turn, in practical philosophy, Kant proposes enlightenment and autonomy as making us capable of avoiding moral corruption. In both fields of analysis, Kantian discipline is fundamental to avoid the effects of social irrationality. Thus, we propose to analyze and demonstrate how Kantian discipline theory can be an alternative to solve the problem of social irrationality in contemporary democracies.

Social irrationality is a problem to avoid because it results in many dammages. In Brazil, unfortunately, we have numerous examples of how social irrationality can be used as a tool to destabilize democratic institutions and discredit objective knowledge: (i) the use of *fake news* as a tool for social control and mass disinformation generated on 08/01/2023 an attack and depredation of the National Congress, the Planalto Palace and the Supreme Court in Brasilia, the capital of Brazil; (ii) the refusal of scientific objectivity on issues such as the use of a vaccine to combat Covid-19 generated numerous preventable deaths. It can be seen, therefore, that social irrationality is not only an individual act that generates collective consequences, but it is also a tool for power and manipulation. Irrationality can be interpreted in several ways, because besides being a concept it can also be read as a conception that encompasses countless areas. We can quickly define it as the opposite of rationality. To be irrational is not to be rational, or it is also defined as the possibility of the human being to *make improper use* of his rational faculty. But this definition does not address the complexity of this concept. For the purposes of my research, taking into consideration my thematic cut, I define social irrationality as voluntary irreflection, refusal to the normative standards of reason, and lack of epistemological clarity. By voluntary irreflection is meant the deliberate act of choosing not to reflect critically on public matters. In turn, the refusal of normative standards of reason is taken as the refusal of procedures regulating discourse and debate in the public sphere. And finally, by lack of epistemological clarity is meant the confusion between what Kant, in *KrV*, distinguished as *opinion*, *faith*, and *knowledge*.

For O'Neill, Kant's critique of reason is also a defense of reason and reasoning. Kant advocates for the nature and limits of the authority of reason, and he does so with two ideas:

> The first thought is that reasoning is fundamentally practical: it aims to provide standards or norms that thought, action and communication can (but often fail to) meet. The second thought is that norms of reasoning must be followable by others: they must be norms that can be used by a plurality of agents.[442]

These two ideas allow for a minimal justification of the principles of reason, since they show that the standards to be met must offer or receive, reject or accept, reconsider or revise the proposals for action, for truth claims, and for attempts at communication, thus taking into account the other and plurality.

According to O'Neill, since communication and reasoning are no longer justified by a shared plan or by other types of authority, it is necessary to understand *the circumstances of reasoning* in order to account for the plurality of agents and their positions, since they disagree with each other. Therefore, people must at least be able to give each other reasons for accepting or believing their statements and for following proposed courses of action. In turn, these reasons must be presented in such a way that others can follow them in thought or adopt them for action. This means taking into account the persons' position and the possibility that they can rationally accept a position different from his or her own.

> So the basic thought is simply that we do not even offer reasons for belief unless we aim to be intelligible to them, and do not even offer reasons for action unless we make proposals that they could take up. Norms of reasoning, as Kant sees them, articulate necessary conditions for the possibility of sharing knowledge, of recommending or coordinating action, and of communicating content among a plurality of agents whose agreement is not presupposed.[443]

From O'Neill's perspective, the authority of reason is tied not only to the explanation of the relationship between the subject and its ability to offer reasons to others, but above all to the discipline and guidance that reason provides for knowledge, action, and interpretation.

The use of proper reason and its faculty of reflection may be a possible tool for trying to avoid of social irrationality as willful irreflection. Critical reflection is the Kantian critical enterprise of putting judgments under *examination* – the analysis of foundations and presuppositions. Kant in *Critique of Pure Reason*, states

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[442] (O'Neill, 2015, p.2).
[443] (O'Neill, 2015, p.3).

> [...] all judgments, indeed all comparisons, require a reflection, i.e., a distinction of the cognitive power to which the given concepts belong. The action through which I make the comparison of representations in general with the cognitive power in which they are situated, and through which I distinguish whether they are to be compared to one another as belonging to the pure understanding or to pure intuition, I call **transcendental reflection**.[444]

Analogously to the *Transcendental Reflection* presented by Kant, in KrV, I propose, in the present thesis, the *Social Critical Reflection* as the deliberate rational activity capable of generating: (i) self-reflection about the foundations given by the agent himself, in order to know at what level of discussion such judgments are, whether they are mere beliefs or arguments/reasoning, that is, the determination of to which place these judgments belong. And (ii) a reflection about the arguments/reasons publicly presented by others, examining their content and their capacity to be plural and universalizable. *Social Critical Reflection* aims at the capacity of self-correction of the assumptions that sustain the reasons publicly given so that it is possible to "clean" them of mysticisms and prejudices. It is emphasized that, just as *Transcendental Reflection*, *Social Critical Reflection* is not a mere logical comparison between concepts, analogously, *Social Critical Reflection* does not serve only to purchase judgments and reasons, because if it did one could not affirm that some reasons are better than others. It is the means to distinguish the influence of beliefs and preconceptions on public reasons that have a claim to universality and that have plurality as their point of arrival.[445]

In turn, the refusal of normative standards of reason as another face of social irrationality can be neutralized by the pragmatic discipline, while the lack of epistemological clarity is neutralized by the theoretical discipline. In the former case, the normative standards of reason are necessary for there to be a dialogue among citizens and for this dialogue to result in social agendas. In this context, we agree with O'Neill that reason is free, since it is not subordinated to any other authority except that given by itself. But stating that reason is free does not mean that it is unstructured and undisciplined. Kant as a systematic philosopher had the critical enterprise of justifying reason and showing how reasoning is capable of providing standards and norms to be used not only for thought, but also for action and communication. These

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[444] (KrV, B 317).

[445] This function of *Social Critical Reflection* is analogous to the function of *Transcendental Reflection* presented by Kant in *Critique of Pure Reason*. "[...] in pure judgments a priori this must happen through transcendental reflection, through which (as already shown) Every representation is assigned its place in the faculty of cognition proper to it, and hence also the influence of the latte is distinguished from it" (KrV, B 351).

standards are drawn from the relationship between the uses of reason and practical discipline and have a universal scope, capable of encompassing the plurality of agents. These standards make it possible to justify principles "or norms of reason by showing that they are standards that must be met if we are to offer or receive, accept or reject, revise or reconsider one another's proposals for acting, for truth claims, or for attempts to communicate".[446]

This means that we find in the Kantian critical enterprise norms of reasoning capable of being shared. In the second case, it is necessary to have epistemological clarity about the foundation of the norms. There are theoretical foundations, which we can find in KrV, and there are practical foundations that we find in political texts in which Kant addresses issues such as the importance of the principle of publicity, for without it there would be no democratic legitimacy. In KrV, Kant emphasizes the distinction between *opinion*, *faith* and *knowledge*[447] and states that judgments can be valid for everyone, but for this, they need to be subjectively and objectively sufficient. According to Kant, *opinion* has both subjectively and objectively insufficient validity. *Faith* has sufficient subjective validity but is objectively insufficient. In turn, *knowledge* has both objective and subjective validity. These distinctions presented by Kant, which are circumscribed in the debate about the empirical and transcendental use of reason about the concepts of *faith*, can be used to question in constitutional democracies which are the foundations of the reasons presented in the public debate. Are these reasons founded on *opinion*, *faith*, or *knowledge*? Do they have sufficient objective validity? What can be considered reasons? Is social irrationality expressed in the public sphere when agents use reasons that are subjectively valid for them – be it opinion or faith – but objectively insufficient for others, that is, when agents use reasons based on *opinions* that have a claim to objective validity? Do radical critiques that threaten enlightenment and reason – or their justification – serve as more promising philosophical positions, or do they merely reinforce the evils occasioned by social irrationality? In view of the above, we can rehearse answers to these questions based on the following common assumption, whether in the theoretical or the practical realm, whether about error or irrationality, the problem lies in confusing subjective grounds for judgment with objective grounds.

O'Neill, in the wake of Kant, states that to reason is to use one's capacities and resources, however limited, to construct "claims and standards, institutions and practices, without depending on claims and standards that have only the backing of happenstantial 'authorities' –

[446] (O'Neill, 2015, p.2).
[447] (KrV, B 848).

such as church or state, ‘common sense’ or personal preference – that some accept but others reject”.[448] Reasons must be grounded in reasoning capable of being understood, accepted or rejected by others, for this requires individuals to put themselves in the position of agents and construct *good reasons*.

Consequently, the theory of discipline is indispensable for conceptualizing the pervasive issues that characterize contemporary society. It offers an alternative to the challenges currently facing us in all spheres and levels of society. As developed in this section and throughout the doctoral dissertation, Kant's theory of discipline is not only fundamental but also necessary for the implementation of Kant's moral theory. In other words, it is necessary for the exercise of autonomy. It does not result in the domestication of bodies; rather, it facilitates the formation of human beings as moral agents and active citizens, capable of self-regulation and interpersonal interaction, and of living with diversity and engaged in the pursuit of a more just and dignified world.

[448] (O’Neill, 2015, p.4).

CONCLUSION

The faculty of judgment is essential for the development of rationality and autonomy. Indeed, when it is absent, individuals may become irrational and obedient to external authority, leading to a lack of self-reflection and a tendency to remain in a minority that is harmful to oneself and others. In contrast, the discipline of Kant's theory represents the path to autonomy. We concur with Herman (1993) that it is essential to illustrate the practical significance of autonomy and rationality in comprehending the nature of the agent. This does not necessitate the assumption that we are wholly, ideally, or essentially rational from a moral standpoint.

> As we are practical agents – human agents – we are constituted by our needs, our interests, our beliefs, and our connections to others. Different aspects of our agency will be peculiar to our 'natural' condition, our social circumstances, and our particular histories. We will be free human agents – ones whose actions express autonomy – as the actual conditions of our agency allow us to deliberate and act according to a conception of the Good that is constructed not only by moral requirements but also by the pursuit and critical attention to interests that we understand to be part of a good life.[449]

In the *Doctrine of the Method*, in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, Kant provides compelling evidence that a culture of reason can develop through the pursuit of moral excellence. In his moral project, Kant recognizes the significance of deliberation and judgment, as well as the authority of reason. Kant conceives of the human being not as a purely moral being, but as a being composed of sensibility and desire. Kant's faculty of judgment and the theory of discipline are not yet the pure interest in morality, but they can assist the agent in becoming aware and exercising their autonomy.

In *Kant's Impure Ethics* (2011), Louden posits that Kant's ethical theory is divided into two parts: a pure part, which he is adamant about, and a second part, which deals with the application of the first part. This is what Louden calls Kant's impure ethics. It is part of the field of practical anthropology, the realm of applied moral philosophy, and it is impure because it does not deal with principles, but with human nature and the empirical. Many philosophers before Kant believed that the investigation of human beings was irrelevant to a moral theory. However, according to Louden (2011), both pure and impure (empirical) investigations are

[449] (Herman, 1993, p.207).

necessary and complementary in understanding ethics. We concur with Louden that Kant's objective was to implement his moral theory. Kant himself states in *Grounding for the metaphysics of morals* that although moral philosophy concerns itself with what ought to occur, it also considers the circumstances under which substantial moral laws do not manifest.

> Natural and moral philosophy, on the contrary, can each have an empirical part. The former has to because it must determine the laws of nature as an object of experience, and the latter because it must determine the will of man insofar as the will is affected by nature. The laws of the former are those according to which everything does happen, while the laws of the latter are those according to which everything ought to happen, although these moral laws also consider the conditions under which what ought to happen frequently does not.[450]

It is assumed that applied moral philosophy, or moral anthropology, does not only deal with the *strictly* empirical side of Kant's ethical project. The project of moralization with which the theory of discipline is associated is as much part of the implementation of Kant's moral theory as it is part of his normative theory, because at the same time as it deals with issues in the external sphere of the individual, it deals with issues in the internal sphere. For instance, moral self-discipline cannot be empirically observed or externally imposed. Conversely, pragmatic discipline can be observed, given that it has an external aspect. Consequently, the discipline theory represents a synthesis of the two distinct categories: the pure and the non-pure. It is a requisite of reason, though it is not yet conceptualized as autonomy. The theory of discipline is situated within both the normative and implementation spheres of Kant's philosophical framework. In the introduction to the *Critique of Pure Reason,* Kant makes room for this "gray area" when he explains that there is "an *a priori* proposition that is not pure". He makes the following statement:

> In the sequel therefore we will understand by *a priori* cognitions not those that occur independently of this or that experience, but rather those that occur *absolutely* independently of all experience. Opposed to them are empirical cognitions, or those that are possible only *a posteriori*, i.e., through experience. **Among *a priori* cognitions, however, those are called pure with which nothing empirical is intermixed. Thus, e.g., the proposition 'Every alteration has its cause' is an *a priori* proposition, only not pure, since alteration is a concept that can be drawn only from experience**.[451]

[450] (GMS, AA 04:387-388).
[451] (KrV, B 2-3 – own emphasis).

In this passage, Kant makes a distinction between pure and empirical knowledge. He states that while experience is a necessary starting point for knowledge, not all knowledge originates from experience.[452] That which has *a posteriori* source is called empirical knowledge, while that which has its sources independent of experience and sense impressions is called *a priori*. According to the above passage, the *a priori* can be non-pure. When we apply this line of reasoning to the methodological spheres of the debate on the moralization project that requires the theory of discipline, we can conclude that it is part of both the sphere of the implementation of Kant's moral theory and the sphere of Kant's moral theory, which is normative and *a priori*. This is because although it is not autonomy, it is a necessary condition and an exercise compatible with autonomy, and is therefore a way of achieving it.

In light of this, I concur with the position of Schneewind (1998) in *The Invention of Autonomy*, who posits that Kantian assumptions about the human condition can still be regarded as valid today. The human condition is expressed by the fact of unsociable sociability, the existence of a plurality of creeds and religions, the variability of conceptions of happiness, the need to build socially recognized norms and behaviors to promote peaceful coexistence and ever greater fairness. Conversely, it is evident that numerous issues are no longer aligned with Kant's perspective, given the absence of unchanging historical and cultural truths. Cultural discourses and social values are inherently linked to historical contexts. Consequently, they may initially restrict human beings to a specific context of thought. The detachment from tradition and the potential for critical-reflexive expansion, both individual and collective, can be achieved through education and the application of theories that support the pursuit of autonomy. Despite certain inconsistencies Kantian philosophy remains a valuable resource for contemporary thought. There are difficulties that agents encounter in the relationship between moral ideas and the world/reality. Kantian philosophy offers a path for reflection and a solution to many current questions, as has been demonstrated throughout the thesis.

According to Kant, human beings are animals capable of acting in accordance with the representation of laws. They must consider themselves capable of submitting their impulses to practical reason. Furthermore, they must be able to remove the obstacles that influence action that is contrary to duty. The removal of these obstacles is the responsibility of discipline. The theory of discipline plays a role in the relationship between the principle of evaluation and the principle of execution. It is a necessary, though not sufficient, tool between normative ethics

[452] "There is no doubt whatever that all our cognition begins with experience; [...] But although all our cognition commences with experience, yet it does not on that account all arise from experience" (KrV, B 1-2).

and applied ethics. Consequently, Kant's theory of discipline, as demonstrated throughout the thesis, is indispensable for his normative theory. In this thesis, I have sought to demonstrate how a reconciliation between discipline and autonomy is possible and how it offers an alternative to contemporary problems. This theory is fundamental for a more complete interpretation of Kant's system and for the implementation of his *moral project.* According to Kant, "[i]t is obvious that between theory and practice there is required, besides, a middle term connecting them and providing a transition from one to the other, no matter how complete a theory may be [...]".[453] The implementation of the Kantian project of moralization, which is linked to rational practical thought, rational practical judgment, and rational practical action, necessitates discipline because it is the discipline of reason that human beings, in all their maxims, must not forget.

Consequently, I have endeavored to illustrate *how* the theory of discipline is an integral component of this interpretative framework for fostering the conditions of possibility for moralization, which is the transformation of society into a moral whole. In this manner, moral development, which is a prerequisite for reason and Kant's moral theory, is interpreted as moral progress. In other words, Kant's theory of discipline is not only formulated to highlight the importance of this concept in Kant's system, but also to demonstrate that it is a tool that supports the practicability of the moral will. Once the obstacles to the realization of the moral end in the world have been identified, the theory of discipline serves as a means of achieving autonomy, as it is a means of exercising reason. The theory of discipline, which is based on a practical teleology that encompasses the theoretical, moral, and pragmatic (juridical and pedagogical) spheres, is not only part of Kant's critical system but also plays a fundamental role in broader Kantian moral theory. The theory of discipline, by being responsible for removing the obstacles of desire, is a necessary tool for the development of the culture of reason. The culture of discipline can be considered a preliminary exercise in moral exercises, in the construction of moral character. It is through this exercise that a pure moral interest and its realization in the world can be exercised, little by little.

[453] (TP, AA 08:275).

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